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STATEMENT OF 
R. DENNIS ICKES 
ON BEhALF OF 
DUChESNE AND UINTAH COUNTIES, UTAH 
TO 
TriE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS 
FLAGSTAFF, ARIZONA 
August 14, 1987 
Ad<U 
Mr. Chairman and members of the Civil Rights 
Commission, my name is R. Dennis Ickes. JE have been requested 
by the Boards of County Commissioners for Duchesne and Uintah 
Counties, Utah, to appear before you today on their behalf. 
Each Board of County Commissioners consists of three members 
who are elected from among the eligible voters of the County, 
whether Indian or non-Indian, and whether tribal member or 
non-tribal member. 
I have haa extensive personal experience concerning 
the subject which is being reviewed by th$ Commission. I 
served as the first Deputy Director of th^ Office of Indian 
Rights within the Department of Justice fr|om 1973-74. 
Thereafter, I served as the Director of that office from 
1974-76. From 1976-77, I was Deputy Undensecretary of the 
Interior. In each of these positions, I c^ ealt directly with 
the issues of individual rights as they interacted with the 
rights of tribal governments. After leaving the federal 
service in 1977, I have practiced law in the West where I have 
either been involvea in or aware of many olf these same issues. 
I hope that I can convey to you tne need to make 
aajustments in existing law so as to, on the one hano, protect 
and enhance tribal sovereignty, and, on th£ other hand, better 
protect the rights of individuals whom are subject to that 
sovereignty. Such adjustments in the law $hould be grounded 
upon the principle that the consent of the governed is required 
before an entity is empowered to impose it^ will upon others. 
Aid I. 
The county commissioners of Duchesne and Uintah 
Counties nave airectea me to appear before you today as their 
representative to share with you their perceptions of the 
problems arising out of tne Santa Clara pueblo v. Martinez 
decision ana a recent decision of the 10th Circuit Court of 
Appeals1 in State of Utah, et al. v. Utah Indian Tribe, 773 
F.2d 1087 (10th Cir. 1985). 
It is not the Counties' purpose today to argue their 
legal differences with the Ute Tribe in 4ny pending or future 
cases. The Counties are not seeking to Have Congress redraw 
the boundaries of the Uintah or the Uncoi^pahgre Reservations. 
Instead, it is the Counties1 purpose to make this Commission 
aware of what is happening and what is li|kely to happen within 
the bounaaries of tne Ute reservation reqognizea by the 10th 
Circuit Court of Appeals. Further, it isi the Counties1 purpose 
to propose a means for resolving the chaols ana unfairness that 
has arisen from the decision. 
Unfortunately, it is not legally possible for the 
United States, the State, the Counties, ahd the Tribe to 
resolve the problems created by the 10th Circuit's decision 
among themselves without the assistance of the Congress. 
Unless the Congress provides the requested legislative 
assistance, the only remaining recourse w}ll be for the 
Counties, the Ute Tribe, the Counties' residents, and tribal 
members to litigate at great expense and ]Joss of time each and 
every consequence of the 10th Circuit's decision. The Counties 
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believe that there is sufficient goodwill between and among the 
federal, state, local and tribal governments to work out a 
jointly arrived at solution if they have %he legislative and 
financial means from Congress to do so. 
STATISTICAL BACKGROUNb 
Duchesne County is the twelfth largest county and 
Uintah County is the sixth largest county of Utah's 29 
counties. Duchesne County consists of 2,086,400 acres ana 
3,260 square miles. Uintah County consists of 2,856,320 acres 
and 4,476 square miles. The 1986 census Showed a population ot 
approximately 13,500 resiaents in Duchesne County ana 24,000 
residents in Uintah County. Approximately 17,000 residents of 
these two Counties and approximately 70% df all fee land are 
encompassed by the 10th Circuit1 s defined CJte Reservation. 
Duchesne County's population consists of approximately 
13,200 non-Indians and approximately 300 Indians, 
Approximately 50% of the total population reside within the 
incorporated towns of Duchesne, Altamont, jyiyton, Tabiona, and 
Roosevelt. None of these incorporated tov^ ns was consiaerea to 
be locatea within the pre-lOth Circuit Ute Reservation 
bounaaries. After the 10th Circuit's aeci|sion, all ot the 
major incorporated areas are considered to be located within 
the Ute Reservation. 
Uintah County's population consists of approximately 
22,048 non-Indians and 1,952 Indians. The principle cities and 
towns affected by the 10th Circuit's decision are Tridell, 
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Lapoint and Ballard which have a combined population of 
approximately 5,000 residents who are predominantly non-Indian. 
Both Counties' Indian population almost entirely 
reside upon lands hela in trust by the United States for their 
individual or tribal benefit. The Indian population consists 
primarily ot members of the Ute Tribef butJ there are some 
persons who are members of other Indian tribes or are racially 
Ute, but are not enrolled in the Ute Tribe|. It is impossible 
to distinguish tribal members from non-tri|bal member Indians, 
except through an examination of the tribal membership books 
and records. 
Approximately 90% of Duchesne County's population 
resides within a 30-mile wide strip that traverses the County 
from east to west. The Duchesne County area north of the strip 
consists primarily of the Ashley National Forest, and the area 
south of the strip is largely comprised of the Ashley National 
Forest ana high mountain country which is sparsely settled. 
Duchesne County is semi-arid oesejrt or primitive 
forest land. The County is known for its high mountain lakes 
and spectacular scenery and attracts thousands of visitors each 
year. 
Both Counties' economic base relics upon tourism, oil 
and gas production and ranching. Future economic development 
in the Counties may include tar sands, oil shale, water 
development through the Central Utah Project and other natural 
resource related enterprises. 
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Presently, both Counties and the State have a number 
of business incentives to attract economic activity, including 
a lack of an inventory tax, utilization of industrial revenue 
bonds, industrial parks, favorable energy rates, and a 
broad-based tax structure. 
An extensive wilderness area known as the High Uintas 
Primitive Area, consisting of 73,000 acres at 13,528 feet above 
sea level, including Kings Peak, the highest point in Utah, and 
many accessible recreational areas, is spread over both 
Counties. Uintah County also is home to Dinosaur National 
Monument, flaming Gorge National Recreatioiji Area, and numerous 
lakes. The Ute Tribe's Bottle Hollow Resort is within Duchesne 
County. 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The Utes originally dwelled within portions of Utah, 
Colorado, and northern New Mexico where th^y relied upon 
hunting and gathering for food. Europeans identified seven 
bands of Ute people, of whom three bands npw reside in the 
Duchesne and Uintah County areas. The Ute people had various 
contacts with the Spanish, the explorers, adventurers, mountain 
men, and trappers. These were followea by the Mormon pioneers 
in the mia-1800s. Conflicts eventually occurred between the 
Utes and the Mormon settlers and by the 18^0s the traditional 
solution of Indian removal was again implemented by the United 
States government. The area acceptable to the United States 
and to Governor Brigham Young was the Uint4h Basin. President 
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Lincoln designated the Uintah basin as a Reservation by the 
Executive Order ot October 3f 1861. A treaty was thereafter 
signed by the Utes and Governor Young upoji the representation 
that the Uintah Basin would become the Ut£ reservation. 
However, this treaty was rejected by the United States Senate. 
For the next four years, as a result of the Senate's 
rejection of the treaty that had been accepted by the Utes, the 
Black Hawk War was waged between the Mormon settlers and the 
Utes. The territorial militia eventually defeated the Utes. 
Under the leadership of Chief Tabby, who favored peace, the 
Utes were removed to the Uintah Valley. 
In 1875, the federal government purveyed the first 
boundary for the Uintah Valley Reservation. In 1888, Congress 
mandated that a 7,040 acre strip of lano hfe declared to be 
public lands of the United States and restored to the public 
domain. This act of Congress began a series of actions by the 
Congress, the President, and the Secretary of the Interior to 
affect the Ute's reservation. The effects of those actions are 
the subject of litigation brought by the Tjribe against the 
State of Utah, the Counties and the citie^. The Counties 
intend that the courts determine these iss|ues. 
LITIGATION BACKGROUND 
In October 1975, the Ute Tribe si^ ed the State and the 
Counties seeking to establish the reservation boundaries in 
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approximately their original location. Approximately twelve 
years later, those boundaries were fixed qs described in the 
map attached as Exhibit "A". 
The 10th Circuit's decision is orie of the most drastic 
ana far-reaching decisions ever handed dowjn affecting the State 
it has quadrupled 
broke of a pen, 
n the Unitea States; 
b and the Counties1 
State, and the 
iae from most of the 
ot Utah ana its subdivisions in that: (1) 
the size of an Inaian reservation with a s 
making it the secona largest reservation 1 
(2) it has dramatically slashed the State1 
tax base; (3) it has placed the Tribe, the 
Counties into direct competition for reven 
same lands, property and people; (4) it hab subjected 
approximately 17,000 people who are not members of the Ute 
Tribe and their property to tribal controll for many civil 
matter; (5) it has deprived those same 18,|)00 people of federal 
court oversight review of tribal government actions; (6) it has 
deprivea non-Ute tribal members of the riglfit to vote and 
otherwise participate in the government thkt asserts 
jurisdiction over them; (7) it has ousted £tate concurrent 
jurisoiction in many instances; ana, (b) iji essence, has placed 
the fate of the Counties' residents in theihands of 
approximately 450 tribal voters who currently vote in tribal 
elections. 
Prior to the filing of the lawsuit by the Ute Tribe, 
there had been a multi-decade and long-standing recognition by 
the United States, the State of Utah, the (pounties, and other 
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political subdivisions, that the Ute Reservation consisted of 
The Ute lribe, as 
of the Comprehensive 
approximately 1,000,000 acres of territory 
late as immediately prior to its enactment 
Law and Order Code in 1975, had accepted that designated area 
as well. Thus, it was a tremendous shock to Duchesne and 
Uintah Counties when the Ute Tribe adopted a Comprehensive Law 
and Order Code in September 1975 which assorted the Tribe's 
governmental power over approximately 4,00 0,000 acres, instead 
of the 1,000,000-acre area that had been previously 
acknowledged. The Tribe currently asserts that it had 
governmental power over all residents of tjie entire 
4,QUO,000-acre area, including power over ^on-tribal members to 
the extent that the subject matter touches in some direct or 
indirect wa> upon the Tribe, its officers, agents, employees, 
property, enterprises, its members, or Indians generally. A 
portion or tnat code is attached as Exhibit "fa". 
Duchesne and Uintah Counties have legally resisted the 
Tribe's assertions at great expense through the federal 
district court in Salt Lake City, through two 10th Circuit 
Court of Appeals1 decisions, and through a Petition for 
Certiorari to the United States Supreme Coiart. 
Prior to the 10th Circuit's decision, or more 
correctly, prior to the time that the Trib^ brought suit 
against the State of Utah in 1975, there existed a somewhat 
predictable delineation of the authority between and among the 
federal, state, local and tribal governments. It was 
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uniformally accepted that the federal govej 
jurisdiction and responsibility for federa 
rnment had exclusive 
1 lands, such as the 
national forest and Bureau of Land Management administered 
servoirs, and to some 
on in certain 
lands, plus navigable rivers, lakes and re| 
extent, concurrent or exclusive jurisdicti 
instances on tribal ana individually allotted trust lands. It 
was equally accepted that the State of Utan had exclusive 
jurisdiction and responsibility for the remainder of Duchesne 
County, such as state land, school lands, fion-navigable 
streams, lakes, and reservoirs, and fee labds, but that it had 
no jurisdiction over tribal or individually allotted Indian 
trust lands. Likewise, it was understood that the Ute Tribe 
had exclusive jurisdiction over its members (and maybe Indian 
non-members), and over trust lands and trust property, but that 
its authority over non-Indians was restricted to removal 
rights. There seemed to be no dispute by ^ny government that 
the incorporated cities and towns were outride of the 
jurisdiction of the Tribe. In certain instances, the federal 
ana state governments shared concurrent jurisdiction over 
certain assimilated crimes and over certain civil matters. 
The State and the Tribe had striven to work out 
cooperative ways of accomplishing mutual gcj>als, such as 
cross-deputization and development of the (tentral Utah Project 
water pact. Sometimes these attempts to cooperate worked well, 
such as cross-deputization, and sometimes they did not, such as 
-9-
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when the Ute Tribe refused, and still continues to refuse, to 
ratify a mutually negotiated water pact wijth the Utah State 
Legislature. 
Thus, for the period preceding trie 10th Circuit's 
decision there existed a somewhat clear understanding of where 
each government stood in its authority ovejr land, people and 
property. 
Subsequent to the 10th Circuit's Idecision, the 
jurisdictional picture is chaotic and, thus, the Counties 
predict that the new situation will generate a large number of 
lawsuits aesigned by each litigant to aefine the limits of the 
particular government's authority with regard to lana, 
property, and people within 4,000,000 acres. As presently 
unaerstooa, the 10th Circuit's decision will significantly 
affect the authority of the federal government within the 
national forest, the Bureau of Land Management aaministereo 
tracts, and on the United States Fish and Wildlife administered 
lanas and waters, as well as in other areajs formerly understood 
to be federal. 
As to the State and its subdivisions, the 10th 
Circuit's decision appears to have ousted ^hem from all areas 
within the reservation where they formerly,possessed concurrent 
jurisdiction with the federal government. 
decision may have placed them into direct cpompetition with the 
Tribe to tax basically the same people for 
In addition, the 
revenue and regulate 
activities of non-tribal members residing yithin the 
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reservation on non-trust lands. Further, the decision has cast 
a pall over the authority possessed by incorporated cities ana 
towns. The aecision appears likely to severely cut back 
revenue ana revenue sources for both the State ana the County. 
While the County is required by law to continue to proviae 
extensive governmental services for all residents, its tax base 
has been greatly erodea. 
NEED FOR AN ALTERNATIVE TO LITIGATION 
Duchesne ana Uintah Counties believe that the 
judiciary is not institutionally equipped to render decisions 
that will specifically confront the jurisdictional problems 
that naturally arise out of the 10th Circuit's decision. 
Therefore, these Counties approach this hearing with the 
attitude that there must be a better way of solving the 
problems createa by the 10th Circuit's decision and the present 
state of the law concerning the Indian Civil Rights Act. 
Only Congress has the Constitutional flexibility to 
stuay the problem ana fashion legislation Ito solve or minimize 
tfte problems. The Civil Rights Commission has the mandate from 
Congress to stuay and collect information concerning legal 
developments pertaining to the civil rights of residents of the 
Unitea States and therefrom to make recommendations to the 
President ana to the Congress. 
CURRENT STATUS OF THE INDIAN CIVll L RIGHTS ACT 
Indian tribal governments are not limited in the 
exercise of their powers by the Bill of Rights, the 14th 
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Amendment, or the United States Constitution. The 1968 Indian 
Bill of Rights purportedly was enacted to restrict the tribal 
governments in many of the same ways as tpe Bill of Rights 
restricts the federal government. However/ the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, )l36 U.S. 49 (1978) 
held that the Indian Civil Rights Act con 
right of action against tribal governments and held that tribal 
governments are immune from suit in federal court. 
Enforcement of the Indian Civil Kights Act today 
resides solely within the absolute discretion of tribal 
government, except for habeas corpus actions. Whether any 
person who comes within the jurisdiction of a tribal government 
receives the intended benefits of the Act 
political discretion of a tribal council than upon the legal 
judgments of its tribal courts. This is so because there is no 
circumstance where a federal court can exercise judicial 
oversight, except in habeas corpus situations, and perhaps in 
limited situtations J.n the 10th Circuit. 
A recent headline in The Lakota times, a reservation 
depends more upon the 
newspaper, demonstrates once again the supremacy that tribal 
councils have over their inferior tribal courts. The July 29, 
1987 edition of The Lakota Times stated "<t>ST Council System 
Overrules Tribal Court". The news article went on to explain 
that the Oglala Sioux Tribal Council votecti to overrule both the 
tribal trial court and the appellate court on an issue 
pertaining to a wrongful employment termination. This incident 
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occurred on the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation in South Dakota 
where there has been an history of tribal council actions which 
have disregaraed tribal courts who have attempted to apply the 
law. For example, in Shortbull v. Looking hlk, 677 F.2d 645 
(8th Cir. 1982) the court of appeals noted: 
We must, however, express serious concern that 
Shortbull1s rights under §1302 of the Indian Civil 
Rights Act (ICRA) [citation omitted] may never be 
vindicated. Shortbull alleges tlhat the tribal court, 
Chief Judge Red Shirt, ruled tha^ . he was entitled to 
run in the primary election because of the Tribal 
Council's January 24 resolution. It appears that 
because of this ruling, Judge Red Shirt was removed 
from office ana was replaced by a judge more 
sympathetic to the Tribal Executive Committee, who 
quashed Juage Rea Shirt's orders.| Such actions raise 
serious questions under the Inaian Civil Rights Act, 
but because the Supreme Court aeterminea in Martinez 
that there is no private right of action under the 
ICRA, Shortbull has no remedy [iii federal court]. . . 
We are [also] presented witq 
Shortbull has no remeay within the tribal machinery nor 
with the tribal officials in whoq 
participate, [citations omitted] 
Congress provides otherwise. [citing Santa Clara 
Pueblo at 72]. We question whether such a result is 
a situation in which 
e election he cannot 
unless and until 
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justified on the grounds of maintaining tribal autonomy 
and self-government: it frustrates the ICRA's purpose 
of "protect [ing] individual Indians from arbitrary and 
unjust actions of tribal governments," and in this case 
it renders the rights provided by the ICRA 
meaningless. 677 F.2d at 650. 
Also, in Garreaux v. Andrus, 676 IF.2d 1206 (8th Cir. 
1982) H[t]he court recognize[dJ that the plaintiffs are being 
treatea unfairly by the tribal council" but nonetheless felt 
compelled to dimsiss, as a result of Sant4 Clara, a suit to 
require an election to change the tribal constitution, Id. at 
1210. 
In Committee to Save Our Constitution v. Unitea States, 
No. 83-3011 (D.S.D., Feb. 24, 1984) 11 ILI^  3035, the United 
States district court said: 
When the tribal council fail 
change from 6 districts back to l| 
ed to implement the 
3 districts, one or 
more of the members of the plaintiff association . . . 
brought an action in the Cheyenne 
Court before Chief Judge LeBeau . 
. . . that future elections must 
districts rather than the 6 distr 
On June 15, 1982, Judge LeBe 
was terminated by tribal council 
21, 1982, the tribal council resc 
River Sioux Tribal 
. . Judge LeBeau held 
Utilize 13 election 
icts then in use. 
ku's term of office 
Resolution. On June 
jinded Judge LeBeau's 
injunction barring further use of| the six election 
-14-
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districts then in place. On or shortly after June 21, 
Melvin Garreau [reputedly the father of the then 
current tribal council chairman] was appointed chief 
judge of the tribal court by the cpouncil. 
In Kickapoo Tribe v. Thomas, No. ^3-4177 (D. Kan.f June 
24, 1S83) (10 ILR 3093) that Court held that it had no 
jurisdiction after the Santa Clara decisioh to consider a tribal 
election dispute adding, at 3096, that it ^is not my place to 
determine whether [ ] congressional Indian policy fosters 
self-government or a vacuum with potential for chaos." 
In Runs After v. United States, 7^ 6 F.2d 347 (8th Cir. 
1985) , the 8th Circuit commented on the Judge LeBeau situation 
and a number of other tribal members who w$re barred from 
seeking tribal office. That Court of Appeals noted that: 
. . . despite the substantive guarantees of certain 
constitutional rights contained im the ICRA, 'the only 
federal relief available under th$ Indian Civil Rights 
Act is a writ of habeas corpus,' ^oodface v. Grassrope, 
708 F.2d at 338 n.4, and f[t]hus, actions seeking other 
sorts of relief for tribal deprivations of rights must 
be resolved through tribal forumsf• 
The Court went on to state that " . . . givpn congressional 
concern about deprivations of individuals1 rights by tribal 
authorities [it is] improbable that Congress desired enforcement 
of rights to be left to the very tribal authorities alleged to 
have violated them." 
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Where federal courts have retained jurisdiction over 
habeas corpus matters, factual situations h 
light where victims of unfair tribal acts h 
kve been brought to 
ave been determined 
to have no non-habeas corpus relief available. In Good v. 
Graves, Civil No. 6-85-508 (D. Minn., May 2D, 1985), the 
plaintiffs in tribal court of Inaian offenses were convicted of 
several criminal offenses, including the possession of drugs, 
ana sentencea up to six months in tribal ja|il. The federal 
district court found as fact: 
Ihe evidence brought forth at tne trial indicates that 
the Red Lake Tribal Council has a |policy of not 
permitting lawyers to practice before the Red Lake 
Court of Indian Offenses . . . [an|d such a policy] is 
in direct violation of 25 U.S.C. ^1302(6) which 
provides that no Indian tribe sha]Jl deny a person in a 
criminal proceeding the right to qounsel . . . 
[Further] the testimony of the Reel Lake prosecutor and 
the former prosecutor indicates that in the past 
several years there has been only one jury trial 
granted to a criminal defendant. By telling [the 
defendants in tribal court] that they would have to pay 
for a jury trial, the Red Lake Coi|irt of Indian Offenses 
denied petitioners their right to a trial by jury which 
is specifically guaranteed by 25 Ip.S.C. §1302(10) . . . 
The evidence in this case leads tljiis court to the 
inescapable conclusion that the rfLghts guaranteed 
-16-
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petitioners by the Indian Civil Rights Act were 
tramplea upon by the officials of the Red Lake Court of 
Indian Offenses. 
The report and recommendation of the magistrate in the 
same case goes on to add that the conduct of tribal officials 
demonstrates "virtually complete disregard 
afforded to petitioners under the [ICRA], Report and 
Recommendation of the Magistrate, Civil Noj. 6-85-508, at 7 
(April 23, 1985) • . . [and it] is reprehensible that 
individuals acting within the tribal court system would directly 
misstate and completely ignore the law," 
for the rights 
In a non-habeas corpus matter, th 
Philbrick, 486 F. Supp. 807 (D.S.D. 1980) 
faith on the part of the tribal council in 
dismissed in light of Santa Clara, supra), 
If the allegations of the complai 
true plaintiffs available tribal 
|e court in Vvells v. 
(allegation of bad 
a chila custody case 
stated that: 
bt may be taken as 
pECRA is to create 
ingful remedies. 
forums seem limited 
. . . [and] it certainly may be argued that the effect, 
after Santa Clara Pueblo, of the 
rights while withholding any meanl: 
Some federal courts have stretched to accommodate Santa 
Clara in certain egregious situations. InJ Dry Creek Lodge, Inc« 
v. Arapaho and Shoshone Tribes, the 10th Circuit found federal 
jurisdiction to consider an ICRA complaint for damages against a 
tribe. It did so largely because the mattjer was "outside of 
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internal tribal affairs", concerned "an issue with a non-Indian" 
and "in the absence of [available tribal] relief or remedy the 
reason for the [Santa Clara] limitation disappear". 
Although the ICRA was intended to protect individuals 
from tribal abuse, enforcement may be unavailable as a practical 
matter. The 10th Circuit reliea heavily oq the facts in Dry 
Creek Lodge to conclude that: 
Plaintiffs Cook, who are non-Indians, had owned 
the 160-acre tract for about ten years and had lived 
there. They decided to build a guest lodge for 
tendent of the 
advised them that 
Iged to provide 
hunting, and consulted the superin|l 
reservation about the matter. He 
projects of that type were encouralc 
employment. He also stated that there would be no 
access problem. A license to plaintiffs Cook was 
issued for the business. The individuals then formed 
Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. to build thq facilities. This 
was done with an SBA loan. The lodge was completed and 
opened, but the next day the Tribes closed the road at 
the request of a nearby Indian family, the Bonatsies . 
. . With the road blocked the persons on the Dry Creek 
land could not get out and were fbr all practical 
purposes confined there until a fdderal court issued a 
temporary restraining order. Thereafter the plaintiffs 
sought a remedy with the tribal court, but were refused 
access to it. The judge indicated he could not incur 
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the displeasure of the Council and that consent of the 
Council would be neeaed. 25 C.F.If. §11.22. The 
consent was not given. 
Without federal jurisdiction, the court reasoned, plaintiffs 
would lack access to any forum. 
personal and property 
been violated by the 
The plaintiffs alleged that their 
rights under the Constitution had 
defendants. A jury so found and ^warded damages. 
There must exist a remedy for parties in the position 
of plaintiffs to have the dispute resolved in an 
orderly manner. To hold that they have access to no 
court is to hold that they have constitutional rights 
but have no remedy. The self-help which was suggested 
to shut down plaintiffs1 "business" accoraing to the 
Council minutes, and which was carried out with the 
help of the federal police, does not appear to be a 
suitable device to determine constitutional rights. 
The decision in Dry Creek Lodge, however, cannot be 
relied upon to solve problems encountered py non-tribal 
members. The decision has been criticized|by a number of 
commentators, See, e.g., Gover and Laurenc^, Avoiding Santa 
Dry Creek Lodge Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, supra, at 8 (The 
Court's "conclusion is wrong because they ignore tribal immunity 
and the rationale of Santa Clara"), narrowed in scope by the 
10th Circuit itself, White v. Pueblo of Saji Juan, 728 F.2d 1307 
(10 Cir. 1984), and rejected by other circuits, Garreau v. 
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Andrus, supra, at 1210 n.2 (8th Cir. 1982) (Refusing to follow 
but mentioning Dry Creek Lodge with approval). Dry Creek Lodge 
is a judicial statement that the ICRA is woefully deficient. In 
his aissent in Dry Creek Lodge, Judge Hollpway said: 
"To me this is a most disturbing cpase because of the 
result I feel compelled to reach. The jury found a 
violation of the plaintiffs1 civil rights recognized by 
§1302 of the Inaian Civil Rights Act, under most 
distressing circumstances. And yet it seems we must 
say that the doors are closed against any orderly 
redress for the wrongs. State and federal 
courts are barred by the immunity doctrine from hearing 
the claims and access was denied |:o the tribal court/ 
as the majority opinion points out. Nevertheless, I 
must reluctantly agree with the trial court's 
conclusion that the Santa Clara opinion compels 
dismissal as to the sole remaining defendants, the 
tribes. 
The most recent known case to touch on the scope of a 
tribal government's powers over an individual within the 
exterior boundaries of an Indian reservation is Duro v. Reina, 
821 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1987). The 9th Circuit held that a 
non-member Indian is subject to tribal government authority 
where the person had significant contacts With the reservation. 
The foregoing discussion of the qurrent status of the 
law concerning the ICRA is both relevant and pertinent to the 
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day-to-day life within the Duchesne and Uirlitah County areas. 
While the County governments are not awarel of any egregious 
deprivation of civil rights by the Ute Tripe prior to the 10th 
Circuit's decision, the 10th Circuit's dec 
acres of non-trust land and 18,000 persons 
control by the Ute Tribe. These 3,000,000 
persons encompass significant property and 
inaividuals do not have any political infl 
(ision adds 3,000,000 
to the partial 
acres and 18,000 
political rights. The 
bence in the conduct 
of tribal governmental affairs. The future need for revenue and 
the lack of federal legislative restraint are likely to either 
compel or allow the Ute tribal government to exercise civil 
control over persons and their property. This situation will 
surely produce extensive litigation by those who can afford it. 
Those who cannot afford litigating to protect their property or 
their political interest will be swallowed) 
of the Ute Tribe. 
by the superior power 
It is fair to say that the curren 
government has been reasonable in many respects since the 10th 
Circuit's decision. Nonetheless, the Ute 
State of Utah and the Counties know in no 
it intends to expand its power into areas 
has not ventured. In early 1987, the Ute 
of Utah and Duchesne County to collect cerl 
collected by the State and County within the 10th Circuit 
defined reservation. That case remains pending. Much 
t Ute tribal 
Tribe has let both the 
(uncertain terms that 
where it previously 
Tribe sued the State 
tain past tax revenues 
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uncertainty remains as to what additional expansion of powers 
this tribal council and future tribal counqils may take with 
respect to property and political rights. 
There are also at issue the political and property 
rights of many persons who are allegedly racially Ute but whom 
are politically non-Ute. These concerns are expressed in 
greater detail in a statement of claims described in a "Notice 
of Claim", a memorandum from the attorney for these politically 
non-Ute Indians to various federal officials, and in a letter 
to the governor of Utah by the same attorney, all of which are 
attached as Exhibits "C", "D", and "E". Irj essence, the 
racially Ute persons have been unsuccessfully seeking for an 
extended period to be accepted as Ute tribal members. The Ute 
tribal government nas consistently denieo them tribal 
membership. Thus, under the Duro decision supra, these persons 
are treated as being within the jurisdiction of the Tribe when 
they are within the 10th Circuit's defined (reservation, but 
they have no Ute political rights. 
There exists both a disparity of political ana 
property rights between tribal members and 
within an Indian reservation's boundaries, 
disparity of political and property rights 
members within a reservation and all citizens of the U.S. who 
live outside of a reservation's boundaries! The existence of 
an Indian reservation places its residents into a "quasi 
foreign territory" where quasi federal constitutional rights 
non-tribal members 
There is also a 
between tribal 
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are applied in theory, but always subject tlo discretionary 
enforcement by the tribal government then in power. Thus, 
tribal members are second-class U.S. citizens and non-tribal 
members are third-class U.S. citizens. If this was intended by 
the 1968 ICRA, then it should be corrected by new law. 
In summary, the ICRA creates "rights" whose 
implementation are subject to the absolute discretion of each 
tribal council. The four-told expansion of the Ute reservation 
and the concommitant expansion of tribal authority give rise to 
justifiable concern by Duchesne and Uintah Counties that their 
respective governmental powers and the political rights of 
non-tribal members will be diminished. All residents of the 
reservation will be deprived of the full protection of the 
Unitea States Constitution. 
NEED FOR A CONGRESSIONAL SOLUTION 
A Congressional solution for current inequities within 
reservations must be premised upon the bed-rock fundamental 
theory of American government that government derives its just 
powers from the consent of the governed. iThis means that 
Congress should examine the functions of tjie governments 
operating within Duchesne and Uintah Counties to ascertain whom 
such governments purport to govern, and then to determine if 
those persons whom they purport to govern *iave given their 
consent to be governed by each of those governments. The 
Counties believe that the Congress would discover to its 
surprise that under present law the Ute Indian Tribe could 
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assert substantial governmental power and Authority over 
persons who resiae within the exterior boundaries of the 10th 
Circuit's defined reservation who, by Tribal law, do not have 
the right to give or withhold their consent to government by 
the Tribe. The elected representatives of all residents of 
Duchesne and Uintah Counties feel this is a deplorable 
condition within the United States of America. 
The governmental power currently recognized to be 
possessed by tribal governments probably includes some degree 
of control over hunting and fishing activities of all persons 
(except perhaps in the national forests), water rights, control 
of ingress and egress to certain non-trust lands, assessment of 
taxes, even on non-Indian fee lands, regulation of the sale of 
liquor, imposition of a severance tax on oil ana gas production 
by non-Indian lessees, imposition of cigarette taxes on sales 
to non-Indians, imposition of zoning and land use regulations, 
regulation of the conduct of business, determination of certain 
domestic relations, tort actions, and collection matters, and 
other important powers affecting the healtp, welfare, safety 
and revenues of the Counties' residents. 
These extensive powers of an Indikn tribe not only 
allow an Indian tribe to assert extensive pivil jurisdiction 
over non-tribal members who reside within 
such powers also operate in many instances 
|a reservation, but 
to exclude the State 
and the Counties from regulating certain activities of the 
Counties' residents and persons passing th rough the Counties. 
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Presumably, the 
te Tribe is not 
Thus, not only will an undisturbed 10th Cirlcuit decision impose 
newly discovered governmental jurisdiction over non-tribal 
members, but it will also dramatically affejct the Counties' 
ability to raise revenue to support government services for all 
of their residents, tribal and non-tribal, 
revenues raised or income received by the tJ1 
required to be expended for the direct benefit of non-tribal 
memoers. It is believed that Duchesne County's $6 million 
budget for 13,500 residents and Uintah County's $10 million 
budget for 24,000 residents is dwarfed by the Lite Tribe's 
budget for 2,713 members. 
Chaos has or will emerge in the cbnduct of government 
and in the conduct of individual business Affairs because of 
the conflicting understandings of existing 
has or will result because there are two inconsistent theories 
of government at work in these two Counties. One theory of 
government arises out of the Declaration of Independence 
statement that government derives its just powers from the 
consent of the governed. This principle was engrained as the 
laws. Unfairness 
in the Articles of 
on, and every 
fundamental source of all government power 
Confederation, the United States Constitute 
state's Constitution. 
A different and conflicting theory of government 
applies to the source of power for tribal government. That 
theory of government arises out of judicial interpretations of 
the commerce clause of the United States Constitution at 
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Article I, which states that the Congress shall regulate 
commerce among the several states and with the Indian tribes. 
This judicial interpretation has come to mqan that Indian 
tribes are free to exercise absolute authority within their 
territory to the extent that such authority has not been 
limited by an act of Congress. 
Thus, on the one hand, the legitimacy of federal, 
state and local governments is based upon t[he consent of all 
persons who are proposed to be governed. On the other 
competing hana, the legitimacy and political power of tribal 
government is based upon inherent sovereignty which is subject 
only to those limitations as have been imposed by Congress. 
The result has been that the Ute Inaian Trjbe has established a 
constitution ana bylaws which confer power^ of government upon 
a tribal business committee whose powers o^ government arise 
from the consent of persons whom the Tribe has concluded 
possess sufficient specified Ute Indian racial characteristics 
to be acceptable as tribal members. The cdurts have defined 
tribal "citizenship" as belonging to those persons whom the 
I 
tribe will accept. Historically, "citizenjship" in a tribe has 
been limited to those possessing certain specified Indian 
racial characteristics, primarily Indian bJLood quantum of a 
certain minimum percentage. In the Counties' opinion the 
currently judicially accepted theory of Indian government 
cannot fairly and equitably assert government power over 
non-tribal member residents within the reservation if it 
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contains significant numbers of non-member^ and contains a 
significant percentage of non-trust lands. 
There are no effective limitations imposed upon a 
tribe's governmental authority over non-menjbers, except habeas 
corpus review by feaeral courts. Nonetheless, it is well 
established that a tribe has the right to remove non-members 
from a reservation. Presumably, this is so even if the 
non-mernber owns property and resides on the reservation. 
Therefore, you can imagine that non-members| will have to 
appease the tribal administration or be in fear of being 
subject to removal. 
Without limitations being imposed by Congress, Indian 
tribes will continue to be capable of imposing obligations upon 
non-members without extending the privileges that would 
otherwise be available to the non-member outside of the 
reservation context. The federal government and state 
their authority 
e Counties are 
governments have accepted limitations upon 
through their respective constitutions. Th|< 
requesting that this Commission recommend to the President ana 
to the Congress that limitations be imposed upon Indian tribes 
which both apply general constitutional law principles to 
tribal governments and provide for meaningful federal judicial 
oversight of tribal acts and omissions. 
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CONCLUSION 
Obviously, something is dreadfullly wrong when a 
federal court acknowledges that a government has extensive 
powers over all residents within its territory, but does not 
simultaneously require that same government to extena the power 
all residents of 
that government, 
federal and state 
of the vote and other political rights to 
legal age who are subject to the powers oil 
This condition would be condemned by every 
court in the United States, except when it involves the powers 
of an Indian tribal government. 
The existing facts require the civil Rights Commission 
to apply its financial and personnel resources to finding a 
creative and fair means to permit the county ana tribal 
governments to operate within Duchesne and Uintah Counties to 
the extent that each government extends political rights to the 
residents thereof. 
Thank you for this opportunity t<^  present our views. 
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Original 1861 and 1882 Reservation Boundaries 
Present Boundaries of the Uintah and Oiufay Reservation *x per 
1985 Tenth Circuit Court Decision Judae Jwtf/i 
MA. W 
PREAMBLE 
This Law and Order Code for the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation is 
established for the purposes of strengthening ^ribal self-government, providing for the judicial needs 
of the Reservation, and thereby assuring the maintenance of law and order on the Reservation. 
TITLE I. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
CHAPTER 1. PRELIMINARY PROVISI0NS 
§1-1-1 Constitutional Authority. 
This Law and Order Code is adopted piirsuant to the authority vested in the Tribal Business 
Committee under Article VI of the Constitution of the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray 
Reservation. 
§1-1-2 Name of Code. 
This Law and Order Code shall be known as The Law and Order Code of the Ute Indian Tribe of 
the Uintah and Ouray Reservation and may be referred to as the Ute Law and Order Code, or Law and 
Order Code, and may be abbreviated as the U.L.O.C. Sub-codes and rules included herein may be 
cited by the name given in the sub-code or rule heading. 
§ 1 -1 -3. Prior Inconsistent Ordinances Repealed. 
Any and all ordinances of the Tribal Business Committee which conflict in any way with the 
provisions of this Law and Order Code are hereby repealed to the extent that they are inconsistent with 
or conflict with, or are contrary to the spirit and/or purpose of this Law and Order Code. 
§1-1-4. C.F.R. No Longer Applicable. 
Any and all provisions of the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 25, Part II, as presently 
constituted or hereafter constituted which deaj with subjects covered in this Law and Order Code or 
are otherwise inconsistent with or in conflict ^vith the provisions of this Law and Order Code or the 
purpose and/or spirit of this Law and Order Cofie are declared to be no longer applicable to the Uintah 
and Ouray Reservation. 
§1-1-5 Amendment of Law and Order Code. 
This Law and Order Code may be amende^, additions made hereto, or deletions made herefrom in 
the manner provided for the adoption of tribal ordinances. Amendments and additions to this Law and 
Order Code shall become a part thereof for all purposes and shall be codified and incorporated herein 
in a manner consistent with the numbering and organization hereof. 
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CHAPTER 2. JURISDICTION 
§1-2-1 Jurisdiction • Tribal Policy. 
It is hereby declared as a matter of Tnoal policy and legislative determination, that the publi< 
interest ar J the interests of the Ute Indian Tribe demand that the Tribe provide itself, its members, anc 
other persons living within the territorial jurisdiction of the Tribe as set forth in Article I of th< 
Constitution of the Ute Indian Tnbe with an effective means of redress in both civil and cnm.nal case 
against members and non-Tribal members who through either their residence, presence, busmes 
dealings, other actions or failures to act, or dther significant mm mum contacts with this Reservatioi 
and/or its residents commit cnminal offenses against the Tribe or incur civil obligations to persons o 
entities entitled to the Tribe's protection This action is deemed necessary as a result of the confusioi 
and conflicts caused by the increased contact and interaction between the Tribe, its members, an( 
other residents of the Reservation and othjer persons and entities over which the Tribe has no 
previously elected to exercise jurisdiction The jurisdictional provisions of this Law and Order Code 
to insure maximum protection for the Tribe, its members and other residents of the Reservation 
should be applied equally to all persons, rrjembers and non-members alike 
§ 1-2-2 Territorial Jurisdiction. 
(1) The Jurisdiction of the Courts of thelUte Indian Tribe shall extend to the territory within th< 
onginaJ confines of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation as set forth by Executive Orders of October 3 
1861, and January 5, 1882, and by the Acts (^Congress approved May 27, l902,June 19 1902,anc 
March 11, 1948, and to such other lands without such boundaries as have been or may hereafter fcx 
added to the Reservation or held in trust for thp Tnbe under any law of the United States or otherwise 
(2) The jurisdiction of the Courts of the Ute Indian Tribe shall extend beyond the temtona 
limitation set forth next above, to effectuate the jurisdictional provisions set forth below, to th< 
greatest extent permissible by law 
§ 1-2-3 Personal Jurisdiction. 
(1) As used in these jurisdictional provisions, the word "person" shall include any individual 
firm, company, association, or corporation 
(2) Subject to any contrary provisions, exceptions or limitations contained in either federal law 
the Tribal Constitution, or as expressly stated elsewhere in this Law and Order Code, the Courts of the 
Ute Indian Tribe shall have civil and criminal jurisdiction over the following persons 
A Any person residing, located or present within the Reservation for 
0 Any civil cause of action, or 
u) Any charge of cnminal offense prohibited by this Code or other ordinance of the 
Tribe when the offense is allegeld to have occurred within the Reservation 
B Any person who transacts, conducts, 0r performs any business or activity within the Reserva 
don, either in person or by an agent or representative, for any civil cause of action or charge o 
criminal offense for any act expressly prohibited by this Code or other ordinance of the Tribe arising 
from such business or activity 
C Any person who owns, uses or possesses any property within the Reservation, for any civi 
cause of action or charge of cnminal offense prohibited by this Code or other ordinance of the Tribe 
arising from such ownership, use or possession 
D Any person who commits a tortious acft or engages in tortious conduct within the Reservation 
either in person or by an agent or representative, for any civil cause of action arising from such act oi 
conduct. 
E Any person who commits a cnminal offense prohibited by this Code or other ordinance of the 
Tnbe, by his own conduct or the conduct of another for which he is legally accountable, if 
i) The conduct occurs either wholly or partly within the Reservation, or 
u) The conduct which occurs outside the Reservation constitutes an attempt, solicita-
tion, or conspiracy to commit ap offense within the Reservation, and an act in 
furtherance of the attempt or conspiracy occurs within the Reservation, or 
in) The conduct which occurs withirj die Reservation constitutes an attempt, sohcita-
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tion, or conspiracy to commit in another junsdiction an offense prohibited by this 
Code or ordinances of the Tribe] and such other junsdiction 
(3) None of the foregoing bases of jurisdiction is exclusive, and junsdiction over a person may be 
established upon any one or more of them as applicable 
§ 1 2-4 Jurisdiction Over Property. 
Subject to any contrary provisions, exceptions, or limitations contained in either federal laws and 
reg jlations the Tribal Constitution, or as express!) stated eK*where in this Law and Order Code, the 
Courts of the Ute Indian Tnbe shall have junsdiction over am real or personal property located on the 
Reservation to determine the ownership thereo or rights therein or to determine the application oi 
such property to the satisfaction of a claim for which the owner of the property may be liable 
§ 1 -2-5 General Subject Matter Jurisdiction; Limitations. 
Subject to any contrary provisions, exceptions, or limitations contained in either federal law, or 
the Tnbal Constitution, the Courts of the Ute Indian Tnbe shall have junsdiction over all civil causes 
of action, and over all offenses prohibited by this Code except the Courts of the Ute Indian Tnbe shall 
not assume junsdiction over any civil or cnminal matter which does not involve either the Tnbe its 
officers, agents, employees, propert) or enterpnses, or a member of the Tnbe, or a member of a 
federalh recognized tnbe, if some other forum exists for the handling of the matter and if the matter is 
not one in which the nghts of the Tnbe or its members mav be directly or indirect!) affected 
§1-2-6 Concurrent Jurisdiction. 
The junsdiction invoked bv this Code over am person, cause of action, or subject shall be 
concurrent w ith any valid j unsdiction over the same of the courts of the United S tates, am state, or an) 
political subdivision thereof, provided, however, mis Code does not recognize, grant, or cede 
junsdiction to any other political or governmental entitv in which jurisdiction does not otherwise exisi 
in law 
§1-2-7 Exclusive Original Jurisdiction. 
(1) The Courts of the Ute Indian Tnbe shall have exclusive original junsdiction in all matters in 
which the Ute Indian Tnbe or its officers or employees are parties in their official capacities 
(2) Nothing contained in the preceding paragraph or elsewhere m this Law and Order Code shall be 
construed as a waiver of the sovereign immunity of the Tnbe or its officers or enterprises unlev 
specificallv denominated as such 
CHAPTER 3. ESTABLISHMENT OF COURTS; JUDGES AND OTHER COURT 
PERSONNEL. 
§1-3-1 Courts Established. 
(1) There is herebv established a Ute Indian Appellate Court, which mav be refened to as the 
\ppellate Court, to handle all appeals from the Tnbal Juvenile Court and Tnbal Court as providec 
elsewhere in this Law and Order Code The Appellate Court shall consist pf three justices 
(2) There is hereby established a Ute Indian Tribal Court, which may be referred to as the Tnbu 
Court, to handle all matters of a judicial nature not specificall} placed within the junsdiction ot som< 
other judicial torum The Ute Indian Tnbal Court shall be a court of general civil and cnmina 
jurisdiction and shall hear appeals from all Tribal administrative bodies 
(3) There is hereby established a Ute Indian Tnbal Juvenile Court, which may be referred to as th< 
Tribal Juvenile Court, to handle all matters set forth in the Juvenile Code contained in this Law anc 
Order Code 
§1-3-2 Judges. 
(1) There shall be appointed 
(a) Three Appellate Court Justices for the Appellate Court; 
(b) One Chief Judge and as man) associate Judges as tne Business Committee sees fit 
for the Tribal Court, and 
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Christensen Mai one, Dennis K. Christensen, Elnora Christensen 
Chandler, Christina Christensen Hullinger, Terry Oran 
Christensen, Gerald Christensen, Vernon Christensen, Clarence 
Harris, Winifred Harris, Romaine "J" Hariris, Kenna Dee Harris, 
Richard Elmer Daniels, Daryl Lynn Daniels, Marilyn Daniels 
Griffin, Larry Grant LaRose, Loren Keht LaRose, Gary Carnes 
LaRcse, Robert Fred LaRose, Joyce LaRose Johnson, Karen LaRose, 
Alan Icrg, Elmer Charles Iorg, Bruce L. Icrg, Pala lorg Nelson, 
Leonard Paul Lopez, Naomi Clara Lopez Adamp, Junior Lopez, Joyce 
Marie Lcpez Monaco, Eileen Rae Lopez Admundson, Carol Jean Lopez 
Martinez, Danny LeRoy Lopez, Sarah Jenks, Troy Edward Jenks, 
Wayne Perank, Jolene Perank, Misty Ann Perank, Monica J. Perank, 
Dallas Wayne Perank, Clint B. Perank, Sony& K. Burns, Norma Jean 
Gray and others. I intend to file a Complaint -for and on behalf 
of said clients, against each of you for engaging, either 
directly or indirectly, in a Conspiracy t£ deny the Civil Rights 
Guaranteed under the Indian Civil Rights A(tt, the Constitution of 
the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation, the 
Constitution of the Unitea States, and al1 other applicable 
statutes and laws. This conspiracy has been directed towards my 
aforesaid clients and others, each of whom are either tribal 
ne^c&rs or under the Tribal Constitution ought to be tribal 
neTiDers of the Ute Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation. 
Your conspiracy to violate the Civil Rights of my clients 
consists of the following: 
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NOTICE CF CLAIM/CIVIL RIGHTS CONSPIRACY 
A4J- 3 * 
1. Engaging in schemes, chimera, plots, artifices, plans 
devices, delusions, stratagem, rusts, illusions, apparitions 
tricks, fantasies, procedures, and otherwise conniving to deny t 
each of my clients, without due process of law, one or more o 
the -following property rights: their Membership in the tribe; th< 
benefits of their judgment against the Tribal Business Committee 
open and free access to the tribal courts including availabilit1 
of tribal judges; the benefits and/pr rights of or to then 
office; or, their unpaid tribal divio^nds or salaries, plus courl 
costs, attorneys fees, fines, etc. 
2. Obstructing justice. 
3. This conspiracy<s> has involved each of you as well as 
others, in varying combinations, ^nd has been an on-going anc 
continuing course of conduct that has utilizes a variety of 
schemes, etc., which extends from priojr to 1976 to the present. 
4. The names of all of the individuals who have joined 
with you as conspirators ar& presently unknown, but will be 
ascertained during the discovery that will occur during 
1itigation. 
5. Those of you who are tribal Officials, your conduct is 
forbidden by Federal Law under the Jndian Civil Rights Act, as 
well as by the Tribal Constitution anil the Law and Order Code. 
Those of you who are non-tribal member^ but who are United States 
officials, your conduct is forbidden ur^ der the laws of the United 
States, as the same has been uniformly applied by the courts. 
NOTICE OF CLAIM/CIVIL RIGHTS CONSPIRACY 
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is hereby made upon each of you to immediately cease, and desist 
in any and every particular from continuing to engage in thi 
conduct. Whether your conduct fpas been active, passive 
supervisory or advisory, it has resulted in giving full force anc 
effect to this insidious, injurious* inauspicious and otherwise 
totally unsatisfactory situation. 
Your failure to immediately rectify this situation and/or 
your attempts to continue to engage in this conspiracy, and/or 
unlawful acts, by any means or device, can only serve to increase 
the damages suffered by my clients and the punitive damages that 
will be awarded against each of you who arB found to have aided 
or abetted in any form or manner this unconscionable state of 
affairs that presently exists on the Uintah and Ouray 
Reservation, 
In order to assure hereafter th0 full compliance with the 
Indian Civil Rights Act, the Constitutions of both the United 
States and the Ute Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation, as 
well as all other applicable Federal and Tribal Laws, you are 
requested to assure that a competent, independent and non-
restricted Tribal Judiciary, which will include at least one law 
trained judge, is appointed without further delay, and in so 
doing, to cease and desist from any ahd all attempts to "pack" 
the court with individuals who will strictly comply with only the 
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Demands and d i r e c t i o n s ai the Tr iba l Easiness Committee. 
E A C H O F Y O U S H O U L D G O V E R N A C C O R D I N G L Y 
\\ 
'. \ 
George E# Mangan \ 
Attorney:for Claimants J 
47 North 200 East 
Roosevelt, UT 84066 
6014722-2428 
CERTIFICATE OF NAILING 
I hereby certify that on the _^ J^ay of January, 1986, I 
personally caused a copy of the foregoing Notice of Claim to be 
nailed to each of the above named individuals, by depositing the 
ssmp in the United States Mail at Roosevelt, Ut, postage prepaid. same in 
George E. i Mangan 
NOTICE OF CLAIM/CIVIL RIGHTS CONSPIRACY P a Q e 
farce E. foqan 
GEORGE E- MAN 
A t t o r n e y a 
47 k r tn Secern £ait 
tose.pit, Utah B 4 ^ 
\G AN , 
t. L a w 
/IPC 
UtaE 
DATE: December 29, 1986 
MEMORANDUM TO; BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, 
SUPERINTENDENT, UINTAH Sc OURAY AGENCY, 
AREA DIRECTOR, PHOENIX^ 
COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, 
SECRETARY OF INTERIOR 
SENATOR JAKE GARN 
SENATOR ORIN HATCH 
CONGRESSMAN HOWARD NIEUSEN 
SUBJECT: 1- ABILITY OF UTE BUSINESS COMMITTEE TO GOVERN: 
2. EFFECTIVENESS OF UTE TRIBAL COURTS; 
3. AVAILABILITY OF DUE PROCESS ON THE UINTAH AND 
OURAY RESERVATION; 
4. EFFECT ON CAPACITY OF UTE TRIBE TO EXERCISE 
ANY EFFECTIVE JURISDICTION. 
This Memorandum is being written 
order that I might express the v| 
cbservations I have made while living 
Tribe for over 15 years. It is 
disrespect, or desire to cause problem^ 
of the Tribe will admit that I have 
the tribe and Tribal rights. During 
probably represented at least 707. of 
the Business Committee in their £ 
committed to the concept of meaningful 
self-government. Hopefully this H 
illuminate some of the more prevalent) 
Tribal governrent; suggest some possi 
future conflicts before they get out of 
to each of the above in 
ery candid and personal 
and working with the Ute 
not written out of spite, 
In fact, most members 
been a champion of and for 
the past 15 years I have 
the individual members of 
sonal matters. I am 
^r 
I have found that personal experi 
meaningful way tD help others understan 
of thatf I have decided to use my exp 
what has come to be known as the " 
"Chapoose« et. ai« vs. Ute Tribal Pusin 
bl 
and representative tribal 
emorandum will help to 
existing problems of the 
e remedies; and resolve 
hand. 
ences are perhaps the most 
d any situation. Eecause 
erience as lead attorney in 
Enrollment Cases" entitled 
ess Committee, et seq." 
It will not only document what has happened, but the frustration 
my clients and I have had 
respect the "Rule of Law." 
in dealing with a group who do not 
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I have diviaed this Memcrandum ilnto tne following areas: 
I. BACNGRCUND 
II. SUMMARY CF EVENTS 
III. CDMrEr4T5 
IV. RECOMMENDATICMS 
As indicated above, this Memcr 
mv observations concerning each ot 
aoove. I have tried to be as object 
my memory will allow me to be* 
bndum will attempt to relat 
tne four (4; areas liste 
tve as the circumstances an 
I. BACKGROUND 
I have been involved in the jdiaicial wordings of the Ut 
Tribe since 1971. At that time it had a C-R cou^t, presided ove 
bv Judge Henry Uochego. Judge LiDChego often discussed with m< 
tne "new" Law and Crder Code that the Business Committee wa 
going to adopt so tnat the Tribe then the Tribe would have it'< 
o**n tribal court ana be anle to handle "everything" that involve! 
tribal members on the reservation, except serious crimes, ht 
often ast ed fcr mv comments and rezommencati ons, wnicn I gave t: 
m m in an appropriate matter. 
was -finally acopted anc 
st copies, and I was one ci 
ice be-fore tne new Tribal 
When The Lite Law And Order Cod^ 
puDlisned, I received one of the fi 
the first attorneys admitted to prac 
Ccurt. The code clearly provided folr tribal courts and judges 
I was one of the few memoers of the Ut| 
the shearing in of Henry Upcnego 
During the next 10 years I probably tried more cases before the 
Tribal Court than any other attorney!. I respected the Tribal 
Court, and found it fair, efficient, and a creait to the trioe. 
Unen the^e were issues that mvoiveo complicated legal issues, a 
ah State Bar who attenoec 
as the first Chief Judae. 
law-trained judge was mane availaole. 
lav judges, Chief Juage Upcnego ano 
Gray had received excellent training a 
tribal Judges in Reno, before the 
I also DC-served tnat the 
Associate Juoge Norma Jean 
the National School for 
|/ unoe-took presiding Dver 
trials, hearings, etc. It was my pt^ception that the trioal 
courts were dispensing justice to triDal memoers in as fair and 
equitable manner as was being done by ^he justices of the peace 
and municipal courts in the State o-^  Utah. In snort, the Ute 
Tribal Courts were affording "CJLKE: Process" to tribal members. I 
often expressed that opinion to tellpw memoers of the Bar, and 
encouraged otner members of the local bar to actively practice 
berore the Tribal Court. 
During this time the Tribal Business Committee seemed to 
respect the independence and integrity of the Tribal Courts. 
Even though the committee and its mumpers were named as party 
derenaants in several actions, they sqbmitted themselves to the 
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•isciction of the Tribal Court, and at least made "appearances 
ccmolving with the final Orders of the Court. 
This ODservation ccntinued until April of 1925. In Apri 
.^25, tne Business Committee made its -first overt attempt t 
strio" tne Tribal Court of some of the court's inheren 
;urisdacticn. At that time tne business Committee passed a 
Ordinance that purported to remove 
cases from the Tribal Court and to 
tne Business Committee. The Tribal 
Crae rs to Show 
Committee and it 
jurisdiction of membersm 
place them exclusively wit! 
Courts issued a series o 
Cause in re Contempt to the Tribal Busines 
memoers. At fir|st the Business Committei 
^:ncred the Orders, out after a prolonged interval, did respond 
In June 1936, tne Trical Court found the Business Committee ir 
contempt of Court, Ordered them to l mn|.edi atel y comply with all o-
tne courts Draers, held the Tribal Attorney in Contempt, awarder 
certain costs, attorney fees, and imposed certain penalties, 
Following the June 1936 Order, the EJusiness Committee initially 
indicated its willingness to comply wi 
Since August, 1986, tnere has been 
Business Committee but only with 
Crier. 
:h tne Orders of the Court. 
•partial" compliance by tht 
lone portion of the Court's 
Otherwise there has been a complete and total refusal b^ , 
the E'usiness Committee to comply 
court. 
witn the rulinas of its cwr 
This background has of necessity ^ = -:r. general. Tne ne;:t 
section dealing with Summary of Events, is designed to fill ir 
some of the gaps. 
II. SUMMARY OF EVENTS 
1. In 1937, the Indians of 
Reservation organized themselves as 
aocpted a Constitution. Wnile tne 
-fcr a means to maKe amendments, there nave 
maae to tne Constitution. 
tne Uintan and Ouray 
tne Ute Indian Tribe by 
hibal Constitution provides 
besn no amendments 
3. Over a period of years the Tribal Business Committee 
accpted a series of Ordinances wnich riqui^ed that in order for a 
cnild to De enrolled as a member of the Tribe, it not only hac to 
oe born to an enrolled memoer, but possess a requisite quantum of 
Ute Blood. As a consequence, hunorids of Indian children wno 
were constitutionally entitled to Tribal membership were excluded 
from the Tribal Rolls. The BIA approved each of these 
ordi nances. 
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In 
pclicv to terminate feae^ai 
.-^iult, congress adopted Puo 
Sec,©71, et. seq.). 
into two (2) grcuos, 
1/2 or le=s of Ute bleed, plu 
tr.s.Tj, and tne -full Dlcoas, wnion were 
Ute DloGd, plus any other Inaian Diced 
oe terminated in 19olf and the ful 
program to provide -for termination th^ 
was tijie "official" congressional 
sups-vision o-f Indian Tribes. As i 
c Law 671, et. seq. (25 U.S.C. 
T M S provided tor tne division o-f tne tribt 
i.e., tne miMed bloods which were those witr 
hose who elected to join witf 
tnose with 1/2 or more o* 
Tne mixed bloods were tc 
1-Dloods were to adopt c 
reafter. 
5. At that time it was felt by 
Ute Tribe had become a "Closed" trib| 
cruld be added to tne rolls. Cong 
t~at issue by amending Fuolic Law o71 
new memoers would continue to oe acded 
right" as provided -for in tne Ut 
Croinances adopted thereunder. 
jmemoers o-f the BIA that the 
e and that no new members 
|re = s specifically addressed 
et seq. to provide tnat 
to the tribe "in their o**n 
TriDal Constitution and 
<b. Subsequently tne Tribal Business Committee adopted a 
more restrictive blood-quantum requirement for tribal membership. 
The new requirement was -tor tne cnild to possess 5/S's o-f 
Historic Ute Indian Blood. Blood quantum's specifically excluded 
tne blood lines from a parent that had been terminated- The BIA 
specifically approved this ordinance. 
7. In about 1974 or 1973, the Tribal Business Committee 
accpted a tribal court system as provided in the Tribal 
Constitution. Until that time thire was no effective, and 
independent forum for trioal members tq> seek redrt 
taken by the Tribal Business Committee. 
S. In 1976-77, several trioal memosrs approached my office 
Crtting tn^ir" cmldren enrolled as to request assistance in 
members of the Ute Trioe. 
enrolled (r,~T,tjBr, wno it) was r 
from actions 
d had b^^n born to (a) an 
on the reservation at tne i G i n c 
i me of birth. They eaz; rsoressnteld that for years they had 
been petitioning the Trioal Business Committee to enroll tneir 
children as provided -for in the Constitution, but that tne 
Business Committee would oeny Each apol 
quantum ordinances. 
cation based on the blood 
9. In 1976-77 I filed in the Tri 
of the enrollment complaints on be 
families. The cases have subsecue 
"Cnaocoss, et. al , vs. The Ute Tri pc-,l 
. Court the "first-wave" 
half of these individual 
ntlv been rBierred to as 
Business Committee, et. 
sen. Tne i-omoiaints were founaea 
Act, alleging that the plaintiffs 
constitutional right to tribal members 
law, etc. 
i>> the Indian Civil Rights 
Were being denied their 
nip without due process of 
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10. These complaints were heard 
Judge Armstrong was law trained and had several /ears exiierierc 
ct being a tribal judge and in nelp 
by Judge George Armstronc 
ng to set-up the Nationa.' 
Indian Tr ia 1 Jucges Szhco1 in Renof Npvaca 
1 1 . J Lido e 
- m: o n g 
MemDership, and tnat the refusal of tips Trioai Easiness Committ 
to enro l l the children was a denial of their const i tut ional rignt 
to t r i b a l membership without due process cf I aw , wt 11cn was lr 
v io la t ion of the Indian C i v i l Rights Act. The business Committer 
was Crdered to enrol l each of the p l a i n t i f f chi ldren, to pay tnen 
dividends f r o m t h e 11 m e o t t h e i r las t 
plus in terest at 6*1 p =-r annum u n t i l o 
found each ot t 1 i« 
en ---»-
,
» -., t o Tr ioa ] 
a p p l i c a t i o n -for en ro l lmen t , 
The T r i b a l Business Committee appealed t he Enrol lment 
(3) ff.cf decisions to the Tribal Appellate Court. A special three 
appellate court was convened to hear the matter. The Appellats 
JuGges were Floyd M. Wyasket of the Ute Tribe, F. Browning 
Pipestem from Oklahoma, and Donald D. |DuFuis from Montana. 
13. On January 22, 1931, after p^o-lcnged briefings an^ 
extensive oral arguments, the Appellate Court affirmed the 
decision of the Tribal Court. The decision was 2-1, with Judge 
Pipestem dissenting solely on the grdunes of possinle sovereign 
immunity by the Business Committee. 
14. The Business Committee 
authorizing the Appellate Court to 
Appellate Court entered its Order auth 
then enacted legislation 
jre-hear the matter. The 
onzing a re-hearing. 
|i=r^  j-|.ie i eg a| issues were again thorougn I y brie-fed to the 
Appellate Court, and extensively argubd in oral arguments. On 
'•Over.oer 23, 1931, the Appellate Couht in a unanimous decision, 
affirmed its prior ruling, cellaring that the Easiness Committee 
members were not protezteG -from suit by "sovereign immunity*' 
ordered the immediate enforcement or Juoge Armstrong' 
16. Based en the Appellate Court 
issued an Order ii \ December 1951 
Committee to immediately comoly with 
and Show Cause why they should not. 
a no 
Geeisi en. 
decision, Chief Judge Gray 
directing the Business 
the Judgment or to appear 
1 On January 14, 19B2, in apparent compliance with the 
Orders of the Tribal Court, the Trioal 
^esoluti on Nc 
Pusmess Committee adopted 
32-05 which autnoriie^ the enrollment of the 
plaintiff children, subject to 
Superintendent, etc. 
tne approval of the 
13. It was. then unknow " the plaintiffs, but the 
plaintiffs were subsequently made aware that prior to the 
Business Committee adopting Resolution No. 82-05, the BIA 
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Regional Solicitor and otner BIA officials had assured the Triba 
Business Committee tnat as an "accommodation'1 to the Busines 
Committee, any resolution enrolling the plaintiff children woul 
rc - r&z~+^& secretarial approval. 
19. Cn January 21, 19 32, less than 10 days after the Triba 
Business Committee adopted said Resolution, the Enrollmen 
Resolution was in -fact disapproved by the Superintendent of th 
Lintan and Ouray Reservation. 
20. The plaintiffs did timely aopeal the decision of th 
3aoeri ntendent to the Fhoemx Area 3-ffice. For reasons that wer 
not clear, the matter was rBtBrred djirectly to the Commissi one 
in Washington 4cr review and determin 
21. A suosequent Crder to Show Cause was heard in Feoruary 
1-22. At that time, a stipulation wafe agreed to by the attorney 
-for tne Business Committee and the plainti-f-fs whereo/ tn< 
interest accumulating on the dividends to be paid to tn( 
p] ai nti-f-f s under the judgment of the Tribal Court, would fai 
increased to be the same as the average o-f the interest rate: 
being earned each year by the Lite T^*ibe on its' certi f l cates o 
ceoosit, etc. 
22. During t!" »e intervening period, several additions! 
complaints were being filed by myself on behalf of othe> 
individuals who claimed to be entitle^ to tribal membership as • 
matter of a constitutional right. In 
tor the Business Committee stipulated 
o-f the administrative proceedings or subseouent -feoera] 
litigation would be binding in &=<ch case, and would resolve th* 
question o-f tribal memnership. 
each instance, the ai'.crre^ 
with me that the oecisior 
n - :=>I_JL_ i a v. tf » 
rol lowing the deatn o-f (thief 
ribal Judae Norma Jean Gray was 
»u a g e 
:00Ol i i u r-u» 
: o in • 7 / 7 , 
.o fill the 
or aoout l?r0. Judge un-e;-. oireo term of Judge Upon ego. 
Armstrong also aied. He was reolacid D> William A. irorr, 
Salt Lake Attorney with considerably InGian Law experience, anc 
r*ho was an American Indian. 
24. rJn April 23, 19B3, i ^ letter Decision -from ths 
Assistant Secretary of Indian ?~ *: fairs, the decision of the 
Superintendent to disapprove the Enrollment Resolution wa= 
li^hel d. 
25. JI »e April 23, 19S3 decision was directi / contrary tc 
the recommendation of the Chief o-f the BIA Branch OT Tribal 
Enrollment Service. This individual had recommended in c 
Memorandum dated January 23, 1933, that the Enrollment Resolutior 
as passed b > ' t he Ute Indian Tribe, be approved. 
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26. Upon
 r e c e i p t of . nal Administrative decision 
plaintiffs filed an action lr, w;,<_ United States District Cour 
fcr Utah, Case Mo. C-S3-1145W. Th4 litigation involved severa 
causes of action. The only cause th^t pertains to this subjec 
."natter, resulted in a Writ of Mandamus memorandum Decision an 
Order of Apr i 1 .1 1 , 19B5
 f Judge Da v i d W i naer J t o t fte appr Dpnat 
iuthorities in the Bureau of Indian Affairs, directing them t 
cease from interfering with the Ute I 
who was entitled to tribal membership 
ndian Tribe in determinin 
27. Following the Decision by Judge Winder, the Iriba 
Business Committee announced that the Federal court had held tha 
tfte Business Comm111 e e was the on1y source to determine who wa 
en 1111ed t o triba I memoer sn i p. 
^.a. 19E5. the 
f o l l o w i n g a c t i o n : 
Bu^ i nes- Commi t t e e X O r i t h 
A . 
B . 
C . 
P a s s e d a r e s o l u t i o n r e s c i n d i n g R e s o l u t i on 
8 2 - 0 5 w h i c h e n r o l l e d t h e p l a i n t i f f c h i l d r e n ; 
P a s s e d a r e s o l u t i o n or | 
t h a t t h e T r i b a l C o u r t s 
t o h e a r e n r o 1 1 m e i »t mat! 
Declared that tne Trib 
was the only and prope 
enrol 1 merit matters. 
ordinance declaring 
had no jurisdiction 
ers; 
1 Business Committee 
r "forum" to hear 
29. In May 1785, plaintiffs obtained a Order to Show Caus 
from Judge T h o m e , directing the Busi 
a time ai id place certain in June, 
there be, why the prior judgment of 
enforced. 
ness Committee to appear a 
19B5, to Show Cause, if an 
the court should not b< 
30. Plaintiffs and their <= 
Tribal Court at the time and placj* 
Business Committee nor their attojr 
request a continuance of any kind. I|i 
Business Committee personally infcrmelc 
clients intended to appear. He indic|< 
clients <the Business Committee) considered the issue of Triba 
Membership to be a "political" question, and not a propei 
question -for the Tribal Courts to be considering. 
jorney appeared before th-
is specified. Neither tn< 
Irney appeared, nor did the 
n fact, tha attorney for th 
d me that neither he nor hi 
at ed to me, t > at f ie and hi' 
31. Plaintiffs requested that tne Business Committee am 
its attorney be held in contempt of bourt. The Court took th 
matter under advisement, and issued aj written Crd^r directing th< 
plaintiffs and the Business Committee! to submit written response: 
to a series of questions. 
32. The plaintiffs did timely | file their response to thi 
questions posed in the Order of the Cburt. However the Busines 
Committee did not do so. The Court- on its own motion extendei 
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tne date tor the Business Committee tp respond. Finally in earl 
! 9 3 D , the Business Committee and its Attorney -filed a response t 
tne questions raised in the Order or tne Court, Oral argument 
we-e set t^y the court and the attorneys -for plaintiffs and th, 
business Committee each appeared and argued the contempt mattei 
to the court. The court took the matter under advisement. 
wri tl 
3 . On 
n Orde r 
A. 
B . 
c 
w 
about June 4, 
ch provided a-
'tG-.s, Tribal Juc,c T Korne issued 
t c11, 1 ows : 
The Business Committee|was to enroll each of the 
plaintiff children; 
The attorney for the Business Committee h*«D to 
pay to the plaintiffs' attorney S500.00 Icr his 
contempt; 
C. The Business Committee «as to pa/ to thi 
plaintiffs their accruid dividends, plus the 
accrued interest; 
D. Plaintiffs were to submit a i • a f f i d a • 1 1 c: f 1 1 e i r 
costs and attorney fee^; 
E. The Business Committed was to be assessed a fim 
of S100.00 for each day the Court's Order was no' 
fully complied with; 
F. The Business Committee was given 90 days withii 
which to fully comply! with the Court s Order oi 
face ft ir ther contempt action. 
34. Thereafter the attorney for the Business Committei 
requested that I discuss with him howjthe Court's Orders could b< 
complied with and yet create a minimum of difficulties for thi 
Ute Tribe. Based on what appeared to!be a good faith attempt b1 
the Business Committee to resolve wlfiat had been a very long an; 
sometimes bitter litigation, I willingly agreed to the same. 
35. Because I felt the Business|Committee had determined t; 
finally respect the integrity of th© Tribal Courts, the Triba 
Constitution, and comply with the Court Orders, I agreed t< 
several extensions requested fay the Attorney for the Busines; 
Committee, which served to extend the 90 d3Ly period listed in #3i 
(F) above, to October 4, 1986. 
36 The attorney for the Business Committee expressl> 
promised to have the matter resolved by the latter parr o-
Aucust, 1?E6. Based on that assurance I agreed to recommend • 
payment plan to my clients so t!~»at the Tribe did not have to com. 
up with all of the judgment moneys at one time. 
37. In August 1936, Associate Tribal Judge Julius "Chunky 
Hurray was released from his positionjas a Associate Judge by th 
Business Committee for "personal" reasons. 
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1937, Associate Tribal Judge Willi 
i Circuit i Judge -for tne State of Utai 
33. In late August 
Thorne was appointed to be a iJudge 
which necessitated his resignation from the TriDal Court. 
*:> : l a r i f y tfr 
a p p o i n t m e n t t 
the Busines 
39. At this time Chie* Judge Norma Jean Gray becar 
C3ricerned about her own appointment cf>r term of office, and sougf 
dii audience w 4 4n tf"t Business Committee in o n e ' 
same. The records indicate that after her initial 
complete the term of Judge U p c ^ g o in 1977, 
Committee hn 1 hr^er formally re-appointsd her I D additional tern 
as Chief Judge. Thp Business CJommittee had continued 
reccgnire her a=> the- Chief Judgq in all matters, i.e. 
correspondence, tribal records, aoplications icr grants in ordt 
to run the tribal courts, shearing in of new merrDtrre of * 
Business Committee and ether judges, etc. 
40. Cn c f it- t September 4, 1936, J U J J P 0>ra/ hac u 
aopointment to meet with the Business Committee. However, sh 
was not allowed to enter the meeting fcom. Rather she was hands 
a envelope t», tlt Secretary of the Business Committee. Th 
envelope contained a copy of a Resolution setting her term o 
office to end on September 1936, but relieving her of he 
duties as Chief Judge as of September 4, 1936. 
the/ 
? to 
>ad vi ol ated th 41. In apparent rezcgmticn 
terms ci the Law and Crder Coae relative tne removai an 
aopointment of Judges, about Septefbe'" 6, L9C£ , th 
Business Committee rescinded the previous appointment which ha 
set September 30, 1936 as the end of the term, and declared tha 
the term had ended cn September 4, 1946. 
42. As a consequence of the varioub 
without any judge to hear any matters, 
rrember of the Arpe!l^Le court 
arrai gnnents, but trials were cancel| 
issued on any matter necessary to th 
Justice. 
events, the tribe wac 
Judge Floyd Wyasket, < 
handled * few pressinc 
ed, and no orders could bt 
^ crflBrly adninistrati on o4 
43. The Business Committee issued a ttTUurary did limitec 
appointment f i Judge Mjri a; to htji natters for one (1) month, 
and then there was no judges to hear anything. Several prisoners 
were held in jail for up to 30 and 40 days without being brought 
before a magistrate, simply because there was no judge available. 
44. Beginning in September, 1736, the Business Committee 
td/ertized for applications for the position of Chief Judge and 
associate judges. Apparently INt-re were several applicants, 
including Norma Jean Gray. Despite [ler extensive training and 
nearly ten years of experience, thfe Business Committee failed 
and/or refused t j appuii t Norma Jean Gray as either the Chief 
Judgp or an asroriatp judge. 
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45. In what was claimed to be 
the Business Committee eliminated the 
a "budget - c u. 11 i r g • m e a s u r e 
positions of an / of th 
court personnel who had any connection or familiarity with th 
Enrollment Cases. The irony of 
positions eliminated were funaed en 
government grants ar td wei e designed 
adequate tribal CDUT t systems. 
this action is that th 
tirely or almost entirely b 
to facilitate proper an 
4,6 . I n C c t o D e r , Ir- ? B 6, the Business Committee d i d par t i a 11 
comply with the Draers of tne Tribi il Court by enrolling th 
plaintiff children, along with over £ 0 0 other eligible children 
All other- oorticns of the Orders of the Tribal Court wer 
lqncred. 
47. In mid-November 1936, Jonn &. Gale, a non-member of th< 
tribe and a former justice of the Peace for the State of Uta! 
received a "temporary and limited11 appointment as a Tribal Judge 
He was specifically instructed by the Business Committee that hi 
was not to hear an / enrollment mattery. 
4S. Recent! y tf :.e Business Committee appointed Kathryn Jenki 
as a Associate? Tr ibal Judge. Judge Jinks has finished 8 years o-
schooling, and has received no trailing or education in how ti 
conduct a court; how to decide legal issues; how to interpret hi 
tribal laws; etc. I am personally Acquainted with Judge Jenks 
and knew her to be a very sweet 
However, she would be among the first 
know how to conduct court, etc. 
49. During the month of Deci 
Committee requested tnat three (3; jut 
the Lite Tribal Court to assist in the 
that had "piled" up. 
and accommodating person 
to acknowledae she does noi 
•iTiber, 1986 the Business 
ges from other tribes visil 
handling some of the cases 
SO. Effectively and for all intents and purposes, the Utt 
Indian Tribe has been without a judicial system since September 
1936, and no proper forum exist^ on the Ute Reservation tc 
Rights Act, or to enforce hear any claims under the Indian Civil 
the prior judgments of the Tribal Court 
51. From all appearances, as wel 
me by confidential but reliabl! sources, to 
Committee has indicated that it doe4 not intend to comply an> 
further with the Orders of the Tribal Court relative to the 
Enrollment matters, and that any judge appointed hereafter will 
be instructed that their appointment will prohibit them from i r 
any way dealing with that issue. 
1 a s f r cm i n f or mat i on g i vei 
t h e Bus iness 
5 2 . - W h i l e t h e Eh i s i i >ess C o m m i t t e e has made some " o u t w a r d 1 
i n d i c a t i o n s t h a t t h e y ar& " t r y i n g " t q g e t q u a l i f i e d i n d i v i d u a l ? 
t o s e r v e as T r i b a l J u d g e s , t h e r e s u l t ^ o f t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s a r e tc 
t h e c o n t r a r y . P r e s e n t l y , t h e r e i s r\o e f f e c t i v e fo rum on t h t 
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Indian Civil Rights Act- The 
for 
Bukiness Committee seems mci 
intent on appointing judges that the 
seeing that due process if guarantee^ 
properly applied. 
resolving Claims involving 
feel they can control, th 
and the "Rule ci Law" : 
III. COMMENTS 
Until the adoption of the Law ahd Order Code, the Ute Indi< 
Tribe -functioned with only one branch of government. Althouc 
not specifically authorized to do so under the Trib. 
Constitution, the Business Committee had acted as tt 
legislative, executive and judicial forums for the tribi 
Members aggrieved by the actions of the Business ^Committee coui 
only lock to the Business Committee -for relief. The decisicr 
that w.ere made were more often what was "politically" expedier 
and were not necessarily legally] morally or constitutional] 
correct. The Ute people had apparently recognized the need for 
Tribal Court when they provided in the Constitution that it wc 
one of the enumerated powers of the Jribal Business Committee i 
create a Tribal Court. 
The creation of a Tribal judiciary was a bold ar 
commendable attempt to create a fair and impartial tribal fori, 
to hear, decide and enforce, excluding major crimes, all of tt" 
legal questions involving tribal members and tribal government 
It has been my observation that the Tribal Business Committee he 
subscribed to that philosophy -for tli 
Court's decision agreed with what th 
The Business Committee has seemed to 
alone is the final "determiner" 
strange magic the Tribal Constitu 
Business Committee into the "soverej 
Business Committee and/or its legal a 
the facr that the true sovereign is 
that the Ute People have conferred c 
the Tribal Business Committee, 
courts, so long as tl~ 
e Business Committee wanted 
entertain the notion that i 
o-f issues, and that by som 
tion has transformed th 
ign". Somewhere the Triba 
dvisors have lost sight o 
the Ute PeDple. It is tru 
rtain enumerated powers uoo 
however the Ute People, as th 
to themselves all powers no true sovereign specifically retained 
specifically granted to the Business Committee. None of th 
enumerated powers of the Tribal Busihess Committee in any wa 
contemplate that the Business Committee could or should discharg 
any judicial function. 
The Ute Tribe is anxious to ceveicp and expand its role as 
self-governing sovereign. This seems to be upper-most in th 
minds of the people and the members o-f the Business Committee 
In order for the Ute Tribe to be trulj/ self-governing, there is 
need for some material and important changes in the Triba 
Constitution, so as to clearly provide for separation of power 
and for some checks and balances. This seems to be especiall 
important in light of the recent affirmation by the US Suprem 
Court that the Ute Tribe has exclusive jurisdiction over larg 
Memorandum on Ute 
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areas o-f land in the Uintah Basin. Apparently that jurisdictic 
extends to non-members of the tribe. 
Under the Indian Civil Rights Act, the Ute Tribe in ti-
exercise of self-government, cannot deprive anyone of thei 
property and certain other rights without "due-process" of la* 
It is impossible for me to conceive that the present method c 
regulating and determining tribal judges can possibly assure an 
genuine, orderly administration of justice or "due process" c 
law. 
-hand observations, I hav 
ividual is elected a memos 
After over 15 years of first-
forced the opinion that once an ind; 
of the Tribal Business Committee, that a transformation take 
place. It is as if the individual feels that he or she t^avB bee 
elevated above the law. They act as if the/ do no: have to ans^e 
to anyone, that the\ »n directly interfere with the courts 
police, and all other officials in the discharge of their swor 
duties. If the Tribal Business Committeeman does not obtain rh 
results that are requested, the individual who fails to comply i 
either terminated or his or her job is placed in jeopardy 
Directions are given and decisions ar^ reached, not on what tn 
constitution or law provides, but whaft the individual or group o 
Business Committeeman desire. o rce 
tribe more of a private social club or a exclusive politica 
party than a fair, democratic and representative governing unit 
There is no way feasible way that the existing tribal governmen 
can afford true due process of law tD al1 Tribal Members. 
this approach makes th 
I might say that while the opinions that I have expresses 
are iTiy own, they do represent the feelings of a large number o 
tribal members. 
Another problem I have perceived is the 
understanding and appreciation among Tribal members 
political process. I have observed that often 
a£ many persons running as c^ndi (bates 
Business Committee, as their 
there ar 
fcr a vacanc 
individuals who vote 
election. Because of the impcr;anc^ of tribal election 
Tribe itself, and to the greater comrroUnity of non-tribal 
it is important that Tribal Members be given some 
1 - — 1. 
1 C.C K 
for 
o 
tn 
e nearl 
y on 
i n 
s to 
th 
thi 
thi 
members 
hel p 
s to 
an( 
thi guidance in how to educate the voter, and get the voter 
pol1s. 
During the past year Mr. Ron Uilliam£, a member of the Ute Tribi 
and President of the Ft. Duchesne Community, has made somi 
serious and conscientious attempts tcf> get to the root of severe, 
matters involving the "high-handed" dealings of the Businesi 
Committee. To date his efforts have largely fallen on deft ears 
and have been blocked at every possible avenue by the Businesi 
Committee. In effect, they have "stonewalled" Ron in ever' 
request he has made for information, including information tha' 
tie-morandum on Lite 
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ne as a tribal member has a right to have access to. Recentl 
Mr. Williams has been seeking to have the Tribal Constitutic 
revised so as to clearly provide for three (3) separate branche 
cf tribal government, with some built in checks and balances. 
Mr. Williams request, I have drafted a revision of the Tribe 
Constitution. The draft is intended to be a "working" draft, bu 
it does lay the groundwork for a workable, representative, viabl 
and "balanced" tribal government. 
coctrine of separation of powers, 
trie basic provisions of the existin 
then relied upon the constitutions 
State of Utah for creating the 
executive, legislative and judicia 
Williams and his co-workers are revi 
discussing it with tribal members to 
To me the Ute Tribe is a gentle, 
understands nor comprehends its rble, power, 
destiny. It has been abused bctn frbm within and 
It would be based upon th 
I was very careful to folio 
g Tribal Constitution, an 
of the United States and th 
articles dealing with th 
branches. Currently Mr 
swing this draft, 
get further input. 
and ar 
awaking giant, that neithe 
strength an 
__^ wi thout. It ' 
leaders need to develop the proper perception of their rcle an 
duties as leaders, as well as confidence in the "Rule of Law" a 
the governing principle for tribal government. The Triba 
leaders need help in understanding the meaning of and how t 
apply a written Constitution. 
IV RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following are a few of the recommendations that I tnin 
need to be implemented on benalf of the Ute Tribe as socn a 
reasonably possible. 
1. The Tribal Constitution should be revised so as t< 
provide for a separation of powers with checks and balances 
This would assure two or more independent branches of triDa! 
government, one of which must be an independent judiciary. If 
addition, the traditional tribal cepneept of General Councils 
and powers and influence of a General Council could more fully ti 
defi ned. 
2. BIA supervision of the Tribe should either be cone awa^ 
with or made truly meaningful. If the 5IA is going to actually 
supervise the Tribe, then the supervision should be such that the 
BIA consistently and conscientious 
decisions of the Business Committe 
Ccnsti tutional Principles, guarantee 
merely serve to "accommodate" the 
Busi ness Commi ttee. 
ly makes sure that th* 
»e are based on corred 
"due process", and noi 
whims and wishes of thf 
3. A federal Court, such as th* Indian Court of Claims, be 
empowered to reviEW the final decisions of the highest appellate 
court of any tribe. This Court would help to formulate e 
consistent body of Indian Law, and tjo assure that the Indiar 
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Civil Rights Act is being fairly alnd eauitably applied by eac 
tribe- The purpose of this court woqld not be to change india 
laws and/or customs, but to see that Indian la^s, customs an 
constitutions are fairly and equajll/ applied and that Mdu 
process" is afforded to all. 
Congress needs act affirmatively to cietermine th 
role of the Ute Tribe on this r\ 
members, taxation, hunting and fi 
eservation, 
shine, etc. 
over non-trioa 
c.^^n though th 
Supreme Court has failed to revieU the 10th Circuit Court' 
decision, the state of affairs is si^ ch that for Congress to fai 
to act is going to mean several more years of litigation. Whil 
that may be an "attorney's relief jAct", it certainly is not i 
the best interest of either tne Ute Trioe or the non-member 
residing within the confines of the original Ute Reservation. 
A sy< rm or program woulq be developed in cocperatic 
in this State to provide or with one or more of the Universities 
going leadership training for present and potential tribe 
leaders. Perhaps a program could be arranged or developed wher 
interested tribal members could receive some concentrate 
leadership and political science training, and then be allowed t 
work with city, state and/or federal governmental leaders. Thi 
should be in almost every level and branch of governmeni 
Refresher courses should be made available on the Reservatior 
Qualified individuals ought to b^ invited to come to tt 
Reservation and to work directly with different tribal leaders s 
as to observe their job functions ancji to assist them in improvir 
their leadership skills. 
6. In addition to developing and enhancing the leadersh: 
capacity of Tribal members, I would urge that one or more of tt 
local universities be invited to use their upper-classmen c 
Graduate students to come to the reservation and study t\ 
political workings of the Ute Trib^. Hopefully they would I 
able to formulate some realistic plans for involving mere member 
of the tribe in the political proc< ss. especially in the actu< 
voting in primary and general elections. 
CONCLUSION 
While there are several immediate problems that face t! 
integrity of the governmental process of the Ute Tribe, the 
problems are not insurmountable. With the support of the prop 
authorities and some quick and decisive action, these proble 
can be transformed into positive experiences, for the benefit 
both the Ute Indian Tribe and their neighbors. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED; 
GEORGE E; MANGAr4 (\ 
^ ML**. 
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GEORGE E. MANGA 
A t t o r n e y at Law] 
47 Norm 200 East 
Rooseve't. Utan B4C55 
B01-722-2C2S 
N, APC 
Utan Bar 
Governor Norman S. Banger t e r 
213 S t a t e C a p i t o l Bui ld ing 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84114 
P-a Meeting with Ute Tribal Business Committee/Jurisdiction 
Dear Governor Banc :er: 
al 
th 
sh 
ca 
cf 
lo 
Last week I listened with a great 
levision and radio news reports concern: 
ioal Business Committee and its attor 
so read an account of it in the Deserei 
is "play" for publicity for a variety oi 
are with you some of my experiences w 
remittee and its attorney, you will unde: 
rticular (shades of Rodney Dangerfield) 
ficials were claiming that they "get nb 
ng time ago that the best way to gain r 
deal of interest to 
ng the visit of the 
i^ey to your office. 
News. I was amused 
reasons. Perhaps i 
lith the Tribal Bus in 
stand my amusement. 
I noted that the Tri 
respect". I learne 
spect is to earn it. 
Ute 
I 
by 
f I 
ess 
In 
has indicated its ! willingness to c 5 c JT.tt The Ute Tri: 
jurisdiction over a large area and population en the original 
reservation. A willingness to do something and the ability to co 
it are two different things. Personally, I could live with the 
Ute Tribe exercising jurisdiction within the framework of whai 
the Court and Congress might intend, if the Tribal 3jsiness 
Committee were caoable oi rover nm*: 
opinion that as structured and advised, the Business Committee cf 
the Ute Tribe is not ready to assume the responsibilities and 
obligations that are involved with "truly? governing. There is a 
difference between governing and "dictating". The Ute Tribal 
Business Committee does not understand the difference. My point 
may best be illustrated in a Memorandum and Notice of Civi] 
Rights Claim that I recently prepared. I I am enclosing copies for 
your information. These documents explain ten years of my first-
hand experience, with resulting frustrations of trying to get the 
Ute Tribal Business Committee to govern py simply complying with 
its own Tribal Constitution. If you or your staff will read the 
Memorandum and Notice it should not tak£ you long to determine 
why the Ute Tribal Business Committee is pot equipped to serve as 
a governing body. I would challenge the Business Committee or 
its attorney to produce evidence that i the information in my 
Memorandum is not correct. 
is 
In August of 1986, you appointed William A. Thorne, Jr., as if: 
AJA-V) 
Pa-
January 15, 1937 
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one of the 
recommended 
aole to ser 
Judoe for t 
of the most 
any level, 
fcrce in a 
comely with 
Circuit Judges in Salt Lake City* I personall 
him to the nominating committee as one qualified an 
ve as a judge of any court. ! Mr. Thome served as 
he Ute Trioe for about six years and as such was on 
effective and fair judges thjat I have dealt with 
Judge Thorne had been a steadying 
ttempting to get the Tribal 
the terms of the Tribal Constitution. In June 193 
he found both the Business Committee and its attorney in contemc 
or court. 
of them. 
actually in 
their own Court. 
appointment 
to comply a 
He imocseo some rather suosta 
while the Business Committee 
dicated they were going to cojtply w i ^ 
However, upon learning o 
to the Circuit Court, the Bu| 
d proceeded to dismantle the 
and compelling 
Business Committee t: 
ntial penalties on eac: 
ani its attorne; 
the Crcers c: 
Mr. Thorne1< 
siness Committee cease: 
Tnoa Sal Court. 
First, those lay judges who had anything to do with the 
decisions that resulted in the Contempt 
(See enclosed Memorandum for explanation 
all court personnel who were in any 
contempt decisions were terminated. Net 
with specific instructions not to accep 
anvthina to that do with the 
a 
subjec 
Business Committee's contempt. Finally, the new judges that 
hired were specifically instructed that they could not handle 
matter involving that subject matter without having it appr 
bv Mr. Martin Seneca, J r., the attorney for the Tribal Busi 
.natec . 
Next, 
rr\r* 
m v 
^ittee. The new judges and the clerks 
staff, that 
Seneca f s aoor: 
.ev are to refuse anvthmi 
val . Tne irony 
Business Committee and its members are 
cases, and Mr. Seneca is its attorney. T 
the defendants1 attorney who decides what 
and what the Court can or cannot hear. ! 
Isn't that a beautiful example of bot 
ability to govern, or should I say dictat 
Business Committee and its attorney is not 
Committee's conduct in your office was amu 
Order were ter~ 
of the cases J 
way involved w: 
p e r s o n n e l were h i red 
or f i l e any document 
the 
any 
oved 
ness 
have informed me and/or 
m a t t e r leading to 
t is d if f icjit to respect any gover 
it pleases and refuses to respect tne Rule 
details how Judae Thorne came to find 
ha t does not r e c e i v e 
eazn i n s t a n c e , tne 
n the 
h o 
: C 5 u . . 1 3 w.i = ; 
iOW 
can or cannot be f 
willingness 
e? This conduct cf 
amusing. The Busi 
sine . 
nea 
ice? 
and 
tne 
ness 
•ping body which does as 
cf Law* My Memorandum 
the Ute Tribal Business 
Committee to be in contempt of court. presently, the Business 
Committee is accumulating a fine at the r|ate of $100.00 per day 
for each day it fails to comply with tne Court's Order. Its 
attorney, Mr. Seneca, was also found to qe in contempt of court 
has a 
to 
f i ne 
take 
of $500.00 outstanding 
care 
against him. He has 
the same. It is my opinion that Mr. 
MIS'' 
D *a •-» J> — "7 — 
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Seneca has willfully and intentionally counseled his clients and 
± u 
th 
an 
so 
i t 
i n d i v i d u a l members a s t o how t h e y c 
e O r d e r s of t h e T r i b a l C o u r t . That i 
d t h e j u d g e s a r e not a l l o w e d t o 
e c i f i e d a r e a s of l a w r w i t h o u t Mr. Sene 
s a t t o r n e y , t h e B u s i n e s s Commit tee is! 
jan a v o i d comply ing w i t h 
s why t h e t r i b a l c l e r k s 
c c e o t any m a t t e r t h a t i n v o l v e s 
ca
%s a p p r o v a l . Through 
r e f u s i n c t o a l l o w t h e 
T r i b a l C o u r t ' s Contempt Orde r t o be e n f o r c e d . In my t w e n t y y e a r s 
of p r a c t i c e , I have n e v e r s e e n sucn a f j l a c r a n t d i s r e s p e c t of a 
c o u r t o r d e r a s h a s been e v i d e n c e d by Mr. ! Seneca and t n e B u s i n e s s 
C o mm i 11 e e . 
With this in mind, perhaps you c^ 
amusement when I read the accounts of 
Tribal Business Committee. Is it a cas 
the pot black, or the victimizer claiming 
the Business Committee using the age old 
so as to detract attention away from whkt 
who are or ought to be members of the Ute 
the members of tne Business Committee qan 
about the fact that individual Indians 
n better understand 
-y 
your m e e t i n g w i t h t h e 
e of t h e k e t t l e c a l l i n g 
t o be t h e v i c t i m ? I s 
t a c t i c of c r y i n g "wolf" 
i t i s do ing t o t h o s e 
s h o u t long and loud 
k r e h a v i n g t h e i r r i g h t s 
a b u s e d by w h i t e men. But I am h e r e on tipe Ute R e s e r v a t i o n and I 
s e e g r e a t 
a b u s e d bv 
numbers of i n d i v i d u a l I n d i a n s h a v i n g 
t h e Ute T r i b a l B u s i n e s s C o m m i t t e e . 
C o m m i t t e e may c l a i m t o be a c t i n g u n d ^ r t h e g u i s e of s e l f -
g o v e r n m e n t , b u t i t s c o n d u c t i s b e t t e r d e s c r i b e d as b e i n g s e l f -
d i c t a t i n c . I t s a c t i o n s a r e and have been a c o n t i n u i n a v i o l a t i o n 
of t h e 
a c t i o n s 
clear 
make 
and exoress terms of its 
a mockery 
t h e i r r i g h t s 
The B u s i n e s s 
a fundamen 
country, namely, respect' for the "Rule of | Law 
own Constitution. Its 
tal principle of this 
It is my considered opinion that as 
Business Committee is net vet ecuipped 
ability, the intelligence nor the foresight to be a 
body. 
covern 
Mv conclusion not only aoolies t 
non-tribal members, but extends 
Tribe. This is because it is unwilling 
Law", to respect the law, or to ei/en abide by 
Constitution. Until such time as the Tifibal Business Committee 
is willing to follow the Rule of Law and 
a duly and properly constituted court, it 
recommend that anyone submit to the j 
out to Mr. Indian Tribe. As I recently pointed 
personal letter, it appears that it is t 
with a "forked tongue" and cries "wolf, (wolf", 
wolf. 
wi th 
?. i 11 e e , the Tribal" 
the advisors, the 
governing 
o its ability to fairly 
to members of tne Ute 
to follow the "Rule of 
|to obey lawful orders of 
is impossible for me to 
Lirisdict ion 
he Indian who 
of the Ute 
Seneca in a 
now speaks 
when there is no 
Please do not misunderstand me. There are many fine, even 
outstanding individuals who are members of the Ute Tribe. In 
k&M 
Ja-
Le' 
Re 
iary 15, 1987 
.er to Governor 3angerter 
Ute Trioal Business Committee/Jurisdiction 
rae 
con 
aci 
Tha 
Bus 
w: 
•-ho 
, there are individual members of the 3usiness Committee I 
individuals 
11 
sider outstanc :ng . These 
iities to assist the Ute Tribe to b| 
t is net the question. The quest 
mess Committee start using those abij 
they cease to insist on being diet 
existing 3usiness Committee does not 
*.ittee prefers to get things dene by 
iugh its legal counsel, or the advice 
;rd, the Business Committee has mace i 
no one had better Question it. 
have the capacity and 
e truly self-governing. 
ion is, when will the 
Iities correctly? V.:hen 
ators? I perceive that 
govern by leading. The 
dictating.H Whether 
the EIA or on its own 
self a law unto itse * - - * i -
The Business Committee can and hjas received a lot of 
gging and pleading and publicity by crying and whining and bek 
claiming that it is not getting the despect to which it is 
entitled. That does not make it so. 
that he is being treated like an incompetent. Whether he is or 
not, may not be the question. The question may be, is the 
reputation earned? So far, I have found 
as a Committee, not willing to pay the 
for it to cause me and others to conclude 
covern. If an individual or a arouo want$ 
treated with respect, then that individual or group must accept 
iat being treated with 
ittee truly desires to 
assume jurisdiction over non-tribal members, then it ought to 
the obligations and responsibilities t\ 
resoect imooses. If the Business Comm 
first try exercising jurisdiction properl 
The Business Committee must pay the 
imposes, namely that it, too, must follow 
law. 
the Business Committee, 
price that is necessary 
that it is competent to 
the privilege of being 
y within the Ute Tribe. 
price that leadership 
the law, and net be the 
of "taxation we 
This nation was founded because of a 
without representation". I r|i 1937, 
potential fer that situation on the Ute Reservation. We have the 
Business Committee trying to 
members. Jurisdiction carries 
who 
 z 
assume jurisdiction over 
:h it the power to tax. w: 
I n d i a n s and n o n - I n d i a n s 
w i t h o u t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in the Ute 
w i t h o u t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s t i l l tyranny? 
i s bad enough for the n o n ^ I n d i a n s , 
not t j r iba l members 
al dovernment . Is t a x a t i o n 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n 
^volution a r i s i n g out 
now have the 
non-
Both 
ill be 
Wn the lack of 
there already 
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to Governor Bange r t e r w«r - w*: 
Ute Trioal Business Committee/Jurisdic tion 
refjses to enroll these individuals who cpnstitutionally and "by 
birth" are tribal memoers, then these individuals are not allowed 
to vote in elections of their Tribe, Ttjius, these individuals, 
are Ute Indians, are not able to register their opinions at 
ballot bcxr nor have a voice in theirj Tribe. Why, when they 
constitutionally members of the Ute Tribe, and citizens of 
Ute Nation? Their constitutional riglht to triDal membership 
wno 
the 
are 
the 
is being 
Reservation 
beyond the 
Even those 
ignored. Their actual members 
oeing determined by the personal whims of 
This has been going on for over forty (4 
sanctioned by every BIA bureaucrat t 
curing that time. The BIA sa 
Reservation, to the highest 
who are "accepted" for t 
difficulty getting information, assistance! 
from the Tribe, if it does not suit j 
Business Committee has in mind. The B| 
every one know that it can make it rough 
make waves. Those threats are complied wi 
cut of line. No wonder the Business Co| 
lack of resoect! 
[hip or lack of it, is 
[the Business Committee. 
0) years. It has been 
hat has been on the 
notion has extended far 
officials of the BIA. 
ribal membership have 
or even their property 
the purposes that the 
usiness Committee lets 
on them if they try to 
th whenever anyone gets 
Immittee suffers from a 
Please be assured that there is morej than just the Business 
Committee's or my side to this story. Th 
Indians who would like to have the privilege of expressing to you 
the frustration, disappointment and actual discrimination being 
exercised against them by the Business Committee. They try, but 
have a hard time cettinc heard on the Reservation because the 
Committee does not find it in th Business 
Business 
are interested in hearina from some of 
Committee to have anyone speak out against 
same happy to arrange the 
two hundred, I can get them 
determine whether to meet wi 
ere are ntanv individual 
e best interests of the 
T* V 
these people, I will ce 
Whether vou want one or a hundred or 
to assemb 
:h them in 
can >|le for you. You 
Salt Lake or on 
Reservation, but just give them a chance J to be heard. All they 
want is justice and equality. They want the law fairly and 
correctly applied. They know what it is like to live on the 
Reservation and to be discriminated against by their "own" 
government. If it is that way for Ute [Tribal members, can you 
imagine what it would be like for those who have "no voice" in 
any of the Tribal elections or affairs? 
For ten years I have hoped that the Business Committee would 
wake up before it is too late. The Business Committee has yet to 
learn it can only gain the respect it dejsires by showing proper 
respect for the Rule of Law. The Rulings of the Ute Tribal 
Appellate Court have been in place for [nearly six years. The 
Ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court has bee^ i in place less than six 
JUL*1 
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letter to Governor 3angerter 
Re: Ute Trioal Business Committee/Jurisdiction 
nont 
foil 
fell 
the 
Z enm 
Orde 
brou 
hs. 
ow 
ow 
If the Business Committee wants 
the rulings of the U.S. Suorem0 
the rulings of its own Cou *---* 
the white community to 
Court, why doesn't it 
It might be surprised at 
es me that the Business 
- s • , - 1 
results. Meanwhile, it truly anus 
and its attorney want immediate implementation of tne 
"white man's" Court, but refuses to comply with the 
"Indian's" Court. Since th 
of compliance witn 
the public, I have c 
the Business Ccmmitt 
orders by leading *-u-
ittee 
rs of the 
rs of the 
ght the 
ntion of you and 
icallv challence 
issue 
71 n; w11n cour 
Business Committee has 
Court Orders to the 
hesen to do the same. I 
lee to set the example of 
le wav. 
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George E. Manqan \ 
Attorney at Law ^ 
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AU.U 
While the U.S. Civil Rights Commission should be 
concerned about abusive use of power against its members and 
non-members, the Commission should not solely focus on whether 
the abuses reach impermissible degrees. Mariy tribes are not 
abusing their powers. However, the void left by Santa Clara 
Pueblo v. Martinez, leaves wide open the possibility and the 
opportunity for abuse of tribal powers when jthere is no 
effective remedy available to persons coming within the 
exterior boundaries of an Indian reservation. The Commission 
should address its concern to how meaningful] remedies may be 
fashioned so that when a tribe does abuse itjs power that 
effective and meaningful remedies are available to the victim. 
The practical impact of Santa Clar^ Pueblo v. Martinez 
is that: (1) generally accepted discretionary constitutional 
being privileges; 
political courts 
rights are converted from being rights into 
(2) tribal courts are more likely to become 
rather than courts of law; (3) there is no oversight by federal 
courts or by non-political bodies who can actually enforce 
rights; (4) the lack of access to any court,j such as was the 
case in Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. Arapaho andl Shoshone Tribes is 
substantially increased; (5) realistic and meaningful remedies 
are diminished; (6) reservation tribal members are made second 
class citizens; (7) non-tribal members are miade third class 
citizens; and, (8) reservation government based upon tribal 
AJU.O 
membership r a the r than upon the consent of the governed i s 
perpetuated because t r i b a l membership has h i s t o r i c a l l y been 
based upon p o l i t i c a l and r a c i a l c r i t e r i a . 
In applying the Santa Clara consequences to the Ute 
Reservat ion area of the S ta te of Utah, the i|mpacts upon 
n o n - t r i b a l members become more obvious and seve re . The 
decis ion of Ute Tribe v . S t a t e of Utah has hiad the fol lowing 
lega l and p r a c t i c a l e f f e c t s : (1) i t quadrupled the Reservat ion 
in geographic t e r r i t o r y , to make i t the second l a r g e s t 
r e s e r v a t i o n in the United S t a t e s ; (2) i t encpmpassed 15,000 
n o n - t r i b a l members; (3) i t encompassed approximately 70-75% of 
a l l fee land; (4) i t expanded the t e r r i t o r y over which the Ute 
t r i b e has s i g n i f i c a n t j u r i s d i c t i o n a l a u t h o r i t y over people and 
p rope r ty , i . e . , hunting and f i s h i n g , water c o n t r o l , cont ro l of 
i ng re s s and e g r e s s , t a x a t i o n , l i c e n s i n g , bus iness r e g u l a t i o n , 
zoning and land use, con t r ac t r e g u l a t i o n , an$ many other 
day- to-day a f f a i r s ; (5) i t placed the Tr ibe , S t a t e and loca l 
governments in to d i r e c t competi t ion for revenues from most of 
the same proper ty and people ; (6) i t e l iminated access to 
federal cour t s by both t r i b a l members and non-members; (7) i t 
placed approximately 15,000 non-members unde^ the governmental 
con t ro l of a t r i b e in which they have no p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s ; (8) 
i t placed approximately 15,000 non-members wivhin the removal 
powers of the T r i b e ; (9) i t ousted the S ta te and loca l 
governments from concurrent j u r i s d i c t i o n in rhany i n s t a n c e s ; 
(10) i t placed most governmental a f f a i r s in ^he hands of 450 
- 2 -
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tribal voters; (11) it increased the likelihood of much more 
litigation over jurisdictional rights withirj the 4,000,000 acre 
reservation; (12) it imposed greater burden$ and stresses upon 
tribal courts; (13) it increased political attentions and 
sensitivities between tribal members and nori-members; (14) it 
diminished respect for and support for the tribal government by 
non-tribal members; (15) it diminished respect for the federal 
government by non-members because the federal government has 
allowed the Santa Clara condition to continue since 1978; (16) 
it has increased political pressure upon the! tribal government 
by tribal members and tribal government advocates to expand 
tribal powers under theory that if they do n|ot use the tribal 
power they will lose it; (17) it diminished values of existing 
reservation property owned by non-members; (|18) it diminished 
the interest of economic development within [the reservation by 
persons who live within and outside the reservation. 
The adverse impacts upon the Ute Reservation's 
population is readily apparent. The Commission must be aware 
that not only should it be concerned about the rights of tribal 
members who live within the reservation, butj non-members as 
well. The Utah situation dramatically points out this problem, 
but every reservation probably has non-member residents. 
Whether one person is deprived of his civil rights or 15,000 
should not make the difference. The Commission should make 
recommendations to overcome these unfair practices through 
legislative recommendations. 
-3-
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r members, from 
ir support for an 
stitutional 
Unfortunately, tribal governments, (for the most part, 
do not support changes to the Indian Bill o£ Rights and the 
Indian Civil Rights Act. In my opinion, it lis in a tribe's 
best interest that an improved Indian Bill <^f Rights be enacted 
with provisions that more closely incorporate the principles of 
the United States Constitution and which projvides for federal 
judicial oversight under reasonable circumstances. Tribal 
governments desire to have respect from theij] 
non-members and from other governments. Thep 
Indian Bill of Rights which incorporated conjs 
principles and federal oversight would accomplish improved 
respect. It would also improve opportunities for reservation 
investment where tribes desire economic development through 
investment from outside the reservation. And most importantly, 
it would improve the quality of life on reservations for all 
residents and persons having relationships w|.th the 
reservations. 
It is also very much in the national interest to end 
the dual standard of citizenship rights thatinow exist as a 
result of certain tribal failures to implement the Indian Bill 
of Rights. I make the following recommendations to you for 
careful consideration as you make your own recommendations to 
the President and to the Congress. Any solution should 
incorporate the following principals: (1) preserve and protect 
the principal of meaningful triba] sovereignly; (2) balance the 
rights of the individuals, both member and ncjn-member, against 
-4-
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the powers of t r i ba] governments ; ( - ~^ *xua~~ *- * 
r ii g 1 11:, 3 e s t a b 11 i s 1 1 e d 1 11 1 3 e 1: !: I: e II il t e d ) 
r eq u i r e t h e consen t 0 f t h e go v e r ned be f c * e 1 - r . c *=• ~ i mpo s e 
*
;
~'l upon others who reside with3 n i ts br:-^ar:-~- (5> 
f : • ] : 1 1 e a 1 12 1 1 • g f 1 1 ] f e d e r a ] j 1 1 d i c :i a ] : v e 1: \ * - : ^  
reasonably available; (6) provide federal fun-ir.? .• ent ; ,c-s * > 
: m r* ,r -;, -^  t h e q u a ] 11 y o f j u s t i c e a n d m a k e r e a I m e protections 
n g r e s s u 1 t i m a t e ] ;r :i n t e n d e d a t r i b e 16 i m p 1 e m e n t . 
CONCLUSION 
11 w o u 1 d b e a f i 11 i n g f o r m o f c e 1 e b r a t i o n o f t h e 2 0 01! i 
year o f t h e IJ n i t e d Sta t es Cons t i t u t io n i f t hi s Co mmi s s ion wi1 ] 
m a k e reco mm e n d a t i o ns t o t h e Pr e s iden t and t o t h e Congress wh i c h 
m a k e t r i b a 1 g i» v e r n m e i 11 m e a n i n g f i :i1 a i i 3 f a :i i: !::  c: a 1 1 p • E? r s • :> n s a n d 
t h e : ; - : : < • .% ' . . .: . : o v e r n m e n t s h a v e a 1 e g i t i in a t e 
cover r T e : t - ".ceresr qoverr.: na . 
/ 
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nairman av: men.: ei . . ",jnr3 
Commis~: 
Indian bin ui r<- * 
My exper:er^< 
stretcr.ed over the .-z 
air-* 
t
 i
 w . w ff .„ *-* S ^ 1 *Ti C * ^  
:ceien 
h - if
 f
-his hea--' — 
jqr *: e • orese• 
that off; 
c 
pri^ a.-
 : . .- . 
have pLac*-
I 
( * jnirle, 
s 
' ecto' 
z-irstance 
x^*r*r 1 . 
,e Countyy Arizona) anc vis * a -
-er Brule Sioux Tribe 
rib 
South Dakota^ 
. _ 6 O i v u X 
d ~ _a r i -2 f 3 f- ci 
^ 1 JL-I iM| i. 1 i * ^ * -
 fc 
; i /r ,rctan :es have made me . *dvoeafe 
i*"c1 ; ' '»1>ja ' "*'•* ^ - ^ - * . ^ *- d * t i -j * 
• a - v i s a ii.li H 
( 
s ; tuat * -J: .j p e r t a i n e d t o i i i d i v i d u a 1 I n d i a n s c i: tribes, 
A^.a 
have advocated support for ,^3 lovernme; ~- •• <=•-= ^2 ted 
its membe 1:s ai i :i 1 101 1 memberr - -.:zl 
p r o t e c 11 o 1: 1 o £ f u n d a in e n t a I .. . 1 e s e x 1 c * - . - r ™ R 
provides minimum elements o: * a i m e r s ^.a* > - r;--* - win 
the res p e c t c: f in e HI b e 11 s a n 
e s t a b 1 1. s h 11: i t 1 a 1 1 e g 11 i m a 1 .. a re l a t i o n s n i p s exist 
without the Bureau of Ind-j*. Affairs being u^reoUj r^ 
ii idi r ectl ] :ii 1 1 re: ] "; e ::i 
Co 1 1 g ress 1 1 as plenary power over Indian tribes. 
Congress has dele gat ed t o t he Bur e a 1 1 o f Indi an A £ f a ir s the 
E > ] " i 1 c i f • a 1 " e s p o n s i ii : i ] ii 11 ::; , f : , • f • : 1: r 11 1 ] = 11 i i 1 g a 1 1 :1 e x e c ' 1 11 i n g n a t i o n a 1 
I n d i a n p o 1 i cy e ve n t ho ug h Co ng r e s s h a s a 1 s o d e 1 e g a t ed f r a g m e n t s 
o f n a t i o n a 1 1 n d i a n p o 1 i c y t o o t h e r d e p a r t m e n t w i t h i n t h e 
e x e c 1 :i t i r e I : ;i : a n c I: 1 B e c a u s € : f 1 I:
 ; e B \ , 1: e a 1 1 c: f 11: 1 d :i a 1 1 1 i f f a i 1: s ' 
h i g h p r o f 1 1 e i n I n d i a n a £ £ a i r s , i t i s o f t e 1 1 t h e 2 i g h t n i n g r o d 
fo r • every perceived wrong t hat has occurr ed i n Ind i a n country. 
individua. - - -;"**-. JI . 
the BIA n • cr e a t u ' - * -^*—oc f-- T wnom 1 -
a i 2 1 il: 1 o 1: i 1: ;v ., m ::> 1 1 e i ,- a 1 1 • ::l 11:1 u c 1 :t c • f i t s p o J I c y. ' I n s t e a d Il intend I * 
conunent c o n c e r n i n g wha t i s \ < »' 1: 1 c t shou 1 d b e , how I,t can ain 11 
s h o u 1 d be d o n e , and \ *h a t sh o u 1 d be d o n e :i 1 1 11 1 e i n t e r 11111 ; 
iTi:; • i si" • A 1 1 1 a t o 1 13 j C o 1 i g 1: e s s c a n p r e s c r i b e 11 1 e c u r e f 01 t h e 
absence of meani ngful enforcement of the Indian Bill of 
l^g^l-5^ j t £s a ^ s o r[1, r v j e |,j ;i E _|: ,  ;i;I :|[t j j Q.0:1 ;igress (:)|( ,! s 
AAA ^ 
and 
more ii-tar - . ,- . : <. - i u icement , c ; r ';*-
Ihr hlk ANL NATIONAL INLIAN POLICY 
" • !?• - i r e f r o n i . 
e x e c u ' r i n c a: . . - 3 : - \ , . i p c i ; ' : i t u n a * . I n c i a * p< . : y ha6 ' 
b e e r L : I ; C , - - . - e r f f -" J • * " - * 1.11 1 .1.1. 
i - i . a , . * e r e s t s * veil 
t h o u g h t h e r e a r e n o n e : f e o - r a l c r o g r a r r - j s s i a t 2* i an 
i n l : - :~u^ * V — ^- -7iams h a v e d^ d pd 
t i o v e r n r p p n t 9 T> sa^ 
t h a t J m g . - s s i o n a 2 j. < - . • s i n c e - t^a,- r ee • ^ ^ a n e j *o 
e n c o u r a g e - — - — d e v e l o p i r - - - , • ,- • , , • • i l 
-: t r _ , *.. - nt 1 lii-
c o n g r e s s : "-ai:'.- ' J ( r - : T i n e a o o ^ . s n^merv .£ t r i b a l c o n s t i t u t i o n s 
and - •: r a n e e s hav^ r ^ r n e n a c t e u D , I f 1 IIIH» mil <i| »| MI I no-ii 
. e . i i t r e ' / . . t e r i o r . E a c . -,; it' a i o r e m e n t i o n e d 
. • -,gr t s s : v J - j<sa . *a" . ! : . c t * oc s power in I', he t r i b t , 
e v e n LIIOU ? 1 mil 1 >,' ! ulna 1 s . I 11 
more r e c e . ~ o , j * ^1 ; - . * v .
 sab . r t f j , e n h a n c e d by t r i b a l 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of more and mote f e d e r a l p r o g r a m s on d 
9 0 v e r nme n t • t o - q 0 v e t" n n 11- • n 1" 11 ;••• •••> 1 «,
 If A ^ I I J I pc 1 s e 11 1 «> H J I I M u ni|i« |„ n„ 
a a n n n i s t e r i n g f e d e r a l p r o g r a m s d i r e c t l y t o b e n e f i c i a r i e s 
t h r o u g h f e d e r a 1 a g e n c i e s . 
During these past VJ yp.uw, M M 1 HI/- 1 I M S IIIII I! 111 <M I I ht> 
restoration ot, meaningful economic and political power to the 
tribes. Although tribal powers were being strengthened, the 
A d ^ 
Arren-.:imenr * 
r - Jl U l U l V l U U r 
that any affemrt wa_, rr.au-. • dlani-.. * 
with the rigiv. r -:;vidual". The . 
u -
s p e ^ . r . c j . . . : J . * . - - • . u . uovernmei. * ne s t a t e -
and t-, the p e o p l e . Howevei f e d e r a l j u d i c i a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s 
o t r i b a l | i MA. »• i hi i' i inn 11 1 11 I mi in 11 t hi in I I in in 11 in I incut! ne i i i ,M » HI I 
any powers . S o v e r e i g n t y w i t h i n an Indian r e s e r v a t i o n i L 
t o t a l l y he ld by the l e g i s l a t i v e branch Hie t r i b e s ' 
l e n i ' 1 *i t IM < if r inr'h*11 'pi w\ m WJJ a • v i,: I, i iiii.ii in* iiii HI I JIS 
p l e n a r y as Congress 1 power i s v i s - a - v i s the t r i b e s . In 
e s s e n c e , u n l e s s t r i b a l powers have been l i m i t e d h\ iY>nqre?r. a 
t i l l ) ( I Ml III I I , II I II I I II I III III ! I l l I I I II II II III I 1 II I I I " , i . i I 111 I. J I 
ordinances have incorporated the United States Constitute :., 
the Indian Hii] of Riqhts, wr a special bill rf rights, the 
i (~ i " O i i *-i 111 i H I T I I I I - 1 I I I | 1 i l l HI »'» iH-Mi' f ' la l l l i r • f y* 1 " - d 
without reasonable judicial oversight. 
THE B1A AND THL K'RA 
1 I i ( M i l t ifii i I i f t h n 1 nr) i ,i in P j 1 1 
Congress' statement that fiibal powers had limits in the Ii 
relationships with persons within then yur i sd i ct i on*... The 
I Vh yi' i l II j I (• 'i ( I I 1 I 1 1 I edljl I If i H I I II 1  III I I PI I i t d t e S 
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s int t i t r i b a l j u r i s d i c t i o n s wh i l e 
t a k i n g In to accoun t c e r t a i n unique* t i i b a l c i r i 'umst .IIIM e« Hi m 
I H»i\ in I i II ml was a c c e p t e d L , neai ly every i e d e r a l i n i t u i t 
c o u r t o f a p p e a l s , i £ n o t e v e r j c i r c u i t,- t h a t t h e f e d e r a 1 c o u r t s 
A < U 1 | 
had jurisdiction to review allegations that a tribe violated 
certain individual rights, During thir same 10-veai period, 
thin Fxeeut i VH IM-HH In n! il !IH IMIJHIJI (JO11*'! HHH-MI! rpcei!rerj 
appropriations from Congress to implement and enforce the Act. 
While the B1A advocated the st renqt hen inq o\- tribal 
puweib tin; itk w i i in MiK'i.n mi ill 'jovei i HIH..1 in t. d J advocacy for 
individuals who came within the jurisdiction ot tribal powers. 
The exception t«" thir statement in: t Mr Mir u I" period frviiTi 1973 
tlimuqh I'i'h vhmni H* ' Nixon I'nrri Administrations created and 
supported the Office ot Indian Rights within the Department of 
Justice, "1 h e Santa Llaia Puebli) 1/, Mac tinez <I H , • 1 -,
 M -11 in I,L^ •" 1 -
effectively terminated one of the significant bases toi llul 
off ice• 
Even t;li0uq11 Mi*•• '">f"f i <",:i « • f i n,<;1 1.111 I"'" 1 • 1 1 1 t c . 0 ' p e r A"' "»• I 1 1 a 
c: i e: p e r . 0 d, some v a I u a b 1 e lessons c a n hi e 1 e a r n e d £ r o m 11 s 
p e r f o r m a n c e , During its 5-6 year period, the Office of Indian 
R i o h t S w'3"-; . in . id t(w 1 il i M M I in I 1 w 1 d 11 ill 11I 11 M I 1 1 1, e 9 e d I y 
vict imized by Lr ibd 1 quvei nments exceeding l* he 1 imitations 
imposed by the Indian Bill ot Rights, I Ms activities we in 
v n n i H wl - i •» w 11 i I 1 111 111 M ' 1 r 1 mi* 1111 fir 1111 R t i r f- il 1 rm 1 11 
advocai ~:.w - .- rights ul nidi t* citizens whom were victimized by 
state and local .?o< •-: : ment s exceeding the limitations imposed 
. - ' I HI I Il <ll I I I ' i l I ''HiiiHin iim- nil >• 
I B O K . , . . v a A i a b i l i t y o f I n d e r a l t m u m s m o t i v a t e d m a n y 
individual ^v:;a- - 5 i rgan izc , t o a s s e r t t h e i r r i g h t s - - a tween 
1 ( II 11 I  I I 1 1 1 1 II 1  111 III' 1 1 1 II 1 1 
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i n d i v i d u a l ' - '^  Mil if UMII ' \ ] iw " i " . , i p " m \ m y r -* I In In 1 i i 1 
the Linn1" ' J I I L L J I poww, if 1 the b r e a d t h >t i n d i v i d u a l 
l i b e r t i e s . While the Act was s t r i c t l y d i r e c t e d tu 
t r ibal - ind i n i i u a I i < 1 11 i n i' n i I llh i mi I In 1111 i i i J r t J in i 1 in i 
Indian ttib«, the entoiceirtent ui tun indian Bill ot Rignis 
heightened \ h^ awareness ot civil liberties of many Indians, 
t ' ' I I I I I K M I » | I | I 111 H I I 1 I III I ill III I I I I I i l l J | | ; I I I l| I I- I,! I I 
ach ieved b | i n c r e a s e d c i v i l r i g h t s awareness inc luded not c j " 
b e t t e r oaJance between t r i b a l qovernments and i nd i v idua I r.,, ou t 
i « - i w * I ' M i I . 1 i j i j i « i i i d i a n , : ; 
v i s - a - v is the s t a t e and loca l governments. By 1 y 7 8 trie t r i b a l 
gov*-:-re** P - . - ^ - - . -• , s p e c i a l sens 111 «1 i hv tn the ricrhtn nf 
i . i I in '-jiivt I unit- ewise ev idence . ! a 
s i m - * j : deg ree _: • •. i w t y to tho r i g h t s of t h e i r I n d i a n 
r e s i d e n t s *^n ^ *r r-^r«~ 
p* . od repeal c J ibe came -
e n c c ; r a q e - c c n o j , , : * \ - i o p n e : , - , -3f-z e r m i n a t i e r ; . . . . .* , a J 
p l u r i - "1 :^i i i . j.iit? l e i d t r 
L . , .qht-Q was g e n e r a l l y goou udt 
oa lane mo ^ * -ouun* u n t a r - r t : 
<~>^ w e i •*- -
sirengtnen*1
 t p r e s i d e n t - * .c u r e a s e . 
n> ^ernr^~~ * - :- --liifiienL t e i d t i o n b 
; ; i u s t r a t i c r i: t h i s eon< - : : • ; s t r e n g t h e n i n g was __.*„ ~~.^ 
/ W '> 
Pvounueu Mite 
Dakot? Th* » 
i - t<- r f e r r er * 
U U H ! » ) , . "•- . d 
: \ '2 i o - J . 
i..eued.* -
- a t 
g t.... .= . - . 
res t ; - orde 
en torceme. . ' 
e x c e s s e s . 
P P ^ I : tr -- - O w v t * . ..!«» 
: * - • *iservat :<n an.: t ! 
: e S u i , : t i 
Inr i i An 
O t P r t ^ C l +r:> , ^r ^lativeS am 
*.t.ttt v.;/.. - generally c o m p l e m e r t a : j r le* 
tne U*pa:;-- * ' .r^eri - * ' <•• ^- ^ *~ Indian Affairs 
I nl' j i *' "' JL u ' "i i" !•»< 11 i.1-1 VI. i '"inj tcit.es to implement 
the provisions ot the Indian h ill of Right s» both through moi:a 1 
leadership and thruuqh c o n s i s t e n t uniform enforcement 
-in I I • i I i ' l 11.11 is1 (-11 MiH I ili 11 In ill I he Bureau nt Indian 
A f f a i r s had several points in its trust responsibility 
relationships with t r i h e c t« dL» thir;, 'Those point;; m c 1 jiled 
i J J e i <"'..:> I MI i mil 111 11 i tin i in t M , i ii n I i until i Hit j I, i in approval process 
and the contracting process. 
As to the approval process, many o£ the * -
JI^IJ {i j an i z«.Mi M i i in I ii,h i i i i 11-id cons*" 
p r o v i s i o n s which empowered the*' Secretary c t the 
designee to review certain tribal enactments, c 
mi , nainances and Constitutional ^r 
tne review process the BIA had the opportunity *_ evaluate 
nal 
:er i v Ai" II l , 
luring 
-7-
Ai4 
tribal actions in the context ui t -
t -ommei it upon or neaaf ^ Q P a c , : - . ,.,u.u..: mat v - L 
there was no consiste: \ . ii- :. '-ft or: _ :. _.__ 
of Rights review. 
As to the contracting process, the BIA and al ] federal 
agencies con t r a c11ng w11h t rIbe s o r t h r oug h t r ibe s had t he 
o p p o r 11 it n i t;; > t: • :: c o m p e ] t r i t: • e s a i :i d t i i e i r a g e i :i c i e s t :: • i it p 1 e m e i 11 
IndIan B111 of R i g h t s ' p r o v I s i o n s . A s a ge n e r a 1 ru1e federa3 
a g e n c i e s r o u 11 n e 1 y i n c o r p o r a t e d o t h e r c i v i ] r I g h t s 1 a w s i n t o 
t h e i :i : :: • : • i I t r a :: t s :i 11 i t i: i I:: • e s !:  i 1 1 :::l ::i ::i i: i • :: t s p e c i f } t: II: :t e 11 I d i a i I , 
B i l l ot R i g h t s , iii p r a c t i c e t h e r e w a s n o e f f e c t i v e c o n t r a c t 
o v e r s i g h t r e l a t i v e t o I n d i a n P i l l o f R i n h t s e n f o r c e m e n t I a m 
UM.^VMI I H 'i I I  f.i n | I i I II I iii in n i I ne I H d I i lie i d I i i JIII I i i • I w i I hi a 
trIbe was terminated or where any contract sancti on was Imposed 
or where even any i nvestiga11on of a 1 1 eged vio1ati ons was 
• ::! :: i I d i i c t e d 11 I J ii g 1 1 1 :: £ 11: :i • 3 i I i i m e i: o u s c o m p 1 a i i 11 s a b o u t 
tribal-individual relationships, :l t i s difficu 11 to be 11 eve 
that -• - _ w^ntracts could have been free, of similar 
t/i HI , 
As a practical m a t t e r , the federal policj of promoting 
tribal s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n and internal H1A po l i t i c < M' i i iiiiqi 1 y 
I 
in 111 11K I I I i i f ii11 IJ i u i i 1111 i ii i 11 | imp11 i i T h t e r i o r * u i e f u s e a n y 
l u u t i n e involvement in I BOH enforcement a c t i v i t i e s even • -".ough 
the Bureau had some nieaninqfui t o o l s a v a i l a b l e t o nm 
u [ I J IP . J , . 
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The BIA'S limited IBOR involvement can be largely 
explained. Due in large measure to Mortoft v. Mancariy 417 U.S. 
535 (1974), BIA personnel charged with executing its mission 
were generally tribally affiliated Indian persons who had been 
in positions of power in tribal governments or were related to 
tribal political leaders or were affiliated in some manner with 
tribal politics and politicians. 
BIA non-enforcement or limited enforcement activities 
can also be traced in part to the collective influence of 
tribal leaders who demanded that the BIA ^tay out of tribal 
politics, and the lack of any significant demand by individual 
Indians that the BIA involve itself in IB0R matters. As a 
general rule, reservation politics was divided between those 
who were in power and those who were out of power. 
Nonetheless, both those in and out of pow£r possessed a common 
desire to preserve the powers of the tribe in its dealings with 
outsiders. Further, the Bureau was comprised of mostly Indian 
personnel, some of whom were tribal members. Thus, BIA 
involvement was feared as being potentially partisan. 
The Indian Bill of Rights was commonly perceived by 
Indian politicians of nearly every faction as a threat to 
sovereignty and their political power. EVen those whom used 
the IBOR to secure their political power saw that it could be 
later used against them. Thus, it was natural for BIA 
personnel to lean heavily in favor of strong tribal governments 
and to suspiciously view the Indian Bill of Rights. As a 
-9-
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result, the Indian Bill of Rights was not a priority with the 
BIA. Further, the Office of Indian Right$ was viewed as the 
responsible agency for its enforcement. With the Martinez 
decision and the termination of the Office of Indian Rights, 
the principal impetus for any government Agency enforcing the 
Indian Bill of Rights within reservations was lost. 
THE BIA'S ROLE AFTER MARTINEZ 
After Martinez and after the demise of the Office of 
Indian Rights, there has been no apparent and visible federal 
government enforcement of the Indian Bill of Rights. Tribal 
councils have controlled access to their courts and in many 
instances have influenced judicial decisions either before or 
after the tribal judiciary has acted. Eacpn tribe has been left 
to its own devices as to if and how it will enforce the Act. 
There is no obvious involvement by the BlA in causing tribes to 
enforce the Act and there has been no visible organized effort 
by individuals to lobby tribes, the BIA, ©r the Congress to 
compel tribal or Bureau enforcement. 
Does this condition suggest that there are no 
problems? The answer is clearly no! Your hearings in Rapid 
City and Flagstaff and various news articles reveal that there 
are many reasons to believe that there ar$ substantial bases 
for Congress to reassess the Act and the lack of oversight. 
The principal reasons that there is not a greater 
outcry against the current situation include the fact that 
general reservation poverty limits the financing of organized 
•10-
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activities by individuals, there is a perception by individuals 
that they cannot beat "city hall", there is a perception by 
individuals that tribal council power is supreme over tribal 
judicial remedies, there is no recourse outside of the tribal 
system, there has been a diminishment of publicly funded legal 
services, there is a general reluctance by publicly funded 
legal services to attack tribal actions, ^nd there is a concern 
that challenges to tribal power will weaken the ability of 
tribes to deal with their outside adversaries, i.e., state and 
local governments. 
Many tribes are not per se opposed to the enforcement 
of civil rights within their reservations but, instead, they 
view civil rights as a luxury which they Cannot afford. Tribal 
budgets are principally devoted to badly needed support 
services with minor portions available to defend civil rights 
claims. Other tribal concerns arise out cbf the Indian Bill of 
I 
Rights1 enforcement history from 1968-1978. Many Indian Bill 
of Rights' contests pertained to the conduct of tribal 
elections where tribal power was often placed at the mercy of 
activists who could paralyze and intimidate tribal government 
by the filing of an action in federal cou^ rt, often using 
publicly financed lawyers. Memories of tliiose years have been 
partially responsible for chilling any support for any new laws 
which would again place tribal government on the defensive and 
where they may be placed in financial jeopardy. 
-11-
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WHAT ULTIMATELY MUST BE DONE 
The long term solution to meaningful civil rights 
protection resides with Congress. It has the plenary power to 
define the rights of individuals and to define the limits of 
tribal powers. In addition, it must provide a meaningful 
enforcement mechanism. Tribal government advocates will 
initially be uniformly against the idea in much the same way as 
the states were opposed to the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments 
and the implementing of federal legislation which states 
perceived diminished their powers vis-a-vis the federal 
government. 
Legitimate tribal concerns can bk dealt with by new 
legislation which strengthens, or at least maintains, tribal 
powers while enhancing the rights of individuals. It is not 
necessarily true that anything which strengthens individuals in 
their relationships with tribal government results in weakening 
tribal government. Congress could strengthen the rights of 
individuals and simultaneously strengthen tribal justice 
systems1 courts, and its law enforcement administration. 
Any revised Indian Bill of Rightjs should include a 
Congressional commitment to finance a reservation justice 
system that meets defined minimum standards. Those minimum 
standards should include a judiciary that is independent of 
political interference during a reasonable term and whose 
members are law trained (not necessarily a lawyer), and a 
police force that is trained in law, techniques for 
-12-
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enforcement, and knowledge of the Indian Bill of Rights. Pay 
standards should be established for the justice system that are 
attractive within the geographical area served. 
For tribes to be truly capable of surviving in times 
of shrinking federal funds for tribal programs, a case must 
also be made for conforming the Indian Bill of Rights more 
closely to the United States Constitution. All tribal members 
are citizens of the United States and are considered residents 
of the states within which they reside. With few exceptions, 
tribal members generally have extensive contact with 
non-reservation situations, i.e., they attend school with 
non-Indians, they shop off-reservation fou many items, they 
often work off-reservation, they frequently marry non-tribal 
members, their reservations are often checker-boarded or have 
significant areas of non-tribal lands, an<$ otherwise have 
substantial interaction with off-reservation persons, 
governments and private enterprise. 
It is not practical for private investment to 
seriously consider a reservation as a place to locate or to do 
business if the tribal justice system is significantly 
different than non-reservation situations with which private 
investment is familiar. It is not practical for tribal members 
who have the means to develop their potential within the 
reservation if the tribal justice system is subject to dramatic 
political change. It is not practical fot tribes to impede 
their own development by adhering to a government system that 
-13-
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offends the majority society's or members' sense of fairness. 
It is not practical for Congress to permi^ tribes to operate 
without guidance as to what is and is notjacceptable concerning 
governmental power and individual rights. 
It is not fair for citizens of t}ie United States to 
have enclaves within the United States' boundaries where 
Constitutional principles are not in effect. It is not fair 
that non-tribal members residing within reservation boundaries 
are without the protection of the United fetates Constitution 
and federal courts. It is not fair that tribal members are not 
assured that they will have recourse to a judicial system that 
is not subordinate to the tribe's political body. 
The current situation with the IJBOR is neither 
practical nor fair to any of those who liJT 
govern within Indian country. I implore 
situation to the Congress and request that Congress begin the 
process for simultaneously strengthening individual rights and 
the tribal governments' ability to assure those rights. 
Not only should Congress be concerned with the rights 
of tribal members within a reservation, fc^ut it should also take 
into account numerous non-member Indians and non-Indians whom 
are not participants in the tribal political process and yet 
are subject to many tribal powers. In s<j>me reservation areas, 
the numbers of non-Indians substantially 
tribal members. In my own State of Utah^ the Ute Reservation 
has a non-Indian population that outnumbers the Indian 
ve, work, invest, or 
you to report this 
exceed the numbers of 
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population eight to one. The Ute Reservation includes 
incorporated towns and substantial business activities. 
Nonetheless, the non-Indian and non-member Indian population 
have no political voice in the tribal government that governs 
Not only are the non-members subject to I 
their disputes with tribal members in tri 
in turn subject to the political power o^ 
business committeef but such non-members 
itigating certain of 
bal courts which are 
the tribe's governing 
have no political 
voice in the election of the business confmittee even though the 
non-member resides in the same political [territory as the 
tribal members. This anomaly must be confronted and an 
equitable solution found. 
CONCLUSION 
Indian people and Indian governments are striving not 
only to survive but to survive with dignity and respect. 
Tribal governments want respect from those they govern and from 
those whom are their neighbors outside the reservation. Tribal 
governments want their legitimacy to be Accepted by others. 
Tribal governments want to safeguard the 
race and political institutions. Tribal 
control their land, resources, members, 
the reservation that affect their intere 
governments want to influence state and 
those policies impact them. However, tr 
require monetary resources to finance thbir operations. In a 
time when tribal financial resources seep to be outstripped by 
uniqueness of their 
governments want to 
knd activities within 
sts. Tribal 
national policy as 
ibal governments' wants 
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tribal wants, tribes must acknowledge that an important 
ingredient to solving their financial neeas lies in the support 
of off-reservation people, communities, governments, and 
private enterprise. Any significant off-reservation financial 
investment on reservations will be contingent in part upon how 
seriously tribes take their responsibility to provide a fair 
and equitable justice system which implements laws that are 
compatible with the United States Constitution. 
Until Congress acts upon this Commission's findings 
and recommendations, there are only the tribes themselves whom 
can effectuate Congress1 intent in the enactment of the IBOR. 
In the interim, the BIA must use the authority and powers 
available to it to provide all individual within tribal 
jurisdictions the assurance that they are 
class citizens. 
not second and third 
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BUSINESS COMMITTEE 
FOUND IN CONTEMPT 
By John Martin 
The Business Committee members 
have been ordered to pay $250 dollars 
every pay period to tribal court til they 
abide by the back payment part of the 
court-order in the enrollment decision 
handed down on June 3,1986. 
Judge William Thome had stipu-
lated in that decision that the leaders 
esroti- 15 flaintif^' children in 
Chapoose va/Ute Tribe* and award 
them back dividends to the time they 
were denied enrollment on June 20, 
1977.^ 
The council (fid pass a resolution to 
abide by that court-order, but during a 
special meeting with the people, they 
learned that the tribe was against the 
back payment A petition was pre-
sented the Business Committee for a 
referendum vote and the people voted 
405 against, and 21 for. - -
The children have been enrolled 
since September 6, 1986, and are re-
ceiving regular dividends. But they do 
not get retroactive payments according 
to stipulation in the enrollment deci-
sion. 
Associate Tribal Judge Lany 
Yazzie ruledonFriday, April 8, that the 
council members were in contempt of 
court and denied dismissal of the case 
as John Boyden Jr.t Tribal Attorney, 
had insisted. 
The ten-year issue stems from the 
tribal constitution not having written 
into it the actual blood requirement of 
5/8's as it is spelled out in the 1956 
ordinance, which the Council has been 
following according to its promulgat-
ing authority in the constitution, to 
enroll new members. 
The Council was led to believe, 
leaders have said, that the 5/8's ordi-
nance was valid. Yet, it was on that 
very point the tribe lost the enrollment 
case. 
According to Boyden, the Business 
Committee abide by court-order by 
passing a resolution to enroll the chil-
dren and pay back-dividends. But the 
people overruled the leaders' action by 
referendum vote when they said no. 
This was the argument John Boyden 
presented in tribal court on Monday, 
April 4, during a show cause Waring. 
He stressed that the council was not in 
^contempt because the tribal court did 
oof have jurisdiction to review council 
' action. He, therefore, asked the]judge 
v to dismiss the case. 
- "The Business Committee is not in 
contempt," jaid Boyden, "and the 
court has no jurisdiction to review the 
council's action. The people have spo-
ken. They followed the constitution, 
-and the decision is conclusive and 
binding." , 
"It^ s hogwashl'9 said Oeorgel Man-
gan, plaintiffs9 attorney, "1 DM no 
delegation of authority to review the 
court decision," adding that there are 
precepts in the Indian Civil Rights Act 
that cannot be taken away. 
Mangan said there was a judgement 
on property rights (dividends), add that 
it can't be taken away without due 
process of law. The Business Com-
mittee is not a court of review," bk said 
The Appellate Court is." 
According to Mangan, the plain-
tiffs' children have always been en-
titled to membership and benefits in the 
Ute Tribe, j 
During the afternoon, Judge Larry 
Yazzie, of Tucson, Arizona, hid the 
council members testify on Ute Tribal 
customs and tradition so he could better 
understand how they arrive at deci-
sions. 
Marine Natchees said that as a child 
she was taught to respectfully listen to 
her Elders, and according to the tribal 
constitution, The Business Commit-
tee is subject to review by the people," 
She was also told that any involvement 
outside the Ute Tribe where cluldren 
were concerned, they could not be 
enrolled. 
"In my opinion," said Natchees, "it 
seems you want us to violate the voice 
of the people (tribal constitution), who 
I draw my sttength from." 
Irene Cuch, Vice Chairwoman, said 
that it's been through the constitution 
and by-laws that business has been 
conducted over the years. The repre-
sentative said she's been standing on 
tbeealh of office to perform her duties 
. and that Elders are important as 
,spokes people. 
- Wilford Conetah talked about the 
chiefs and sub-chiefs in the Bear Dance 
and Sun Dance. Efc also said, "1 had to 
honor tfcr referendum vote. 1 had the 
people to answer to." 
Here, John Boyden suggested get-
ting historical material and bringing in 
Elders if it would help the case, adding 
that the Tribe only wanted the plain 
meaning of the constitution; that the 
people spoke oat in the referendum 
vote and reversed the court decision, 
"which is bincfing," he stressed 
T i l the people change them," con-
tinued the tribal attorney, "these are the 
rules we have to play by: the will of the 
people." "" *' 
. "We might as well take their argu-
ment to its ridiculousness," said 
' George Mangan. "Everytime there's a 
court decision someone can disagree, 
then the Business Committee can re-
view the case." 
Representatives Gary Poowegup, 
Stewart Pike and Chairman Lester 
Chapoose were cut off from testifying 
on culture when Judge Yazzie was 
reminded that the tribe only wanted the 
plain meaning of the constitution. 
All six council members were pres-
ent during testimony on Monday, ex-
cept the chairman, who was excused 
before noon for his dialysis appoint-
ment. 
At the Friday hearing on April 8, 
Boyden called Dr. Floyd O'Neil to the 
witness stand as an expert on die Ute 
Tribe, Indian self-rule and self-deter-
mination. The historian, from tlie 
American West Center at the Univer-
sity of Utah, said be was "not perfect in 
AU. *H 
his knowledge, but knowledgeable." 
O'Neil testified that up to 1936, 
before the tribal constitution was rati-
fied, the Ute people decided issues in a 
simplified, community way. They 
chose war leaders and hunting leaders 
by community action, and took on 
government powers only when forced 
by white seizure of lands. 
Boyden asked him if there was any 
evidence of separation of powers. 
"None I can think of," said O'Netf. 
T h e final power rested with the 
people." 
The historian said that during the 
Reorganization Act, there was skepti-
cism in the community in accepting the 
tribal constitution til the people were 
assured that the final power would rest 
with them and not the Business Com-
mittee. Again, he said there was no 
evidence of separation of powers. 
The Historian explained that power 
was by consent of the people as a 
community function. "In the white 
world," he said, "the US constitution is 
the power," and in the Indian world the 
community consent of the people is the 
power - "the traditional way." 
Boyden told the court that there is no 
evidence of the Ute Tribe practicing 
the Anglo separation of powers. He 
added that the issue the court must 
decide is if the general council meeting 
and referendum vote are binding on the 
court, and the Business Committee. 
The constitution is very plain,- he 
said, "that the vote on the referendum 
election is conclusive and binding. The 
court gets its authority from the coun-
cil. Are we going to honor the 
constitution?" asked the attorney. 
There's no choice for the Business 
Committee but to. Does the Tribal 
Court have authority to bold the Bus-
ienss Committee in contempt? The 
court can \ because the Business 
Committee has the authority*to review 
the court" 
Boyden then asked that the case be _ 
ismissed. 
Mangan said it was difficult for him 
> see where the council acted in good
 ( 
rith when they had time to respond to 
wrt-order. He said the Business 
ommittee, the Tribe and the people in 
social ncedtosec that tbeavil Rights 
ct is followed. 
The attorney said toe right to re 
cannot supercede individual rights 
adding that in the Ovil Rights Act, 
defendants cannot re view when there 
due process of law. 
There wece not new issues, accord-
ing to Mangan, as John Boyden has 
insisted about the referendum vote 
having ultimate power over the coun-
cil, but "just a new whitewash that was 
orchestrated. The by-laws do not give 
dignity to the constitution. 
Judge Yazzie, who is also a profes-
sionally trained attorney, said the 
council's resolution to pay back divi-
dend was invalid, that the referendum 
vote just dealt with that issue, and the 
"It invades my sense of Indiannes 
said the judge, "to enter a decision an 
deny rights of membership (to the cl 
dren) and the decisions before. It woul 
be undermining the dignity and status 
of the court system." He said there w^s 
already a movement in this country to 
undermine tribal courts based on tlie 
Civil Rights Act ' 
T h e referendum does not chal-
lenge tlie authority of this court," said 
Judge Yazzie. "It's difficult for me to 
understand - that these children will nit 
be a strength to the tribe. Shall we ask 
them to leave? They seem to be In-
dian." 
The judge said that according to his 
interpretation, the issues on enrollment 
have already been litigated, and the 
tribe had the opportunity and ample 
time to raise a defense. 
He then denied dismissal of the case 
and reminded the parties Judge 
Thome's stipulation, wherein the 
* council was ordered to enroll the chil-
dren and pay them back dividends. He 
said the $500 dollar charge against 
former tribal attorney Martin Seneca 
was paid to tribal court for distribution 
among the plaintiffs. ^ 
When asked about the $100 dollars 
a day charged to the council represen-
tatives, Boyden said that it was not 
done. 
Judge Yazzie asked, "Did the refer-
endum say not to pay?" 
Boyden said, The tribe was com-
pelled to not pay through the referen-
dum." 
T h e prim decision will be en-
forced," said the judge. T h e referen-
dum does not absolve the Business 
Committee of the court-order." 
*' Thejudge then sought out a compro-
mise among the council, the plaintiffs 
and children of the different families 
by having them meet with the attorneys 
and the judge • "to deter further con-
tempt charges," said the judge. 
" But no. Judge Yazzie's said he was 
sad to report that the council did not 
wish to comply with court-order, that 
be bad hoped to avoid further contempt 
charges against the Business Commit-
tee. Then be reaffirmed Judge 
Thome's decision. 
T h e constitution is based on cus-
tom and tradition," said Judge Yazzie, 
that the Court of Appeals is the su-
preme law; that the constitution man-
dated a separation of powers between 
the Business Committee and the tribal 
court, which "interprets and enforces 
law." h 
The judge said the overruling con-
sideration was the Indian Civil Rights 
Act and former decisions. 
George Mangan stipulated in his 
contempt charge that the Business 
Committee pay the back dividend at an 
assessed interest rate wherein each 
plaintiff child would receive over 
$32,000 dollars; that the council be 
fined up to a $1000 dollars a day, or be 
jailed for non-compliance. Mangan 
asked for attorney fees of $135 dollars 
a day for himself and $105 for his co-
counsel.
 v 
Then he said, The enrollment case 
has been ip appeal for eight years, and 
in federal court for tliree years. Nothing 
but game-playing." 
Judge Yazzie accepted all but the 
incarceration of council members, 
saying that lie was enforcing actions of 
non-compliance with orders and stipu-
lations. He said the council had gone 
back on its word. 
Boyden said there's been a new 
issue siuce the Appellate decision, 
because of the special meeting and 
referendum vole. "It's not to show 
contempt of this court, your honor, or to 
go back on our word - but honoring a 
higher authority: the people." 
AJci fc-
He asked the incarceration of coun-
cil members be softened, because the 
police are under the BIA and the court 
has no jurisdiction over that 
••We've got to do something about 
this order," said Mangan, and sug-
gested taking the members to any ap-
propriate facility. * 
Judge Yazzie bad the defendants 
step forth and testify under oath as to 
their understanding of the court-order 
and if they would coqiply; reiterating 
again, that the US constitution through 
the Indian Civil Rights Act, and litiga-
tion that went before inlhe Tribal Court 
of Appeals and the Federal court of 
appeals, established in law, rights of 
die plaintiffs' children. 
T h e referendum vote does not 
override the constitution and Civil 
Rights Act," saidthe judge, "as applied 
and interpreted by this court. So, will 
you use your best efforts to cany out the 
court's decisions?" 
Stewart Pike testified that MI do not 
feel the Boyden Firm represents me. I 
do not recognize that And will not 
That's got us into this situation." Pike 
added that he was going to raise his own 
defense, "because we're charged as 
individuals." 
4
 Irene Cuch said she understood the 
decision and woulc^not comply with 
the court decision - as the referendum is 
interpreted 
Wilford Cooetah said, "I will listen 
to what the people have to tell me." 
" Gary Poowegup said, *The people 
have spoken. We gotta listen." He re-
spected the court's decision but said the 
people's referendum vole threw a dif-
ferent light on the situation. 
And finally, MaxineNatchees said, 
"I understand the ruling according to 
your interpretation of the constit-
ution," but she wouldn't comply, be-
cause she couldn't violate the 
constitution and the people. 
Judge Yazzie said the defendants1 
excuse for non-compliance" was insuf-
ficient and the referendum vote did not 
amend the tribal constitution. 
~riie 
it toab 
Business Committee chooses 
no | a ide by court-order," he said, 
and found the council in "willful dis-
obedience and disregard to a lawful 
judgement order." Judge Yazzie called 
out the council's names and said they 
were in contempt," stressing that, 
"We 're back to the same place after ten 
years'* of litigating the enrollment is-
sue. 
He granted Mangan's motion for 
contempt, except confining the leaders 
and charging them $ 100 dollars a day. 
He did fine them $250 dollars every 
pay period, which starts after the judge 
signs the order and the council mem-
bers are served. 
'*"" Juagc* Yazzie said he would con-
sider more serious fines if there was 
non-compliance with the order, which 
would be issued without further notice. 
He said the defendants were entitled to 
the Appeals Court, and any stay on the 
decision must be lodged with die trial 
court J He granted Mangan the $135 
an hour attorney fees: $105 
an hour for his co-counsel, and 
a stay on the decision that 
n felt the tribe was entitled to. 
isions of the past should be 
concluded Judge Yazzie. 
lefendants had ample opportu-
nity to raise their arguments" on a case 
's been before the Tribal Appeals 
Court twice, and once before the Fed-
eral Court of Appeals. 
MI encourage you to take seriously 
the words spoken here. *T ve straggled 
with you very hard and appealed to 
your sense of reason. I leave the door 
open to you, and pray, you will accept 
Itation. 
will recess." 
the invitati 
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Martin Seneca, Esq. 
11647 Newbridge Court 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAS 
THE UTE INDIAN TRIBE, LESTER CHAPOCSE, 
CHAIRMAN, UTE INDIAN TRIEE, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SZkZZ OF UTAH; UTAH STATE TAX 
COMMISSION; DUCHESNE COUNTY, UTAH; 
Defendants. 
tiOMPLAINT FOR REFUND 
OF TAXES, DECLARATOR' 
AND INJUNCTIVE RELIE! 
For their claims against Defendants, Plaintiffs allege the 
following: 
JURISDICTION 
1. This is a civil action for refund of taxes, declaratory 
and injunctive relief. This Court has jurisdiction to hear these 
claims under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1362 and 1343. Pliintiffs' claims 
arise under Article I, Section 8, Clause 3, Article VI, Clause 2, 
and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution; under the 
Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938, as amended, 25 U.S.C. 
§? 396a-396f (1976); the Indian Joint Ventur* Act of 1962, 25 
U.S.C. § 21C2, et sec, and 30 U.S.C. § 191. 
AU.si 
PARTIES 
2. Plaintiff UTE INDIAN TRIBE ("the Trifc>e") is a sovereign 
American Indian Tribe, with a governing body, the Ute Indian 
Business Committee, duly recognized by the United States 
Secretary of the Interior as the governing bo^ iy of the Uintah and 
Ouray Indian Reservation (the "Reservation") 
Chaooose is the Chairman of the Ute Indian Tr 
with the responsibility of administering the [Tribe's governmental 
resocnsibilities. 
Plaintiff Lesier 
ibe and is charged 
Defendant STATE OF UTAH ("State" or j"Utah") is a 
sovereign State of the Union, pursuant to the Enabling Act of 
July 16, 1894, 26 Stat. 107. The Department of Community and 
Economic Development of the Stare of Utah is authorized by Utah 
law to distribute federal mineral lease revenues to Utah 
communities under 30 U.S.C. § 191. As used i 
term "Utah" shall include the Stare of Utah, 
its subdivisions. 
ir> this complaint the 
s agencies, and 
4. Defendant Utah State Tax Commission is charged by 
statute with the responsibility of collecting! the taxes levied 
under the Utah Mining Occupation Tax Act and the Utah Oil and Gas 
Conservation Act, Utah Code Ann. 1973 §§ 59-5-66 et sec, and 40-
6-14 et sec, respectively. 
Defendant Duchesne County, Utah, is 
supervision o- the state. Part of the Ute 
a large portion of the Ute Tribe's oil and ga 
trust by the United States are encompassed wi 
boundaries of Duchesne County. Duchesne Coun 
Utah statute with the responsibility of collej 
the Utah Ad Valorem Property Tax Act § 59-1-1 
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 
a political 
Lndian Reservation and 
s resources held in 
thin the exterior 
y is charged by 
ting taxes under 
6. The United States holds in trust and the Tribe is the 
beneficial owner of oil and gas reserves underlying portions of 
the Reservation. 
7. The Ute Tribe and its members maintain their tribal 
customs, ceremonies and language. They have ;their own 
government, which manages their own tribal j?o 
maintains their own roads, and manages their 
all in accordance with the provisions of the 
Constitution and Tribal Code, and at all time 
with the United States government. By providing substantially 
lice force, 
own social services, 
Ute Indian 
s in conjunction 
servation in a all necessary governmental services to the Re| 
coordinated program with the United States, the Tribe has freed 
-2-
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the State of Utah from the obligation of providing on the 
Reservation State services it provides throughout the non-Indian 
portions of the State. 
8. The Tribe has leased approximately orte hundred thousand 
acres of lands held in trust by the United States to non-Indian 
companies for the purpose of oil and gas exploration and 
production pursuant to either the federal Indian leasing program 
or the mineral joint venture program, both enicted by Congress 
and supervised by the Secretary of the Interior. The Tribe is 
currently negotiating with other companies vh^ are interested in 
developing the Tribe's oil and gas properties^ 
S. The federal scheme under which the U^e Indian trust land 
is leased to non-Indians for the purpose of ojLl and gas 
exploration and production is detailed and comprehensive. Its 
purpose is to maximize both tribal self-government and economic 
prosperity, free of outside interference. 
10. The State of Utah has enacted three statewide taxes 
which relate specifically to oil and gas production. They are 
the Utah Mining Occupation Tax, the Utah Oil j& Gas Conservation 
Tax, and the Utah Ad Valorem Property Tax. The Occupation tax 
and Conservation tax generate revenues which are placed into the 
State1s general tax fund. The Ad Valorem property tax is 
collected by Duchesne., County and generates revenues which are 
placed into the County's general tax fund. 
11. Through these taxes Utah and its subdivisions have 
collected over the last five years nearly $24,000,000^from 
Reservation oil and gas production. During the same period of 
time Utah and its subdivisions have orovided minimal governmental 
services r.o Reservation oil and gas activities, and hay^. provided 
in total, including..public schools, governmental services to thel 
Reservation programs costing the State and it[s subdivisions 
"approximately "20%~~bf the oil and gas tax revenue's generated from 
the Reservation. VTrtuaiiy all of the Reservations oil and gas 
tax revenues collected by Utah are expended bff the Reservation 
and most of the oil and gas tax revenues collected by Utah's 
subdivisions are also expended off the Reservation. 
12. The continuing unabated imposition of Utah's oil and 
gas taxes is (a) preempted by the comprehensive federal scheme 
under which Ute Indian trust minerals are to be developed so as 
to maximize the economic return to the Tribe;and its members, and 
(b) infringes upon the sovereign right of th£ Tribe to gcvern its 
Reservation so as to maximize its revenues fjrom the Reservation's 
resources free of outside interference. 
AH. SI 
12. During the very time period Utah arid its subdivisi 
transferred Ute oil and eras wealth from the Reservation 
.ens 
have ga
lands and have failed to return an appropriate amount of such 
wealth to the Reservation in the form of Statie and local 
services, Utah has also systematically excluqed the Reservation 
f^cm receiving—federal-monx-es- allocated to Idnds in Utah impacted 
by federal energy development. 
14. During the past five years, Utah has received nearly 
5150,000,000 from federal mineral development, a portion of which 
is derived from federal lands neighboring on the Reservation. 
Congress directed Utah to distribute such sunjs giving priority to 
those areas of the State socially or economically impacted by 
federal mineral development. Rather than following the federal 
mandate that such funds be equitably spent irj energy impacted 
areas, Utah has elected to place the funds in| State institutions, 
subdivisions, and non-Indian communities, an4 none of the federal 
money has been directed into impacted portiorjs of the 
Reservation. 
15. The plaintiffs are suffering irreparable harm and have 
no adequate remedy at law. 
16. An actual controversy exists between the plaintiffs and 
the defendants as to the validity of the past and current level 
of Utah oil and gas taxes imposed on Ute Indian oil and gas 
production, and the validity of Utah's policy of excluding the 
Reservation from the benefits of 30 U.S.C. § 191. 
CLAIM ONE 
17. Paragraphs 6 through 16 are incorporated herein by 
reference. 
18. Defendants1 taxation of oil and gas operations and 
production without abatement on Ute trust land is preempted by 
federal law, and therefore violates Article I, Section 6, Clause 
3 (the Commerce Clause) and Article VI, Clause 2 (the Supremacy 
Clause) of the Constitution of the United States. 
CLAIM TWO 
19. Paragraphs 6 through 16 are incorpqrated herein by 
reference. 
20. Defendants' taxation of oil and ga^ operations and 
production on Ute trust land imposes an impermissible burden en 
commerce in violation of Article I, Section 8/ Clause 3 (the 
Commerce Clause) of the United Stares Constitution. No 
production occurs within State jurisdiction 4nd yet Utah and its 
AJcHO 
subdivisions tax such operations and production, without 
abatement, in violation of the requirement that all taxes be 
assessed on fairly apportioned income. 
CLAIM THREE 
21. Paragraphs 6 through 16 are incorporated herein by 
reference. 
22. Defendants1 taxation cf oil and gas operations and 
production on Ute trust land without abatement violates the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution since the taxes assessed and collected are 
net fairly related to the services provided t|o Reservation 
residents by the State and are distributed ori a discriminatory 
basis as between Reservation portions of Utahf and non-Reservation 
portions of Utah. 
CLAIM FOUR 
23. Paragraphs 6 through 16 are incorporated herein by 
reference. 
24. Defendants1 refusal to distribute ^ny of the 
$150,000,000 it has received from the United IStates over the past 
five years to the Reservation violates -30 U.S.C. § 191 and the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth "Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs seek from this Court a declaration 
that the State of Utah oil and gas taxes are unlawful as applied 
without abatement to oil and gas operations ^nd production on the 
Ute Indian Reservation, and an order restraining Defendants from 
collecting such taxes without abatement in tiie future. 
1. Plaintiffs also seek a declaration that an amount of 
Utah oil and gas tax revenues collected by tljie State of Utah and 
Duchesne County from the Reservation since January 1, 1982, to be 
determined at trial, is deemed to be held by the State of Utah in 
constructive trust for the use and benefit of the Ute Indian 
Tribe of Indians, and an order directing the State cf Utah to pay 
over the amount of such unlawfully collectedImonies to the Court 
for distribution to the Tribe. 
2. Plaintiffs also seek a declaration ihat the State cf 
Utah's systematic exclusion of the Reservation from the benefits 
cf the $150,000,000 in federal mineral revenues provided the 
State of Utah under 30 U.S.C. § 191 since 19$2 is unlawful and an 
order restraining Defendants from perpetrating such exclusion in 
the future. 
5 
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3. Plaintiffs also seek a declaration t:(iat an appropriate 
amount of the 5150,000,000 in 30 U.S.C. § 1911 funds improperly 
excluded from the Reservation, to be determined at trial, is 
deemed to be held by the State of Utah in constructive trust for 
the use and benefit of the Reservation and an order directing the 
State of Utah to pay over such amounts, to th6 Court for 
distribution to the Tribe for energy impact purposes, together 
with interest, costs and attorneys' fees to t|ie extent provided 
by lav, and for such other relief as this Couijrt deems proper. 
Dated: 1967. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Daniel H. Israel 
Cogswell atid Wehrle 
1700 Lincoln Street 
Suite 3500 
Denver, COj80203 
Tel. [303]|861-2150 
Martin Seneca, Esq. 
11647 Newbridge Court 
Reston, VA 22091 
Tel. [703]I860-9012 
Attornevs for Plaintiffs 
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IN REPLY REFER TO: 
dministration 
1306-10 
I Jnited States Department of the Interioi 
BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS 
CHEYENNE RIVER AGENCY | 
EAGLE BUTTE, SOUTH DAKOTA 57625 
MAR 3 i ^ 88 
CERTIFIED MAX*. RETU1N 
RECEIPT JUWJMTW) —NO. P20 0758455 
Mr. Don Liston, Manager 
Dupree City Package Liquor 
P.O. Box 33 
Dupree, South Dakota 57623 
Dear Mr. Liston: 
This is to inform you that the Cheyenne River 
provided me with information regarding compl 
Tribe's Liquor Ordinance, and has asked tttat 
take action to enforce that Ordinance. 
The Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe has enacte<|l a Liquor Control 
Ordinance, and that Ordinance was certified by the Secretary 
of the Interior, and published in the Federal Register in ac-
cordance with Title 18, United States Codi, Section 1161. 
The Ordinance requires license to introduce, purchase, sell 
or deal in liquor within the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation. 
The sale of intoxicating liquor without the necessary Tribal 
Liquor License is a violation of Title 181 United States Code, 
Section 1154. Conviction under that Section for the first 
offense could result in a fine of $500 or imprisonment for 
not more than one (1) year. For each subsequent offense, the 
individual could be fined not more than $2,000.00, or impri-
sonment not more than five (5) years, or poth such fine and 
imprisonment. 
Sioux Tribe has 
iance with the 
the United States 
The Bureau of Indian Affairs has the resp< 
the Federal Statutes referred to above, a 
intention to do so. Since the Bureau of 
the responsibility to enforce the Federal 
to above, along with the Cheyenne River S 
to initiate action to enforce their Liquo: 
I am hereby requesting your cooperation i 
Tribe's Ordinance by May 30, 1988. Failu 
the Tribe's Ordinance, after this date, w 
with no alternative, but to initiate acti 
Title 18, United States Code, Section 115 
msibility to enforce 
id it is this Agency's 
[ndian Affairs has 
Statutes referred 
Loux Tribe's request 
: Control Ordinance, 
i complying with the 
:e to comply with 
.11 leave this office 
>n in accordance with 
\U ^3 
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If you have any questions regarding your obligations under 
the law, I urge you to contact this Agencpy, or an attorney. 
Agency Superintendent 
Add, 4 4 
Wayne Ducheneaux 
SECiREJ*** 
AflSneThompson 
TREASURER 
Mona R. Cud more I 
VICE-CHAIRMAN 
Everett Hunt 
J i trie 6 , 1 9 8 8 
P.O. Box 590 
Eagle Butte, South Dakota 57625 
(605)964-4155 
(605) 964-4984 
Trua Clown, Sr. 
Vernon M t t t t t 
DISTRICT 2 
Tad Knlft, Sr. 
DISTRICT 3 
Maynard C. Duprlt 
Donald Annla 
DISTRICT 4 
Rooart Lofton, Sr. 
David "Bud" Duprla 
Everett Hunt 
DISTRICT 5 
Gilbert Marshall 
Sam Eagla Staff 
Banna Chasing Hawk 
Gilbert LaBaau 
Lanny LaPlant 
DISTRICT 6 
Calvin "Red" Travarsia 
Joan LaBaau 
P UGH,
 KENN 
* * ? * - P U G ^ ' FORNEY A T L A W 
—
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RE= BUSINESS^ICENS^ 
CHEYENNE RIVER SIOUX TRIBEJ3F SOUIH^DAKQIA. 
Dear Business Owner: 
The Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe has been Regulating 
businesses and the transactions thereof sinc£ the passage of 
Ordinance One (1), approved by the Secretary of the Interior, 
and adopted and enacted in 1937, the Ordinance was later amended 
in 1987. The Ordinance governs the regulation of businesses 
within the exterior boundaries of the Cheyenfie River Sioux 
Reservation, including the granting and issuances of the 
appropriate licenses thereof. 
The Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe as a sovereign, governmental 
entity possesses the authority to regulate activities within the 
reservation. The Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe is becoming 
increasingly aware of the seriousness of the problem wherein 
businesses within the reservation have failed to make 
application and to remit the r quired fee tq the Tribal Council 
for the appropriate business license, thereby failing to 
acknowledge the Tribe's sovereign, regulatory powers. 
Previously, the Revenue Department of the Cheyenne River 
Sioux Tribe has mailed to you written notice regarding the 
Tribe's business licensing requirements. The records of the 
Revenue Department of the Cheyenne River Sidux Tribe indicate 
that your business does not possess the required tribal business 
license. Therefore, the Tribe is, again, asking for your 
The blue represents the thunder clouds above the world where live the thunderbirds whl> control the four winds. The rainbow is for the 
Cheyenne River Sioux People who are keepers of the Most Sacred Calf Pipe, a gift from thi White Buffalo Calf Maiden. The eagle feathers 
at the edges of the rim of the world represent the spotted eagle who is the protector of all Lakota. The two pipes fused together are for 
unity. One pipe is for the Lakota, the other for all the other Indian nations. The yellow hocips represent the Sacred Hoop, which shall not be 
broken. The Sacred Calf Pipe Bundle in red represents Wakan Tanka—the Great Mystery. Ail the colors of the Lakota are visible. The 
red, yellow, black and white represent the four major races. 1 Mue is for heaven and the green for Mother Earth. 
A<U< 
Page 2. - .LETTER TO BUSINESSES WHO ARE OPERATING WITHOUT 
APPROPRIATE TRIBAL BUSINESS LICENSE. 
cooperation and requesting that your business establishment 
comply with the governing laws of the Cheyenne River Sioux 
Tribe. The Tribe will request that your business come into 
compliance,upon ten (10) days of receipt of this letter. This 
same letter will be sent to all businesses within the exterior 
boundaries of the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation who presently 
are operating without the requisite tribal business license. 
The Tribal Council during their Regular Council Session on 
May 7, 1988, passed a resolution regarding t[he regulation of 
businesses within the reservation. A copy c^ f the resolution, 
Resolution No. 126-88-CR, has been enclosed for your review. 
Should your business fail to come into compliance with tribal 
ordinance governing the business licensing ifequirements, the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs may be forced to implement federal law 
regarding the Federal Trader's licensing provisions 
The Tribal Council of the Cheyenne River Siou x lit ibe looks 
forward to your cooperation and mutual support. 
Sincerely, 
Wayne^ 
CHEYENNE RIVER SIOUX TRIBl 
WD;pdJ :m 1 i 
Enclosur e: 
xc: Individual Business Licensee File 
Diane Johnson 
File 
AcU.^ 
RESOLUTION NO. IZO-SO-UK 
WHEREAS, the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe of South Dakota i s Ian unincorporated 
Tribe of Indians, having accepted the provisions (jf the Act of June 
18, 1934 (48 Stat . 984), and 
WHEREAS, the Tribe, in order to es tabl i sh i t s t r iba l organization; to conserve 
i t s tr ibal property; to develop i t s common resources; and to promote 
the general welfare of i t s people, has ordained aiid establ ished a 
Constitution and By-Laws, and 
WHEREAS, the Government of the United States desired peace with the Great 
Sioux Nation and, thereby, executed the 1868 Treaty with the Sioux, 
of which the Chiefs and Headmen of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe 
were s ignatories thereto , and 
WHEREAS, the Act of March 2, 1889 set apart the Cheyenne R|.ver Reservation 
for the sole use and occupation of the Minniconjoti, Itazipco and 
Siha Sapa Bands of the Great Sioux Nation, and 
WHEREAS, the Act of June 18, 1934 (48 Stat- 984), duly aut 
empowered federal ly recognized Indian Tribes to 
and By-Laws for the development and strengthening 
infrastructure of Indian t r i b e s , and 
(lorized and 
ajiopt Constitutions 
of the governmental 
WHEREAS, t h e Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe duly a c c e p t e d the fcerms o f the Act 
of June 18, 1934, and enacted a Constitution and jiy-laws for the 
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe of South Dakota, said Constitution and 
By-laws were approved December 27, 1935, including subsequent 
amendments thereto , and f 
WHEREAS, the 
territory 
Georg 
WHEREAS, 
sovereignty of 
stemming from 
;ia, 31 U.S. 
a, 30 U.S. C5 
the United States Supreme Court has recognized 
Indian tr ibes over both t h e i r members and 
the early Supreme Court cases of Worchester v. 
(6 Pet . ) 515 (1832); and Cherokee Nation v . Georgi 
Pet . ) 1 (1831), and 
the Supreme Court of the United States has continually recognized 
Indian tr ibes as domestic, dependent Nations, with sovereignty 
extending over the ir members and t e r r i t o r y , and with which laws of 
the State can have no force or e f f e c t . (Worchester v. Georgia, 31 
U.S. (6 Pet .) 515 (1832), and I 
WHEREAS, the inherent sovereignty of Indian Tribes has be0n recognized by 
the Government of the United States and through Subsequent United 
States Supreme Court dec i s ions , and 
WHEREAS, the Congress of the United States has plenary pov|rer over Indian 
Affairs which i s traced to the Indian Commerce CJause, Art ic le I , 
Sec. 8 of the Constitution of the United S ta tes , and 
IVHEREAS, Indian Tribes possess the f u l l a t tr ibutes of sovereignty which are 
subordinate only to the superior sovereign, the fJnited S ta tes , and 
AW.Ti 
RESOLUTION NO. 126-88-CR 
Page Two 
WHEREAS, the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian Tribe can only be 
extinguished or limited through specific and express Acts of Congress, 
and 
WHEREAS, the Congress of the United States duly enacted a statute governing 
traders with Indian on August 15, 1896 (19 Stat, 200), codified at 
25 U.S.C.A. § 261, 262, and duly authorized the Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs with the sole power and authority to appoint traders 
to the Indian tribes and to adopt such rules and liegulations thereto, 
and 
WHEREAS, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs duly adopted sajid rules and 
regulations in 25 C.F.R. Part 140 et., seq, and 
WHEREAS, Article IV, Section 1 (i) of the Constitution of the Cheyenne River 
Sioux Tribe duly authorizes and empowers the Tribal Council to 
adopt ordinances governing the licensing of businesses on the Cheyenne 
River Reservation, and 
WHEREAS, the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe duly adopted and enacted Ordinance No. 
One (1) regulating the licensing of businesses on the Cheyenne River 
Reservation, including amendments thereto, and 
WHEREAS, it has come to the attention of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe that 
certain businesses within the exterior boundaries of the Cheyenne 
River Reservation have failed to recognize the sovereignty of the 
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe in its implementation dnd enforcement of 
Ordinance No. One (1), now 
THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED, the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe hereby requests the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs, Department of the Interior, United States 
Government, to enforce Title 25 U.S.C.A. § 261 an4 262, governing 
the licensing of Indian Traders within the exterior boundaries of 
the Cheyenne River Reservation, and 
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that the Revenue Department of the Cheyenne River Sioux 
Tribe shall forthwith submit a list to the Agency Superintendent, 
Bureau of Indian Affairs of those businesses withiin the exterior 
boundaries of the Cheyenne River Reservation who tjave failed to 
recognize the sovereignty of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe through 
their willful failure to obtain a business license through submitting 
an application and paying the required fee, and 
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe hereby directs the 
United States, as trustee for the Indian Tribes, to uphold the 
integrity and sovereign status of the Cheyenne Riyer Sioux Tribe 
through the enforcement of the Federal Trader's Licensing provisions 
of 25 C.F.R. Part 140 et. seq., of which the United States is 
obligated to enforce. 
A&.<W 
'RESOLUTION NO. 126-88-CR 
Page Three 
CERTIFICATION 
I, the undersigned, as Secretary of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, certify that 
the Tribal Council is composed of fifteen (15) members, of whom.-12, constituting 
a quorum, were present at a meeting, duly and regularly called, noticed, convened 
and held this 7th day of May, 1988, Regular Session; and that the foregoing 
resolution was duly adopted at such meeting by an affirmative vote -of 10 for, 0 
against, 2 not voting and 3 absent. 
Arlene Tho 
Cheyenne River Si 
A<W. * 
j m i t iw/r <*>\J\J i n u'rvrs.wirv 
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ATTORNEY GENERAL 
RICHARD P. T1ESZEN 
CHIEF DEPUTY 
June 28, 1988 
Mr. Geoffrey J. Butler 
Clerk of the Utah Supreme Court 
332 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Re: State v. Perank, No. 860243 
Dear Mr. Butler: 
Pursuant to your recent telephone conversation, I have 
enclosed a copy of the Brief for the States of South Dakota, 
et al. as Amici Curiae In Support of Petitioner filed in the 
United Statefs Supreme Court in State of Utah, et al. v. 
Ute Indian Tribe, 773 S. 2d 1087 (10th Cir. 1985), cert, 
denied, 107 S.Ct. 596 (December 1, 1986), by South Dakota 
and New Mexico. Additionally, the states of California, 
Montana, Washington and Wyoming, by and through their 
Attorneys General joined this amicus efforjt. 
I 
I understand that the same issue involving the original 
Uintah Reservation is now before your Court in State v. 
Perank, No. 860243. As we told the United States Supreme 
Court in the Ute Indian Tribe case, a correct resolution of 
this issue is "of substantial importance to the State of 
South Dakota and other states with present and former Indian 
reservations. The United States Court of | Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit has concluded that Acts of| Congress with 
operative language restoring Indian reservations to the 
public domain were not intended to disestablish those 
reservations. The Court of Appeals premised its decision on 
a misreading of Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984), and 
plaintiffs in New Mexico and elsewhere 
specifically relying on this misreading 
boundaries of Indian 
disestablished." 
are already 
to resurrect 
reservations loijig deemed 
STATE CAPiTOL Pierre, South Dakota 57501-5090 ^one (605)773-32^5 
m \oo 
Geoffrey J. Butler 
June 28, 1988 
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"In recent years South Dakota participated in Solem and two 
similar cases before the United States .Supreme Court, 
DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975), and 
Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977). The 
decision of the Court of Appeals conflicts in principle with 
all three of these cases.11 
I appreciate this opportunity to bring out position in the 
brief to the specific attention of your Court in Perank. 
Thank you for your time and considerationJ 
Si^ aeerely, 
ROGER A. TELLINGHlilsEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
RAT:Id 
Enc. 
CC: Michael M. Quealy 
Kirk C. Bennett 
Stephen G. Boyden 
Herbert Wm. Gillespe 
Tom D. Tobin 
Attorneys General of the States of California, Montana, 
New Mexico, Utah, Washington and Wyoiiing 
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
1. Whether the language of the Uncompahgre Act 
of August 15, 1894, implemented by the Act of June 
7, 1897, and the Uintah Act of May 27, 1902, as 
amended, providing that the unallotted lands of these 
original Indian reservations shall be restored to the 
public domain, constituted clear language of disestab-
lishment, as this Court has recognized, or whether 
the original reservation boundaries continue to exist 
because this Court's decisioi} in Solem v. Bartlett 
changed the effect of such language, as the en banc 
majority of the court below held. 
2. Whether the original Uncompahgre Reservation 
was disestablished in light of! the express statutory 
language and the facts that the United States has 
not treated the disputed area;as a reservation since 
1897, that in 1965 the Tribe recovered damages from 
the United States on the basis that the Uncompahgre 
Reservation no longer existed, £nd that the population 
and land use in the disputed area are more than 
ninety percent non-Indian. 
3. Whether the original Uibtah Reservation was 
disestablished in light of the express statutory lan-
guage and the facts that the [United States did not 
administer the disputed area as|a reservation for more 
than sixty years after the dat^ of opening, that con-
temporaneous Presidential, Congressional and admin-
istrative treatment of the area showed that it was no 
longer considered a reservation, that more than half 
of the original reservation was! 
forest and that the population) 
remaining area are more thai} ninety percent non-
Indian. 
made into a national 
and land use in the 
Aid,(63 
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INTEREST OF THE STATES OF SOUTH DAKOTA 
ET AL. 
This case presents an issue of substantial impor-
tance to the State of South Dakota and other States 
with present and former Indian reservations. The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
has concluded that Acts of Congress with operative 
language restoring Indian reservations to the public 
2 
domain were not intended to disestablish those re-
servations. Pet. App. la-62a. The Court of Appeals 
premised its decision on a misreading of Solem v. 
Bartlett, 465 U.S 463 (1984), and plaintiffs in New 
Mexico and elsewhere are already specifically relying 
on this misreading to resurrect boundaries of Indian 
reservations long deemed disestablished. 
In recent years South Dakota participated in Solem 
and two similar cases before this Court, DeCoteau v. 
District County Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975), and Ro-
sebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977). The 
decision of the Court of Appeals coiiflicts in principle 
with all three of these cases. The Ajnici Curiae une-
quivocally support the petition for a writ of certiorari. 
DISCUSSION 
1. The en banc majority's rationale, premised on a 
misconstruction of the significance of ''public domain" 
language, is of substantial concern to amid. Here-
tofore, the equation of public domain language with 
reservation disestablishment has b^en a universally 
accepted principle of federal Indian! law. Throughout 
the Western States, Congress and the Executive 
Branch routinely utilized such terminology in the lan-
guage and legislative history of Acts such as pre-
sented here. In South Dakota, for example, millions 
of acres of Indian reservations wer^ ' 'restored to the 
public domain".1 Until the en banc majority's decision, 
no court seriously questioned that such operative lan-
guage was not precisely suited to disestablishment. 
Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351, 354-55 
1
 Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 589 (1977). See, 
generally, Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United^ States, 316 U.S. 317 
(1942). 
3 
(1962); Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 504 n. 22 (1973). 
See, generally, United States v. Pelican, £32 U.S. 442 
(1914). 
Indeed, in 1975, when this Court franged the issue 
in DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425 
(1975), it did so in terms of an underlying inquiry for 
"public domain" indicia: | 
These two cases, consolidated for jiecision, 
raise the single question whether t\ie Lake 
Traverse Indian Reservation in Sobth Da-
kota, created by an 1867 treaty between the 
United States and the Sisseton and Wahpe-
ton bands of Sioux Indians, was terminated 
and returned to the public domain, b^ the Act 
of March 3, 1891. DeCoteau, supra at 426-
427. (Emphasis added). 
Since the legislative history in DeCoteau indicated 
that Congress intended to restore the reservation to 
the public domain, the issue was decisively resolved. 
See DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 441, where, ^fter noting 
that the intended effect of the Act was (made clear 
by the sponsors, this Court set forth in I the text of 
the opinion two ''public domain'' excerpts from the 
Congressional Record ("surrender of a l^rge portion 
of their reservation to the public domairi"; "all this 
land is opened by this bill to settlement as a part of 
the public domain"). Id. at 439-441. In concluding, 
the Court reiterated this basic understanding: 
That the lands ceded in the other agreements 
were returned to the public domain, stripped 
of reservation status, can hardly b^ ques-
tioned, and every party here acknowledges 
as much. The sponsors of the legislation 
4 
stated repeatedly that the ratified agree-
ments would return the ceded lands to the 
'public domain.9 See supra, at 440-441. Cf. 
Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, *t 504 n. 22. 
DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 446. (Emphasis added.) 
Two years later, in Rosebud Siowti Tribe v. Kneip, 
430 U.S. 584 (1977), this aspect (\i the issue was 
treated essentially the same. Rosebud, 430 U.S. at 
589, 600, 600 n. 21. Even the Rosebud dissent ex-
pressly acknowledged that '"restored to the public 
domain'" was '"clear language of depress termina-
tion'". Rosebud, 430 U.S. at 618 (Marshall, J., dis-
senting). 
In the instant case, the district court and the panel 
below premised their initial decision on this funda-
mental understanding (Pet. App. 694, 76a, 78a, 79a, 
83a, 84a), as the en banc majority acknowledged (Pet. 
App. 17a-18a). Subsequently, however, this Court de-
cided Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984). The en 
banc majority's conclusion that Solfrm "dictated" a 
different result with respect to the crux of this case, 
the significance of operative public aomain terminol-
ogy, is explicitly stated: 
The original expression 'return o^ the public 
domain' does not reliably establish the clear 
and unequivocal evidence of Congress's in-
tent to change boundaries. Soleifi, 104 S.Ct. 
at 1166 [majority opinion]. 
Our conclusion is that the phras£ 'restore to 
the public domain' is not the same as a 
congressional state of mind to disestablish 
[majority opinion]. 
5 
Although the district court and the panel 
viewed this as language of cession, I believe 
that Solem dictates a different result [con-
curring opinion]. 
Prior to Solem, 'public domain' language 
could have been construed as more conclusive 
evidence of disestablishment; following So-
lem, the term must be viewed as ambiguous 
in portent.. . [concurring opinion]. 
Ultimately, I interpret Solem to hold that 
'public domain' language standing alone is 
insufficient to support a finding of explicit 
congressional intent to disestablish [concur-
ring opinion]. 
Pet. App. at lla-12a, 17a-18a. (Emphasis added). Sta-
te™ clearly did not dictate this principle. See Pet. at 
14-17, 19-21. Although the en banc majority addressed 
other points, some of which are noted below, it is 
evident that the ultimate conclusion centered around 
this fundamental misconstruction. 
As a result, this Court is now presented with la 
conflict of even greater magnitude than the related 
issue presented in Oregon Department of Fish and 
Wildlife v. Klamath Indian Tribe, U.S , 10J3 
S.Ct. 3420 (1985): 
Because the Court of Appeals' decision ap-
peared to conflict in principle with the de-
cision of the Eighth Circuit in Red Lake Band 
of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota, 614 F.2d 
1161 (per curiam), cert denied, 449 U.S. 905, 
101 S.Ct. 279, 66 L,Ed.2d 136 (1980), we 
granted certiorari, 469 U.S , 105 S.Ct. 
242, 83 L.Ed.2d 180. We now reverse. 
6 
Oregon, 105 S.Ct. at 3427 (Emphasis added). The im-
portance of the principle resolved in Oregon (i.e. re-
servation rights remaining after cessions of Indian 
reservations) highlights the important of the prin-
ciple at issue here (reservation rights remaining after 
restoration of Indian reservations to pjublic domain). 
Moreover, with respect to operative public domain 
language, the decision of the en banc | majority une-
quivocally ' 'conflicts in principle" withj not just one 
circuit but all circuits—in fact, it appeals to " conflict 
in principle" with all reported decisions that have 
addressed, indirectly or directly, the] effect of a 
Congressional act or Executive order w^ose operative 
language restored an Indian reservation to the public 
domain. Pet. at 13-21. This controlling j aspect of the 
opinion below, which influenced the en bhnc majority's 
view of other pertinent factors, thus clearly warrants 
review. 
2. While amici unequivocally support and share the 
concern of Petitioners that the second largest Indian 
reservation in the United States (4,000,(^ 00 acres) has 
been resurrected in Utah as a result of this miscon-
struction, the sweeping mischaracterization of Solem 
by the en banc majority undermines thi^ area of fed-
eral Indian law and is thus of even broader conse-
quence. 
The recent New Mexico cases, aiscussed by 
Petitioners at 12, where the plaintiffs specifically rely 
on this misreading of Solem by the en tianc majority, 
will not be isolated examples. Nor is the list of twenty-
nine public domain areas in other states cited by 
Petitioners, extensive as it is, all inclusive. Pet. at 
7 
11-12. Kappler identifies nine additional Orders in the 
short period of 1876 to 1883.2 
Compounding the en banc majority's mischaracter-
ization of Solem and making even more certain the 
predictability of additional litigation in these areas is 
the evaluation in a recent Comment in the American 
Indian Law Review that was awarded first place in 
the Indian Law Writing Competition at Harvard Uni-
versity:3 The author there concludes, as d}d the en 
banc majority, that after Solem "[t]he caiegory of 
statutory language terminating a reservation has been 
reduced by eliminating 'public domain' . . \. the ar-
gument, approved in Solem v. Bartlett, that the pubic 
domain language in surplus land acts carried little 
meaning ", id. at 69-70, 73 (Emphasis added). In 
context, the remarks in Solem obviously were not 
intended to support such a conclusion.4 Nevertheless, 
2
 Seey e.g. Exec. Order of October 30, 1876 (I Kappler 814) 
(White Mountain); Exec. Order of May 3, 1877 (I Kappler 821) 
(Mission Res.); Exec. Order of February 5, 1883 (I Kappler 823) 
(Mission Res.); Exec. Order of August 19, 1874 (I Kappler 856) 
(Blackfeet); Exec. Order of March 29, 1884 (I Kappler 885) (Tur-
tle Mountain); Exec. Order of January 28, 1876 (I Kappler 889) 
(Malheur Res.); Exec. Order of September 13, 1882 (t Kappler 
889-90) (Malheur Res.); Exec. Order of May 21, 1883 (1 Kappler 
890) (Malheur Res.); and Exec. Order of February 2^, 1883 (I 
Kappler 904-05) (Chief Moses). 
3
 Comment, Reservations: The Surplus Lands Acts and the 
Question of Reservation Disestablishment, 12 A.LL.Rev. 57 
(1986). 
4
 In contrast to the operative public domain language in the 
Utah Acts and Proclamations, the reference to public qomain in 
Solem was an isolated one. Public domain terminology did not 
appear in the operative language of the Solem Act, andialthough 
the reference itself was deemed supportive of disestablishment, 
8 
that such a conclusion could be erroneously attributed 
to Solem shows how unsettling and disruptive the en 
banc majority's decision promises to!be. 
Authoritative review by this Court 
stem the tide of writs for habeas corpus and other 
actions, in precisely the same manner 
when this Court acted decisively and reversed the 
decision of the Court of Appeals for 
at this time will 
as in DeCoteau, 
the Eighth Cir-
cuit for . a similarly fundamental Misconstruction. 
DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 430, 447. In the absence of 
such review, an inordinate expenditure of time, effort 
and resources will continue to be wasted on an issue 
that had been settled for decades. 
3. Solem. If Solem can fairly be faulted with respect 
to a lack of clarity on the public domain issue, as has 
been suggested, then this Court's attention to other 
aspects of Solem at least merits additional consider-
ation. Apart from the fact that Soutjh Dakota's po-
sition before this Court in Solem mak^s clear its view 
of the holding in Solem, the guidance of Solem in 
other respects leaves more to be desired. Insofar as 
the "fairly clean analytical structure" that Solem 
counsels, (465 U.S. at 470) even the Ajnerican Indian 
Law Review Comment, supra, recognizes: "a con-
torted body of doctrine"—"two interpretations of the 
history of the allotment policy as applied to the sur-
plus lands acts"—"two historical interpretations of 
what the allotment process meant for the reservation 
system: one, that it ended the reservations, and an-
other, that it did not."—"The interpretations of sur-
Solem noted that it was "hardly dispositive'1 when "balanced 
against" other persuasive evidence of continuing reservation sta-
tus. Solem, 465 U.S. at 475. See the discussion in Pet. at 14-
17, 19-21. 
9 
plus land acts is confused"—'The preseht case law, 
discussed below, is now so confused." Id. at 61, 62, 
69. 
In light of this lack of clarity, it is noi difficult to 
understand the widely divergent views knd marked 
disagreement below—or elsewhere for th^t matter. It 
is left to this Court to settle conclusively I what Solem 
means and to state whether the Court intended to 
contradict more than a half a century of jurisprudi-
ence regarding the significance of public |domain lan-
guage. 
a. Part of the apparent confusion may} stem from 
a study that figured prominently in the Solem opinion. 
Solem, 465 U.S. at 466 n. 5, 477 n. 21,1479 nn. 22 
& 23, 480 nn. 24 & 25. This study deallt only with 
the Cheyenne River Reservation. Subsequent to So-
lem, it was discovered that a prior comprehensive 
thesis of the allottment era (1880-1920) kjy the same 
author (1) significantly contradicts the autpor's Solem 
study and (2) expressly recognizes that th^ Utah Uin-
tah Act and others "followed the model" pi the 1904 
Rosebud Act—the same Act that the Rosebud Court 
held reflected the baseline purpose of disestablishment 
in the Rosebud legislation.5 
cor b. Although Rosebud effectively and jected the Ash Sheep* and related lingering 
interest argument, as "logically separat 
question of disestablishment", (Rosebud, < 
601, n. 23) and although Solem cites Rdsebud 
5
 F. Hoxie, Beyond Savagery: The Campaign 
The American Indians, 1880-1920 at 390 (Univ. Microfilms 
6
 Ash Sheep Co. v. United States, 252 U.S. 159 
rectly re-
-beneficial-
from the 
30 U.S. at 
with 
to Assimilate 
1977). 
1(1920). 
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approval repeatedly, Solem also cites Ash Sheep with 
approval and again lends support throughput to the 
Ash Sheep and related lingering-beneficial-interest ar-
gument. Solem, 465 U.S. at 468. While §ohm rec-
ognizes that it is now " settled law that soriie surplus 
land acts diminished reservations...and other surplus 
land acts did not. . .", {Solem, 465 U.S. at 469) it is 
doubtful that this Court really intended for a holding 
in a particular case to actually depend upon which 
analysis of the same argument a particular court 
might find persuasive. Rosebud, 430 U.S. ^t 601, n. 
23; Solem, 465 U.S. at 469. 
4. The en bane majority goes beyond Solem 
additional respects. Although not at issue, 
below initially describes this case as one 
lands and title to lands: 
in several 
the court 
involving 
. . .this writer agreed. . .who generally !ruled 
that the Uintah Reservation and its lands 
remained the property of the tribes that are 
involved. As to the question of whether the 
acts dealing with the Uintah Forest and the 
Uncompahgre Reservation mean that the In-
dians lost title to these lands, the view of 
this writer is contrary to the view of the trial 
court. 
Pet. App. 3a. (Emphasis added.) But the parties in 
this litigation were not contesting the title to the 
lands involved. Secondly, while this Court has held 
that opening land to settlement was not necessarily 
inconsistent with continuing reservation stjatus, the 
11 
en banc majority initially "assumes the very question 
to be decided"7: 
Actually the intent was to open the reser-
vation to non Indian settlers and this couldn't 
[disestablish the reservation]. 
Pet. App. at 4a. (Emphasis added.) But se$, DeCoteau 
and Rosebud. I 
Moreover, while Solem did note that there are "lim-
itations as to how far we will go to decipher con-
gress's intent in any particular surplus land act" this 
Court has consistently and meticulously, on both the 
evidentiary and pragmatic level, at least considered 
all arguments. The court below categorically rejected 
this approach: I 
No particular significance can be given to 
these articles since they were writteii from 
the white settlers' point of view. I 
Pet. App. 13a. See DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 431, 432, 
where documentation similar to that rejected by the 
court below is set forth at length in the text of the 
DeCoteau opinion. 
5. In other instances, the en banc majority simply 
ignores Solem. No particular significance is paid to 
the fact that the area in dispute encompasses more 
non-Indian land than any "Indian reservation" in the 
United States and is populated by over 90% non-
Indians. Pet. at 9-10. DeCoteau and Rosebiid discuss 
justifiable expectations at length, and Solem specifi-
cally notes that such pragmatic factors, not present 
7
 Escondido Mutual Water Company v La Jolla Band of Mis-
sum Indians, 466 U S. 765, 777 (1984) 
12 
in Solem, were still entitled to considerable weight 
and consideration. Solem, 465 U.S. at 4^1. The en 
banc majority does not even discuss this aspect of 
Solem. In this instance, the u Solem standards'' were 
ignored. 
fact 6. The en banc majority also ignores the 
United States has consistently taken the pcjsition 
the Utah Uncompahgre Reservation ceased 
because it was restored to the public domain 
nearly a century of reliance upon expres^ 
tations of the United States, by the people, 
the state government and the Congress, 
majority should have at least discussed th^ 
this position. This is especially so in light 
that the United States does not lightly 
reservation has been disestablished. In 
Mattz, Rosebud, DeCoteau and Solem 
States argued against reservation disestab 
that the 
that 
to exist 
After 
represen-
he courts, 
en banc 
merits of 
the fact 
Conclude a 
Seymour, 
United 
ishment. 
the 
bf 
the 
7. The en banc majority does not, however, neglect 
to mention that the Justice Department supported its 
conclusion with respect to the Uintah Reservation 
when it appeared for the United States £s amicus 
curiae. However, the arguments of the United States 
have not been consistent with reference tjo the Act 
of February 8, 1887, 24 Stat. 388, (GeneralJAlIotment 
Act). In Seymour and Mattz and until DeUpteau, the 
focal point of the position of the United States was 
the General Allotment Act of 1887. Because there 
were no major subsequent adjustments in federal In-
dian policy until 1934, the United States reasoned, 
logically, that any Congressional constancy I in federal 
Indian policy vis-a-vis the surplus land statutes, must 
necessarily be tied to the General Allotment Act. The 
United States therefore concluded that surplus land 
13 
statutes subsequent to the enactment of the General 
Allotment Act were not intended by Congress to dis-
establish reservations. After this Court held in 
DeCoteau that Congress utilized the General Allot-
ment Act in surplus land statutes to continue to di-
sestablish Indian reservations after 1887, the United 
States abandoned its argument relying on Congres-
sional constancy in federal Indian policy. In jits stead, 
the United States substituted a case by cas^ analysis 
based upon more subtle indicia of Congressional in-
tent. According to this new argument of tl}e United 
States, such an analysis must necessarily reflect that 
Congressional intent vacillated from time to jtime and 
from act to act. At any one time Congress might 
utilize a standard format intending to disestablish one 
reservation and the next time utilize the same or 
similar format not intending the same result. The 
concept of such vacillating Congressional intent is 
made more elusive by the fact that no Congressional 
enactment between 1887 and 1934 has yet surfaced 
to establish when such a fundamental shift in 
Congressional policy occurred. (Not only is the his-
torical record everywhere silent with respect to any 
contemporary documentation to support such an ar-
gument, but it also affirmatively refutes the existence 
of such an ill conceived Congressional plan)i. Never-
theless, the United States maintains this is wpat Con-
gress intended. Fortunately for Utah, the pqsition of 
the United States with respect to the Uncojnpahgre 
Reservation does not hinge upon such subtleties. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the petition foi^  writ of 
certiorari should be granted. 
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Conflict regarding the prerogative^ of tribal governments on 
Indian'reservations has escalated steadily in recent years. Some 
resident tribal enrollees have complained to outsiders* "THE U. 
S. CONSTITUTION STOPS HERE," was the headline of a series about 
Red Lake Reservation in the Minneapolis Star and Tribune. Indian 
courts were "islands of injustice," wrote investigative 
reporters. Reservation residents were not represented by 
qualified counsel. Ill-trained judges ordered, and self-serving 
politicians enforced, penalties for alleged infractions to 
satisfy personal interests. Their Red Lake constituents were 
either driven into exile out of fear, or stripped of 
opportunities and possessions, "with almost nowhere to turn" for 
help. 
The problem was not restricted to Ojibway Country, the 
reporters added. On 487 reservations scattered across the 
country, many Indians were threatened by the loss of justice due 
them as citizens of the United States without recourse, and most 
reservation residents were deprived of economic opportunities 
because "businesses... important to the well-being of reservation 
economies" were "scared away by unjust and incompetent tribal 
courts." "Federal judges refuse[d] to hear appeals." 
"Congress... failed to pass laws curbing) abuses," even though it 
held constitutional "authority over Indian tribes," and the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs had "powerful leverage" to enforce 
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federaL^laws*. with "the $1.4 billion t^ dispenses annually for 
tribaF governments." 
As they championed the rights of Ihdians who lived under the 
jurisdiction of tribal governments, the Minneapolitans were left 
with the embarrassing conclusion that reservation leaders were 
not competent to govern without federal supervision. Their 
escape from the charge of racism was a ploy used often by outside 
observers who breeze through Indian Country. To blame were not 
self-serving tribal politicians, after all, but "the long history 
of white men's exploitation of IndiansJ1 
Cultural self-condemnation did not assuage the resentment of 
Oglala Sioux journalist Tim Giago. Froto his Lakota Times office 
at Pine Ridge, he wrote not only in defense of the chief judicial 
officer at Red Lake, but also in protest against non-Indian 
journalists who passed judgment on reservation societies. Using 
news releases about Wounded Knee-1973 and Red Lake-1986 as prime 
examples, he accused uninformed Whijtes of calling Indians 
incompetent without justification, failing to give the victims of 
journalistic condemnation a chance to respond, and reaching 
erroneous conclusions that impaired the opportunities of all 
tribal members. "It is patently wrong for white reporters to 
overlook the ancient customs and laws of the much older tribal 
governments" when appraising the applications of justice, wrote 
Giago. And he challenged the authority of the United States to 
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intrude,, contendin&Jthat its Constitution was "not„the law of the 
land on the sovereign Indian nations*" 
At the end, Giago employed a tactic used often by Indians to 
escape the charge of racial bias for the blanket condemnation of 
White people. To blame for problems on the reservations was not 
abuse by non-Indians in general, but erroneous judgments by White 
historians in particular, who persist in teaching that Indians 
were "uncivilized savages when the white man first arrived .,2 
More troublesome still than conflict about the affects of 
tribal governance on Indians has been distress regarding judicial 
sanction for tribal jurisdiction aver White people who live 
within the original boundaries of Tndian reservations. While 
weighing arguments about the civil authority of Indians submitted 
by tribal lawyers and federal spokesmen against counter arguments 
advanced by counsel for state or local governments, federal 
judges have ruled indecisively on one side, then on the other, 
Non-Indians have felt betrayed by attacks against state and local 
authority that has worked for them thrpugh several generations. 
They have complained that tribal governance might deprive then of 
time-honored constitutional guarantees. (See Appendix A) Indian 
leaders have asked why White people, who have managed their 
affairs so long in the past, could not live under tribal 
authority in years to come. 
Consternation escalates partly because of legal 
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implications, and^more due to inevitable economic^consequences. 
At issue in" Sioux Country during the slimmer of 1986 were tribal 
ordinances designed to ease Indian unemployment in excess of 
eighty percent on reservations with th£ preferential hiring of 
tribal enrollees on federal road prqjects, which have been 
accomplished mainly by Whites in the past. Few non-Indians 
attacked the ordinances directly, but South Dakota Governor 
William Janklow took exception indirectly when he challenged the 
legality of a special tax to fund the training of prospective 
3 
Indian road workers* In this instance, a ruling on the 
preferential employment of Indians may determine whether families 
of Indians or Whites who dwell within reservation boundaries will 
afford the necessities of life, and increasing intercultural 
antagonism will be the result. At issde in the summer of 1986, 
too, was whether Pine Ridge Reservation residents should purchase 
Oglala tribal or South Dakota state license plates for their 
automobiles; and whether federal, stat^ or tribal jurisdiction 
should prevail in the regulation of tribally operated bingo 
halls, which have been under investigation for possible 
corruption by crime syndicates. In these instances, the coffers 
of state or tribal governments are likely to be affected 
considerably• 
Because tribal jurisdiction hi 
applications of practical and economic 
action to restrict or expand it will sa 
as so many potential 
consequence, no federal 
tisfy both tribal members 
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and White people. At the grass roots* tihey\ar^ ejer^at odds, and 
express divergent opinions regarding how the conflict should be 
resolved. Most non-Indians and sora^  relocated mixed-bloods 
believe that tribal government is anachronistic, and say that 
tribal jurisdiction if not the entire reservation system ought to 
be abolished. Nearly all Indians who occupy allotments or derive 
noteworthy benefits from reservation affiliations contend that 
reservation life under tribal authority is essential to cultural 
survival, but they disagree about the extent of power that tribal 
leaders should retain. On the one harid, Harold Shunk of Rapid 
City, a Yankton Sioux who served more than three decades in the 
U. S. Indian Field Service, has expressed the opinion that tribal 
authority ought to be restricted to the management of Indian 
land. On the other hand, Leonard Bruguier, a Yankton who has 
devoted his life to the study of tribal history, leaned toward 
the opposite extreme. In his opinion, 
that has subordinated tribal to White governance across Indian 
Country is wrong. Within reservation boundaries, tribal leaders 
should be sovereign with no constraint except the obligation to 
honor the presence of Whites. As national citizens, they should 
be at liberty to live and own property within reservation 
boundaries. But those who cannot adjust to tribal regulations 
should be encouraged to relocate (possibly with the benefits of a 
voluntary relocation program and an employment assistance plan at 
federal expense), and all who resist the authority of tribal 
an historical assumption 
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officials openly ought to be removed* 
Controversy in dialogue has brought action among officials, 
which has further aggravated and confused the victims of 
jurisdictional dispute. Indeed, many adversaries have reached 
agreement in the belief that a definitive answer which favors 
either Indians or Whites would be preferable to the continued 
escalation of the controversy. Already, at least one tribal 
policeman has resigned because "nobody could tell him where on 
his reservation he could arrest susbects and enforce Indian 
7 ' 
laws." White and Indian reservation residents have grown 
increasingly suspicious of each oth^r through debates about 
theoretical questions they barely understand, and practical 
issues that affect them directly. Federal judges have floundered 
in the contents of briefs and testimonies containing incomplete 
or faulty information. Attorneys have grown antagonistic about 
the erratic behavior of the courts, and increasingly intolerant 
of the performance of researchers who hjave worked as consultants 
on jurisdictional cases, with some ji^ stif ication. All public 
historians have not called Indians "uncivilized savages," as 
Giago has charged, but some have done jurisdictional research in 
violation of standards that govern their profession. Out of 
indolence, incompetence, or commitment to social causes, all too 
many historical consultants have skirted the grueling pursuit of 
truth in contexts and data to fashion selective information into 
polemical insLr urnenLs lor use in a righteous effort to make up 
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for past inequities. 
Compounding the uncertainty and the seriousness of the 
problem discussed above (who has jurisdiction over whom on Indian 
reservations) is an additional and mofe serious jurisdictional 
dispute, which is the subject of this p^per, namely: dispute over 
the intended effect of surplus land }.aws enacted pursuant to 
Section 5 of the General Allotment Act on the boundaries of 
reservations • The issue is: did Congress, through Section 5 of 
the General Allotment Act, intend to disestablish these surplus 
land areas from the reservation, or did it not? 
One historical consultant who supplied information for this 
type of jurisdictional boundary litigation in a case that 
involved a Sioux tribe either stumbled L^nto files that supported 
his sense of fair play, or gathered evidence selectively by 
design, and permitted its use to demonstrate congressional intent 
to sustain recognition of original reservation boundaries, even 
though the weight of evidence should have revealed that the 
opposite was true* In other words, he either lacked competence, 
or abandoned the pursuit of truth for the role of referee on 
retribution as an advocate of one adversary in the judicial 
process. By doing so, he ignored an obvious trend in 
jurisdictional history, and confounded the proceedings of justice 
Q 
all the way to the Supreme Court of the United States, 
The decision in that case has confused subsequent litigation 
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in pursuit, of a definitive answer to
 i the central:question in 
every oner of the Section 5 jurisdictional disputes. Through the 
era between the passing of the Dawes Act in 1887 and its 
termination by the Indian Reorganization Act in 1934, did 
tribal 
Congress mean to leave intact federal andA jurisdictional 
authority, or did it intend to disestablish the affected portion 
of the reservation? Because congressmen of that era left no 
cogent statements, historical consultants have presented 
selective passages from legislative an|d administrative records 
that pertain to intent. Attorneys hav^ tortured phrases here, 
and marshalled implications there, to support divergent postures 
toward how congressmen should have responded eighty or ninety 
years ago. Judges have listened to the^ .r arguments, mulled over 
conflicting precedents, reviewed legislative and administrative 
histories, even taken Indian-White population ratios into 
account, and from appearances relied excessively upon their own 
social values when reaching decisions. 
From their inconsistent rulings ha$ evolved only confusion. 
How much better it would be to also search for elusive intent in 
evidence regarding the behavior of administrative officials in 
that era as they worked with congressional support and 
allocations on the management of Indian affairs. Using 
publications nrul cloctnnont.s tlmt dm I with t lie* npplicnlion IIM wrll 
I 
as the formulation of federal policies, historians with impartial 
disposition and proven expertise should be able to extrapolate 
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intent with^little margin of error. 
In every case they research, they 6ught to take into account 
three things: (1) as background, JURISDtCTINAL POLICY FOR INDIANS 
from colonial times to the late nineteenth century, before many 
of the tribes moved onto reserves and accepted allotment and 
surplus land sales according to the terms of the Dawes Act of 
1887; (2) the GENERAL PLAN OF FEDERAL {LNDIAN POLICY through the 
period from 1887 to 1934, before the DaWes Act ceased to function 
; and (3) the AFFECT OF FEDERAL POLICY upon governance within 
reservation boundaries, where Indian Field Service officials 
managed agency affairs with congressional support. 
Unique historical developments may cloud the issue of 
jurisdiction somewhat, of course. In Teton Country, Wanbli on 
Pine Ridge and Lower Brule both come to mind, where federal 
officials assigned peoples to lands they declined to accept, and 
were forced to make special concessions. Accordingly, the 
records of each reservation that becomes involved in 
jurisdictional litigation must be searched. No general 
assumption regarding congressional intent can be applied without 
corroboration by records pertaining to the tribe whose history is 
subjected to judicial judgment. 
The affairs of nearly all reservations were managed 
according to the same general policies, however. Hence, a 
historian who has kept up with the literature on federal policy 
- 10 -
Add 130 
toward Indians* and,£ has labored in the records of. a major 
federation of tribes for long, can present a scenario for the 
typical tribe that had a typical * relationship with Congress 
through the era when the Dawes Act was in effect. 
Any historian who has pursued Indian history as a specialty 
should find it easy to trace JURISDICTIONAL POLICY FOR INDIANS 
down to the passing of the Dawes Act. l|t is readily available in 
recent publications supplemented by a narrow selection of 
9 
original documents. Sources at harid reveal that general 
suppositions about the sovereign authority of Indian leaders to 
govern have been fairly consistent since the formulation of 
policy for this issue soon after the founding of Jamestown in 
1607, 
Jurisdictional Policy Prior to the Dawes Act 
Throughout the colonial era, Anglo-American officials looked 
upon groups of Indians as political entities with title to land, 
which could be "quieted" only by purchase or conquest in war. 
Few White colonials proposed to ignore aboriginal claims or 
exterminate tribes as means of territorial acquisition. Like 
officials in England, they thought of areas occupied by Indians 
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of Indian^ Country as boundaries within which Indian leaders 
exercized jurisdiction over tribal and diplomatic affairs; and 
negotiated often vrLth tribal spokesmen by procedures in use for 
international deliberations between sovereigns of Europe. 
Similarly, Indian representatives dealt with Whites as they had 
with neighboring tribes through formal discussions in preference 
to war. The process of treaty making evplved almost naturally. 
White diplomats were more aggressive than tribal spokesmen, 
for several reasons. There was a supposition about universal 
rights to land in short supply explained by the European 
philosopher Emmerich de Vattel. He argued that sedentary, 
agricultural life was superior to diversified, semi-nomadic 
existence, assumed that "the earth beloqgs to all mankind" as a 
"common dwelling-place and source of subsistence," and contended 
that no component of mankind should apprppriate more land than it 
could use if other parts were in need of space. 
Secondly, there was the belief shared by colonials regarding 
New World "discovery." A European sovereign whose agent staked 
first claim to a tract had the right of preemption over other 
European monarchs in competition for Western Hemispheric empire. 
It could be exercised as quickly and extensively as tribes 
relinquished claim by treaty, or lost it in war. 
In addition, there was an assumption that sovereignty was 
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divisible, and in the process of its Reduction English monarchs 
had from might or other right acquired the greatest measure. 
Especially through divine ordination, 
supreme magnitude for themselves, and 
second order in tribal governments, 
rights of discovery, and perceptions 
aggressive motivation from coloni^ 
Christian^ mission and the capitalist's right of exploitation. 
they assumed dominion of 
recognized sovereignty of 
To Vattel's hypothesis, 
of sovereignty was added 
1 assumptions about a 
Non-Indian colonials were hell-bent on 
and federations were bound to lose fo 
concert. 
expansion. Tribal groups 
|r their failure to act in 
In spite of this, colonials dealt often for land as though 
tribal spokesmen were their diplomatic equals. Until the 1750s, 
ranking officers in the several colqnies were responsible for 
Indian diplomacy, or war, over land. Beginning in the 1750s, 
Superintendents of Indian Affairs did the work of diplomacy while 
British generals or colonial governorsi were in charge of war. By 
the terms of the Proclamation Act of |1763, Parliament made clear 
the separation of land ceded for colonial use from Indian 
Country. Through the 1760s, surveyor^ fixed an approximate line 
near the crest of the Appalachian Mpuntains. Officially, there 
were two jurisdictions, and a non-Indian could not enter Indian 
Country legally without permission fr^m British authorities. 
During the American Revolution, many White people crossed 
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demarcation lines illegally with the breakdown of British 
vigilance. But the Second Continental Congress vested 
responsibility for Indian affairs in central not state or local 
government* Adopting colonial practices without substantial 
change, national authorities dealt wlj 
entities, and resumed negotiations. Lil 
ith tribes as sovereign 
ke colonial leaders, they 
supposed the transfer of land from Indian Country to public 
domain could be accomplished only by | treaty or war, and that 
non-Indians might not cross the line irjto Indian Country without 
federal permission. 
Congressmen who legislated u 
Confederation as organic law from 178 
same assumptions. They attended to 
Country from land owned or occupied le^ 
the entry of non-Indians for trad 
jnder the Articles of 
\L to 1789 perpetuated the 
the separation of Indian 
ally by Whites, prohibited 
; or settlement without 
permission, and tried to arrange the l^gal entry of pioneers, 
The restraint of non-Indians was 
land available for expansion was in short supply. The average 
farm in New England was less than ha 
century earlier, and farmers placed| 
cultivation. Substantial tracts lay 
plantation states from the mining 
production without fertilization or 
southern farmland was sometimes abanl 
not easy, because arable 
[Lf the size it had been a 
marginal acreages under 
in ruin across southern 
of land for cash crop 
crop rotation. Indeed, 
doned in as few as three 
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years, and plantation* owners paralleled tjhe efforts of northern 
prospectors toward the opening of virgin ijand iir the* WestV 
Shortages forced Confederation congressmen to act* Quickly, 
they dispatched negotiators to bargain for acreages already 
occupied by squatters on the northwestern frontier, and to 
confine the tribes to smaller areas. At the same time, they 
stipulated in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 that land in Indian 
Country belonged to tribes until it was relinquished by the 
13 
consent of their spokesmen. 
The Ordinance of 1787 also dealt with the issue of 
jurisdiction on ceded land, where it specified that "criminal and 
civil...laws shall be in force,!f and for their enforcement the 
I 
i 
Governor of a Territory shall "lay out the parts of the district 
in which the Indian titles shall have been extinguished, into 
counties and townships." Lt went JDH to say that when a 
population reached 60,000 free inhabitants, a state "shall be 
admitted... on an equal footing with the original states, in all 
respects whatsoever" with liberty to "form a permanent 
14 
constitution and State government." One supposes that "in all 
respects" included the application of "criminal and civil laws" 
on land ceded by Indians. A blue print for the transfer of 
jurisdiction over White and relocated citizen Indians from tribal 
through federal to state authorities was in place. 
I 
When the authors of the Constitution of the United States 
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added the power to deal "with the Indiaji tribes" to the other 
^on they ordered the 
aced ultimate authority 
prerogatives of congress, Dy implicat 
perpetuation of previous practices, and pi 
in the legislative branch. To be sijre, War and Interior 
Department officials took over the management of policies and 
treaty negotiations, but to the end of treaty making in 1871 
administrators concluded diplomatic settlements by and with the 
advice and consent of the United States Senate, and implemented 
d by both houses of 
)g to Indian territorial 
egislative prerogative 
treaty terms with allocations approve 
Congress. After 1871, business pertainin 
ownership or transfer remained a ll 
exercised through "congressional agreements." All along, 
congressmen were in charge of fundamental issues pertaining to 
land and jurisdiction. 
With acreage in short supply across the upstart agrarian 
nation, no issue was more critical to early national leaders than 
was territorial expansion through the application of the 
Northwest Ordinance, followed by the ac 
Indians. Through the 1783 Paris Treaty) 
colonial sea-to-sea land grants by state)* 
two and several Indian treaties, by 
claimed sovereignty over some 225,000,000 acres. To keep 
non-Indians out of areas recognized as Indian Country until 
arrangements for transfer were complete! congressmen made tribal 
f 
land inviolate to any except those who entered with permission 
jcquisition of land from 
, the relinquishment of 
s, a major Indian war or 
1802 the United States 
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from federal authorities when they drafted Trade and Intercourse 
Acts, beginning with that of 1790, 
Ceded land in public domain was processed for private entry 
first under the 1785 Land Ordinance, then through the 1796 Land 
Act and subsequent legislation. The attachment of a footnote to 
the 1796 Act in the 1861 edition of Statutes at Large not only 
summarized legal assumptions regarding sovereignty and 
jurisdiction, but also indicated their abiding application. 
Discovery constitutes the or 
on the American continent, as t 
European nations. The title t 
exclusive right of acquiring the i 
and establishing settlements upon 
with Great Britain and the I 
concluded the revolution, the pow[ 
the riftht of soil, which hncl boo 
Britain, passed ciefiniLoJy Lo Lhe 
The United States, or the s 
clear title to all the lands... 
Indian right of occupancy.... 
has been once legally ap 
purpose ... [it ] becomes severed fr| 
lands: and no subsequent law or ] 
would be construed to embrace i 
perfect right to legislate as sh 
Congress are invested by the 
power of disposing of public 
property is passed...[by federa: 
other in the state, is subject to 
far as that legislation is 
admission that the title passed, 
p.ginal title to lands 
etween the different 
hus derived was the 
oil from the natives, 
it... . By the treaty 
nited States, which 
ers of government and 
previously in Great 
United States. 
pveral states, have a 
subject only to the 
Whenever a tract of land 
propriated to any 
om the mass of public 
roclamation, or sale, 
t. . . . A state has a 
e may please.... But 
onstitution with the 
l^nd.... Whenever the 
laws, it] like all 
state legislation; so 
consistent witik the 
land was vested. 
Down to 1861, Congressmen evidently thought it traditional 
and axiomatic that acreages acquired fjrom tribes, and transferred 
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to public domain for private ent^ ry under federal land 
legislation, fell under state jurisdiction. The same disposition 
was implicit in congressional action 
decades. National attention focusq 
revolution in the East, which thrived 
over the next several 
d upon the industrial 
on resources and services 
from hinterland economies in territories and states of the 
trans-Mississippi West. Immigrants 
congressional legislation that screen 
entered freely under 
bd new arrivals only for 
national origins and objectionable tendencies. Population grew 
17 
only seventy-five years. 
Indian wars, treaties and 
by some 33,000,000 from immigration in 
On frontier provinces acquired through) 
congressional agreements, immigrants and citizens from the East 
who crossed the Mississippi River found ample space to settle on 
plots governed by federal land legislation, which was amended 
often to suit western conditions. Af 
caused by post-Civil War partisan c 
states entered the Union in less 
beginning with four under an omnibus bj 
they contained passed from tribal 
jurisdiction according to congressional policy. 
appearances, no federal official 
transfer of jurisdiction over ceded aboriginal land. 
per a lull in state making 
jonflict, nine new western 
than a quarter century, 
ill in 1889. The ceded land 
through federal to state 
From 
said otherwise about the 
18 
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General Application of the Dawes Act 
All the while, Indian tribes weri segregated from Whites on 
reservations managed by employees or the U. S. Indian Field 
Service, wherein additional acreages 4ere relinquished and opened 
for non-Indian settlement. Section 5 of the Dawes Act of 1887 
created procedures whereby communal tracts they contained could 
be dissolved and allotted to individuals by executive action. 
With allotting agents at the scenen-often in the presence of 
ill-qualified interpreters, irate tribal traditionalists, 
meddlesome missionaries, and troublesome White hangers-on—tracts 
deemed adequate for subsistence farming or ranching were parceled 
out arnonft tribal members in scvorntt 
Act prescribed LlmL on the cuinplctio 
said allottees" they would "have the benefit" and "be subject to 
the laws, both civil and criminal, of the State or Territory in 
which they may reside." After tribal needs for allotments were 
satisfied, surplus areas could be "sold or released to the United 
I 
States" by tribes "for the sole purpose of securing homes to 
actual settlers," whose example ^as to encourage agrarian 
y. Section 6 of the Dawes 
I oi "pnten Ling oi lands to 
interest among Indians. (This was the heart of the General 
19 
Allotment Act.)* The United States either purchased surplus 
lands, or managed their sale piecemeal as rapidly as demand 
allowed. Proceeds went into tribal accounts for use mainly ir 
educational support, or in per ctapita payments to sustaii 
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illottees and their families, who yere expected to attain 
eirship land. On each 
Indians filibustered or 
self-sufficiency from allotted or h| 
reservation so administered, some 
protested rigorously at every stage ih the application of the 
Dawes Act, but on most the majority aqceded to the plan, albeit 
under duress. 
Historians of Indian-White relations understand that the 
applications of Sections 5 and 6 of the Dawes Act on most 
reservations failed miserably at the time. Reasons included the 
termination of treaty annuities, ^nc* depletion of tribal 
accounts, before self-sufficiency was 
by many Indians to take up farming an< 
infertility of acreages on allotments; 
adverse climatic conditions; an inadequate land base; and the 
general discouragement of Indians about their increasing 
dependence on paternalistic regimes in charge of their 
reservations. 
attained; a disinclination 
d ranching full time; the 
land hunger among Whites; 
Students of the applications of the Dawes Act on western 
reservations know, too, how littl^ Indian allotments have 
contributed to reservation economies since the Dawes Act was 
applied. Indian Office industrial surveys of the 1920s revealed 
that only three families in an enrolled population of more than 
2,000 Yankton Sioux, whose administrative history is most 
familiar to the writer, attained self-sufficiency from their own 
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land. Statistics show that Yankton acreage had gone from 
11,155,890 to 430,000 by the terms of tfhe 1858 treaty, and that 
through allotment, surplus acreage transfer and subsequent 
allotment or heirship land sales, aggregate tribal and allotment 
holdings comprised only about 40,000 acres by 1940. In seventy 
years, Yankton people retained recognized title to an area 
containing only 3.6 percent of the tract to which their 
20 
prcdccossors coded aboriginal claim. M On overage, the other 
Sioux tribes fared little better. 
Sensitive observers have looked back on this with deep 
regret and desire to somehow rectify a tragic error in the 
history of Indian-White relations. Some have published to elicit 
support from readers in the effort to follow up post World War II 
monetary payments through claims awards with other kinds of 
compensation. 
Additional recompense would be just. It should not be 
tailored by judges, however, or counsel, or expert witnesses, or 
historical consultants seeking retribution through jurisdictional 
adjudication. Such an approach could only compound one injustice 
by the addition of another. Worse, it| would further aggravate 
reciprocal images and relationships between Indians and Whites at 
scenes of jurisdictional dispute, where race relations have been 
tortured by war, social bias or fear for generations. 
Recompense should be made through some other means, and 
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jurisdictional disputes resolved by a search for congressional 
intent in developments related to the applications of state, 
federal and tribal governance witnin the same original 
reservation areas. To the question of yhether congressmen meant 
to leave federal and tribal jurisdiction intact throughout all 
lands contained by the original borders of the reservations, or 
intended to transfer jurisdiction from tiribal to state and local 
governments over land ceded as surplus fpr entry by Whites within 
those boundaries, there is a reply |by implication in most 
statements by congressmen and administrative officials regarding 
the general purposes of the Dawes Act. In various ways, Henry 
Dawes himself expressed the belief thdt "the time is not far 
distant when the holding in severalty wiill prevail all over this 
21 
country among Indians as well as white npen." By this he surely 
meant to encourage de-tribalization. In 1905, the Acting 
Attorney General of the United States wrote: "Undoubtedly the 
ultimate purpose of the allotments provided by the Act of 1887 is 
to wipe out the reservations." His belief in the elimination of 
tribal governance was clear, and he added that "it is for 
Congress, and not for the courts, to say when that purpose shall 
22 take effect." Because the Attorney Geheral's focus was on the 
rot en Lion of COIIJ» r »»MM I onn I jnr indie I I o|i 
"federal institutions" containing Indian 
may not apply directly to recent litigation involving tribal 
versus state or local governments. Ye£ his view of "ultimate 
n over rrnrr vu t 1 OILS MM 
"inmates," his statement 
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purpose" expresses the expectation of de-tribalizationf and so do 
many other official opinions pertaining to the Dawes Act in that 
era* (See Appendix B) From a broaa and general survey of 
JURISDICTIONAL HISTORY, an historian ih likely to conclude that 
tribal jurisdiction over aboriginal land was ceded with title, 
and that tribal authority over land on reservations was 
considered a temporary expedient even on the acreages assigned to 
allottees• 
Recent literature on the GENERAL GOAL OF FEDERAL INDIAN 
POLICY for that era bears a similar message* Policy reflected 
suppositions handed down from co|lonial times: Vattel's 
hypothesis; preemption rights to sovereignty and supreme dominion 
over tribes by the United States; and Christianity coupled with 
free enterprise economics as guiding f 
Field Service administrators and 
eatures in federal goals* 
missionaries backed by 
congressional support labored to transform Indian people into 
self-supporting citizens of the United] States; to separate them 
from tribal ties, and to attach them to White institutions, 
including those of governance. Congressmen authorized as they 
funded these processes year after year with published information 
at hand regarding administrative efforts, and considerable 
instruction from lobbyists with influence they could not ignore. 
That congressmen knew the reduction of tribal authority was part 
of the general plan they authorized anp funded is surely implied 
in appropriate chapters of Francis Paul Prucha's The Great 
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Father, for example, and the text ofl William T« Hagan's The 
23 
Indian Rights ^ Association, The latter indicates clearly that 
the imposition of mainstream beliefs and practices in place of 
Indian habits and philosophies in most of their manifestations 
was the goal of fawning eastern do-gooders with enormous 
influence among congressmen, and implies that the destruction of 
tribal authority was part of the acpulturationistsf plan all 
along* 
Records pertaining to the AFFECTS OF FEDERAL POLICY on 
tribal governance within the reservations of Sioux Country, at 
least, suggest that the congressmen |who listened to reformers 
could not have been blind to what was happening at the grass 
roots. Their awareness from participation seems clear in 
abundant evidence preserved by the National Archives in "Letters 
Received by the Office of Indian Affairs" and "Indian Central 
Classified File"; and by the Federal Records Centers in 
collections called "tribal decimal files," such as the ones in 
Kansas City annotated in a publisheq inventory for Pine Ridge 
Reservation records. 
The contents of federal document 
and other archival collections as 
reveal that several forces were op 
tribal governments, generally, throu 
|ary holdings, mission files 
well as secondary sources 
|enly at work to undermine 
h the period 1887 to 1934: 
(a) the abiding erosion of legitimate tribal authority that had 
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taken place through official action sinc£ the Age of Jacksonj (b) 
an intensified program of acculturation instituted as the Peace 
Policy under Ulysses S. Grant; and, in support of these older 
commitments, (c) a particular effort between 1880 and 1910 to 
supplant traditional tribal governments with Business Committees 
under the control of Agents and Superintendents, who either 
manipulated their agendas or rendered them defunct by the outset 
of the 1920s. (By 1880, the powers of tribal government over 
western reservation affairs required congressional recognition, 
one assumes, inasmuch as the rights of tribes to reservations 
were based not upon aboriginal but on recognized claim under 
federal treaty or congressional agreement.) 
(a) Previous determination to erotje tribal authority was a 
key to success in every de-tribalization effort while the Dawes 
Act was in effect. An early statement of intent to make this 
part of federal policy for trans-Mississippi tribes appeared in a 
plan for acculturation submitted by Saint Louis Superintendent 
William Clark to Secretary of War Jaftes Barbour, on March 1, 
1826, in which he urged federal action toward tribal members T!to 
teach them to live in houses, to raise grain and stock, to plant 
orchards, to set up land marks, to divide their possessions,11 to 
"establish laws for their government, to get the rudiments of 
common learning" and "give to the tribes the idea of submission 
to the authority of civil government" and to gather in 
settlements "over which a competent agient should be placed with 
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full power of conducting the executive part of a Government*" 
Soon a plan like this was implemented widely by U. S. Agents, U• 
S* Farmers and other regular employees of the Indian Field 
Service, with ever increasing effect. 
(b) At considerable expense to tax payers and tribal 
accounts, the plan was enlarged and enforced on reservations 
under Ulysses S. Grant's Peace Policy, Field Service employees 
and missionaries labored with congressional encouragement and 
support to educate young Indians about rion-Indian culture, to put 
adults to work as farmers and ranchers, to replace Indian beliefs 
with those of Christianity, to supplant individual attachments to 
tribes with ties to civil governments through citizenship, to 
undermine if not prohibit the pra<:tic$ of tribal folkways that 
seemed incompatible with nrainstream proclivities, and most of all 
to subdue if not dismantle traditional Indian governments. The 
application of these strategies culminated in a frenzy of 
citizenship awards and fee simple land issues followed by the 
depletion of tribal accounts with per capita payments. By the 
early 1920s, many grass roots observerls thought de-tribalization 
I 
for most Indians was nearly accomplished. (The temperament of 
congressmen that caused them to support the acculturation of 
Indians was related to the attitude which caused them to fund the 
export of culture throughout the Progressive Era. Theirs was the 
age of the "White Man's Burden," "missionary diplomacy," and 
other manifestations of non-Indian cultural imperialism. Indians 
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were not.the only victims.) 
(c)-The notion that men in Congress who flaunted mainstream 
American culture around the world mi^ht have wavered in its 
imposition upon Indian tribes through the period in question is 
not only illogical, but is also inconsistent with records 
pertaining to the reactions of agency personnel toward tribal 
governance. In documents preserved for Sioux Country at least, 
there exists in correspondence of War and Interior Department 
officials up and down the chain of command unmistakeable 
agreement in the belief that the manipulation of tribal 
government was essential to the control of the tribes, and the 
dissolution of tribal authority was a key to the detachment of 
individual Indians from tribal ties for entry into mainstream 
society as citizens. Methodically over the years, they 
dismantled traditional governments by fairly uniform procedures. 
Characteristically, federal officials replaced government by 
traditional chiefs and headmen as recognized forces on 
reservations with "made-chiefs" and advisory committees 
comprising other compliant Indians, £tnd these in turn with 
elected assemblies, or general councils, which delegated 
authority to Business Committees chaired by agency 
Superintendents. The Committees voted on such things as land 
management, claims development, tribal fund allocations, and 
tribal memberships. They were summoned infrequently at the 
pleasure of Superintendents, sometimes remained inactive for 
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years, and in most though not all instances were defunct by the 
early 1920s. Traditionalists protested in vain against the 
erosion of independent tribal authority through petitions and 
delegations to Washington, DC. For Sioux Country it is fanciful 
to suggest that any viable, federally recognized tribal 
government of the people's unencumbered choice existed on a 
25 
reservation by 1910. Where Indians participated in decisions 
about the general affairs and resources of their tribes, it was 
through Business Committees headed ai)d controlled by agency 
Superintendents. 
In spite of this, during recent prbceedings lawyers argued, 
and evidently justices were swayed to believe, that effective 
tribal government existed with congressional sanction on a Sioux 
reservation through the Progressive Era, following the full 
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implementation of the Peace Policy. Their assumption must have 
evolved from scanty research, because Indian Field Service 
records, correspondence of Interior Department officials, 
Inspectors1 Reports and congressional documents all indicate 
otherwise. Some iedornl officials m n y hnvc boon crooked and 
despicable, but lew of thorn were ioolfi onough Lo leave tribal 
governments intact. They picked them apart and transferred their 
functions mainly to regular agency employees in aggregate teams 
that ranged in size from a few on small reserves to scores on the 
larger reservations. From the Agency, Authority was delegated to 
employees at Sub-agencies or Farm Districts who dwelled in the 
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communities* A^t the^grass roots, Sub-ag0nts and Farmers (one and 
the same in many instances) marshalled the forces around them 
27 
effectively to remain in control. 
Included in local teams were tribal members, mainly those of 
mixed-heritage with tractable dispositions. They served as 
Assistant, Additional or District Farmeijs; Tribal Policemen; and 
various wage labor employees. Involved, too, were judges, who 
served for little or no remuneration. All Indian appointees were 
treated as liasons or instruments of Social control through a 
period of intensive acculturation, and their prerogatives were 
restricted and controlled by Farmers, Superintendents and other 
agency personnel. To be sure, Tribal Police and Assistant 
Farmers herded children to schools, and imposed other agency 
regulations. But they did so under careful supervision by Agency 
Farmers and other superiors. Grantpd, tribal judges made 
decisions in cases involving Indians. But they were empowered by 
federal policy like Justices of the Peace at the low end of an 
appellate judicial system wherein U. S» Farmers or 
Superintendents reviewed their cases with the authority to 
reverse their decisions. The contention that Indian officers 
recognized or employed by agencies g^ tve expression to tribal 
sovereignty with congressional recognition cannot be defended 
through the examination of records pertaining to the local 
applications of federal Indian policy. A historian who has pored 
over agency documents for long must reach the conclusion that 
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congressional as well as federal administrative intent was not to 
recognize but to quash tribal sovereignty. Under federal 
sanction, Indian leaders exercised little authority in the lives 
of tribal members, and almost none over the lives of White people 
who settled on surplus lands pursuant to Section 5 of the Dawes 
Act. (See Appendix C) 
Rigorous effort by agency officials to dismantle and control 
if not destroy tribal governments should not have been allowed, 
according to recent popular opinion, |>ut it went on with tacit 
approval by congressmen through allocations of funds without 
protest. What happened almost a qentury ago can only be 
superseded, either by congressional action or by an amendment to 
the Constitution of the United States. As the Acting 
Attorney-General put it in 1905: "it i$ for Congress, and not .for 
the courts, to" legislate federal policy for affairs on Indian 
reservations. 
If the urgency of need for a solution to current confusion 
regarding federal and tribal jur isdi|c tion within the original 
boundaries of reservations is not clcnr enough in examples of 
conflict presented at the beginning of this paper, it is 
dramatically apparent in the review 0f briefs and decisions on 
Section 5 jurisdictional boundary cases that have come before the 
federal courts since the early 1960s. Given the outline above as 
background, it seems clear that the courts are sorely in need of 
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the information and methodology which historians can supply when 
focusing on SccLlon 5 of tho Geiicrrtl ALlolmcnL Act and ita 
28 
legislative implementation. A colleague from the discipline of 
law on the faculty of the University of South Dakota underscores 
the need for the help of historians in her review of central 
cases, which follows. 
1. January 4-7, 1986 
2. Sioux Falls Argus Leader, March 30, 1986. 
3. Sioux Falls Argus Leader, July 22, 1986. 
4. Sioux Falls Argus Leader, July 27, Sdptember 16, 1986* 
5. Personal interview by the writer in Pierre, June, 1986. 
6. Personal interview by the writer at Vermillion, August, 1986. 
7. Personal interview by the writer with former policeman who 
prefers anonymity, July, 1985. 
8. Solem v. Bartlett. 
9. Francis Paul Prucha's the Great Father (Two Vols.; Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1984) supplies the best general 
coverage of Indian policy from colonial times to 1980. 
10. The Laws of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law 
(Washington, DC: Carnegie Institution, jL916), 37-38, 84-86. 
11. The official view of sovereignty is summarized in a note 
attached to the Land Law of 1796 printed in the 1861 edition of 
Statutes at Large. 4 Stat., 465. 
12. Howard Lamar, The Reader's Encyclopedia of the American West 
(New York: thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1977). A survey of early 
federal land policy appears on pp. 632-642. 
13. Greater detail about early national Indian policy is 
available in Prucha's The Great Father. 
14. I Stat., 50-53. 
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15. 4 Stat., 469-474. 
16. 4 Stat., 465, 
17. Henry Steele Commager's piece about the impacts of 
immigration on the character of Americans in Modern Maturity 
(February-March 1986) contains this estimate for the period 1865 
to 1940. 
18. For example, the Yankton Sioux surrendered aboriginal claim 
and jurisdictional authority on 11,155,890 acres in present-day 
South Dakota east of the Missouri river when they accepted 
recognized claim to 430,000 acres in th$ 1858 Washington Treaty. 
19. 24 Stat. , 388. 
20 . C h a r l e s J . K a p p l e r , I n d i a n T r e a t i e s , 177S-1883 (New York: 
I n t e r l a n d * P u b l i s h i n g , I n c . , 1 9 7 2 ) , 7 7 6 - | 8 0 . 
2 1 . 49 Cong . , 1 S e s s . , C o n g r e s s i o n a l Record , p . 1559. 
2 2 . " A u t h o r i t y of t h e Uni ted S t a t e s over I n d i a n s — o p i n i o n of 
Ac t ing A t t o r n e y - G e n e r a l , 1 1 Depar tment of J u s t i c e , Washington , 
D . C . , May 3 5 , 1905. The w r i t e r found t h i s i n F o r t Peck L e t t e r 
Books a t t he F e d e r a l Arch ive and Records Cen te r in Kansas C i t y . 
2 3 . Tucson: The U n i v e r s i t y of Ar izona P^ress, 1985 . 
24 . Record Group 75, M234, r o l l 747 , N a t i o n a l A r c h i v e s . 
2 5 . An example of the long term p r o c e s s of d i sman t l emen t i s 
c o n t a i n e d in He rbe r t f. Hoover , "The Yankton Sioux 
E x p e r i e n c e . . . 1 9 0 0 - 1 9 3 0 , " The American West ( T o l e d o : t h e 
U n i v e r s i t y of To ledo , 1980) , 5 3 - 7 2 . 
26 . Solorn v . Bar t l o t L . 
2 7 . The c e n t r a l r o l e s of U. S. Farmers in r e s e r v a t i o n d i s t r i c t 
management i s e v i d e n t in t h e a r t i c l e " A r i k a r a , S ioux , and 
Government Fa rmers : Three American Indi+an A g r i c u l t u r a l L e g a c i e s , " 
South Dakota H i s t o r y , XI I I ( spr ing/Sumiaer 1 9 8 3 ) , 2 2 - 4 8 . 
2 8 . The i n i t i a l overv iew of t h e G e n e r a l A l lo tmen t Act i n Appendix 
B i s h e l p f u l . A d d i t i o n a l work must be accompl i shed in pr imary 
s o u r c e s for each a p p l i c a t i o n of S e c t i o n 5, however , in o r d e r to 
p r o v i d e an adequa te s y n t h e s i s of i n f o r m a t i o n p e r t a i n i n g to i t s 
s p e c i f i c u s e . Federal documents wi l l be mo^t essen t i a l , but materials 
published in a r t i c l e s and books wi l l be important, too. For example, Father 
Louis Pfa l lo r ' s James McLaughlin; The Man With An Indian Heart (New York: 
Vantage Press, 1978), which has been important to the development of th i s 
paper, supplies v i t a l information about the application of the Dawes Act. 
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APPENDIX A: The Issue of Constitutional Guarantees 
United States Senate Bill 2564, introduced by Barry 
Goldwater during the Second Session of the Ninety-ninth Congress 
on June 16, 1986, precipitated discussion regarding the 
consequences of granting tribal governments jurisdiction over 
Whites, or over Indians without tribal membership. The bill 
provided the administration of justice by the Salt River 
Pima-Maricopa Indian Community Court over criminal misdemeanor 
offenses* It went to the Committee on Indian Affairs with 
support from officials in Arizona state government and nearby 
cities, and with assurance that this Indian court was up to the 
task.1 
Deputy Assistant U. S. Attorney General Victoria Toensing 
wrote the opinion that while under current law established in 
Oliphant v. Suguamish Tribe (1978) an Indian court had no 
jurisidction over non-Indians, the Department of Justice 
supported the change in light of endorsements from non-Indian 
officials in Arizona. She raised questions, nevertheless, about 
the capacity of the Court to handle the caseload; the community 
to provide jail space; and the tribal [government to assert 
jurisdiction without infringing on the constitutional rights of 
non-members: right to appointed counsel, trial by jury, proper 
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administration of the test for intoxicated [driving, application 
2 
of proper rules of evidence, and right of appeal 
Concern about the constitutional rights' of persons tried by 
the tribal court gained more succinct expression from South 
Dakota Attorney General Mark V. Meierhenry. In a letter to 
i 
Senator James Abdnor on September 4, he expressed firm opposition 
to S. 2564 because "Congress cannot constitutionally deprive an 
American citizen of his Bill of Rights guarahtees" by placing him 
under a political force not bound by constitutional constraints. 
At risk were the republican form of government guaranteed to each 
state group, right to appoint counsel, right to a jury of persons 
"from which members of a defendant's race are not automatically 
excluded," and right to trial by a political system in which one 
may participate. Any bill extending jurisdiction to a tribe over 
non-Indians, Meierhenry contended, would have to contain 
safeguards to assure these rights. 
1. 99 Cong., 2 Sess., S. 2564; Letters of support attached to the 
bill when it went to Committee. 
2. Statement of Victoria Toensing...before the Select Committee 
on Indian Affairs, United States Senate, July 23, 1986. 
3. South Dakota Attorney General Mark V. Meierhenry to James 
Abdnor, September 4, 1986. 
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APPENDIX B: The Purposes of the Daw^s (General 
Allotment) Act of 1887 
While congressmen debated the bill tha^ : became the Indian 
Reorganization Act of 1934 (which reversed tlfie philosophy behind 
the Dawes Act), the Office of Indian Affairs employed D. S. Otis 
to write a history of the act of 1887. He explained how it 
transformed earlier piecemeal efforts to place Indians on 
individual farms and ranches into a general plan for severalty in 
most of the tribes, discussed arguments that led to its passing, 
identified groups that had been for and against it, and described 
its early application. When Francis Paul Prucha prepared Otis1 
report for reprint in book form, he wrote in the introduction 
that wto many reformers" who shared responsibility for the 
passing of the bill authored by Henry Dawes "this was the most 
important means of destroying tribalism," and that Otis had 
demonstrated "how the allotment policy fitted well into the 
12 dominant views of that age of individualism." 
Throughout his text, Otis quoted and paraphrased opinions to 
demonstrate that most reformers and legislators supported the act 
to prevent the further loss of Indian land, but "the supreme aim 
of the friends of the Indian was to substitute white civilization 
for...tribal culture.... Allotment was counted on to break up 
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tribal life." Other philosophies were influential. Mention that 
"Indians were of course making no use of natural resources which 
should be developed in the interests of civilization" expressed 
4 the legacy of Vattel. But belief that "allotment was the legal 
method by means of which...breaking down the reservations...was 
to be accomplished" expressed the social anq economic purposes of 
most non-Indians. 1 : In a summary remark, Otis expressed the 
opinion that "allotment was first of all a method of destroying 
the reservation and...secondly a method of bringing security and 
civilization to the Indians." And he demonstrated in many ways 
that this was the popular solution to the "Indian problem" among 
most philanthropic reformers, legislators 
voting public* 
and members of the 
The major fault in Otis' analysis was excessive reliance on 
published agency reports and congressional documents, and failure 
to use original sources generated at the grass roots. 
Correspondence and inspection reports express far greater 
opposition to allotment and surplus land sa^es by Indians than he 
perceived. But primary sources corroborate the perception that 
both the popular goal of Whites and the accepted policy of 
congressmen and federal administrators was to de-tribalize 
Indians, and destroy their reservations. 
This conclusion came from a substantial number of 
congressional publications, many of which contain succinct 
- 2 -
Add. irt 
statements by members of Congress. Congressman Thomas Skinner of 
North Carolina made a typical argument in 1$86 when he said that 
"tribal relations must be broken up"; Indians should "shake off 
the shackles of tribal authority." With more land on 
reservations than they could "profitably use," they should sell 
surplus so Whites "may get possession of them and come in contact 
with Indians." Through the possession of individual allotments 
and exposure to subsistence farmers would come "the most direct 
route to citizenship for the Indian." "No better element can be 
found than the men who go out and settle upon the public lands, 
and make for themselves honest homes," said Senator Henry Teller 
from Colorado. "Give to our people...the right to go upon the 
Indian lands and make, side by side of the Indian farm, a farm 
tilled by the aggressive and enterprising Anglo-Saxon, and in a 
little while contact alone will compel these people to accept the 
8 civilization that surrounds them on every side." 
There was dissent all along. Back in 1880, a minority in 
the House Committee on Indian Affairs expressed the opinion that 
"it does not make a farmer out of an Indian to give him a quarter 
section of land," and went on to charge that "the main purpose of 
this bill is not to help the Indian...so much as it is to provide 
a method for getting at the valuable Indian lands and opening 
9 
them up to white settlement." In 1883, stronger opposition came 
from spokesmen for the Creeks in a memorial containing evidence 
of numerous instances where allotment and citizenship had led to 
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the Dawes bill into 
nism toward tribal 
extreme hardship• 
GenerallYi views expressed in congressional sources support 
Otis's conclusions, however. Most congressmen and reformers 
favored the Dawes Act to destroy tribalism, to instill desire in 
Indians for self-sufficiency through personal initiative, to 
expose allottees to the example of agrarian subsistence by 
opening surplus lands within reservation tjoundaries to bonafide 
settlers, and to remove obstacles to citizenship in the United 
States. One would have to torture phrases considerably to show 
from majority opinions any inclination to preserve reservations 
or tribal authority* One would search in v&in to discover a hint 
that congressmen who drafted and voted 
legislation felt anything but antagc 
governance. Surely they would have opposed the notion that 
Whites who settled within reservation borders to serve as models 
for allottees might be subjected to tribal governance. This is 
not to say tribal authority would necessarily have offended all 
non-Indians; by the late 1880s, many lived without inconvenience 
on reservations as husbands of tribal women. It is only to 
recognize that the vast majority of congressmen in that era 
believed that tribal governments and reservations were temporary 
expedients soon to vanish as Indians received land in severalty 
and citizenship. The suggestion that White settlers might be 
placed under tribal jurisdiction, one suipects, would to them 
have seemed preposterous. 
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1. The DawesjAct and the Allotment of Indian Lands (Francis Paul 
Prucha, editor; Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1973). 
2. Ibid., x-xi. 
3. Ibid., 8-9. 
4. Ibid., 17. 
5. Ibid., 21. 
6. Ibid., 32. 
7. 49 Cong., 2 Sess., Congressional Record (December 15, 1886), 
190. 
8. 49 Cong., 1 Sess., Congressional Record (February 25, 1886), 
1763. 
9. 46 Cong., 2 Sess., House Report No. 1576J. 
10. 47 Cong., 2 Sess., House Miscellaneous Pocument No. 18. 
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APPENDIX C: The Erosion of Government ^n Tribes of the 
United States from the Age of Jacksoi* to the 1920s 
Infringement on the "ancient customs and laws of the much 
older tribal governments," to which Tim Tiago referred in his 
editorial, began when colonial merchants ^nd administrators of 
New France selected middlemen for the f^ ir trade. Historian 
Harold A. Innis wrote that "the best of hunters were rewarded 
with favors and promotions," and "governors made titular officers 
of those..•accounted the best huntsmen and warriors." To' each 
they gave "a coat, a pair of breeches and a hat, appointing him 
captain of a river." To each, Innis might have added, they also 
extended advantage in the exercise of influence among tribal 
members around them for their central rol§s as liasons between 
suppliers of trade goods and Indian consumers. For diplomatic 
purposes, early Canadian fur trade operatives engaged in a 
practice known to officials of the United States in the 
nineteenth century as "chief-making." 
Meriwether Lewis and William Clark, anc^  Pierre Choteau Jr.'s 
leading Upper Missouri River trade operative, Honore Picotte, 
were among leading explorers and merchants 
practice during early national history. In 
who engaged in this 
1856, General William 
Harney founded Fort Randall near the center of Sioux Country, 
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wrote about chief-making and its significance, and described his 
effort to alter' the process- for the enhancement of federal 
authority: 
Certain chiefs were recognized by the nation, 
others by the military, others again by the agents, and 
the traders, for their own purposes, have most 
unwarrantably given medals and appointed chiefs.... 
These conflicting interests necessarily weakened the 
authority of all these chiefs.... 
I have caused the Sioux nation to select and 
appoint a certain number of head chiefs and chiefs to 
govern them, and to see that they carry out the 
conditions to which they have assented in council; and 
I have informed them that these would be the only 
chiefs recognized by the President, myself, or their 
Indian agent. 
Harney designated leaders mainly to carry on diplomatic 
affairs, but his recognition gave them status within their 
tribes. Regardless of previous standings they now were in 
position to influence Indian-White negotiations, the distribution 
of annuities, the choice of recipients for gratuities, the 
distribution of irregular agency employment, etc. Men who 
acquired positions in tribes by traditional means as well as 
those who did not were eligible for such "appointments." Only 
those who demonstrated steady support ior federal policies 
retained recognition for long. 
Chief-making became common practice among Field Service 
Agents as they founded reservations and searched for leaders to 
take over new bands formed by agency staff, and cooperative 
chiefs to replace traditional leaders as ^hey passed away. On 
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the Yankton Sioux Reservation, for example, Agent Alexander 
Redfield recognized *Francisv Deloria as "chief" ~of^ a new 
mixed-blood band* Redfield1s successors, acting with approval 
from their superiors in Washington, DC, "made" Jumping Thunder 
chief in place of Smutty Bear, Felix Brunot then Blue Cloud chief 
in place of Pretty Boy, John Ree chief in place of Mad Bull, 
etc.3 
Within approximately a quarter centulry, Greenwood agents 
reported the majority of chiefs to be compliant, and gained their 
approval for the replacement of traditional by republican tribal 
government under federal supervision. J. F« Kinney declared that 
chiefs were "not only useless," but also were impediments to 
"progress" on the reservation. In 1891, all who remained in 
office were induced to join a representative "Speaking Council." 
Young men who aspired to leadership positions through traditional 
means formed the "Sons of the Chiefs" and "Society of Orphans" in 
protest, but their letters were ignored. In 1901, when 
made-chiefs Jumping Thunder and Medicine Cow passed away, 
Superintendent James D. Staley said he would no longer "recognize 
chiefs" on his reserve. After that, Superintendents permitted 
the elective council to fall into disusd. Later on, tribal 
spokesman Clement Smith recalled the subsequent existence not of 
effective tribal government, but only of "factional 
4 
groups...floundering." 
- 3 -
Similar developments occurred around other agencies. At 
Sisseton, the constitutional "Renville Repujblic" collapsed in the 
mid-1890s, following the death of its only President, Gabriel 
Renville, leaving the tribe without effective central government 
until the New Deal Era. In most othejr Sioux tribes, the 
destruction of tribal authority was not as complete, but the 
process of erosion was similar. 
Among Tetons, it began as early as 1^78, when a commission 
recommended the distribution of rations to Upper Brule and Oglala 
family heads instead of to band leaders, and wrote that "the 
domination of the chiefs should be broken up" and replaced with 
authority by tribal officers elected for short terms. The chiefs 
exercised power with support from traditionalists, who were 
opposed to progress according to federal standards, and their 
removal had become "an agricultural necessity." In 1880, Crow 
Creek Agent William Dougherty said tribal government should be 
destroyed in order to undermine "traditions and prejudices...of 
which the head chief is the head repository." In 1882, he 
recommended "breaking up the organizations of bands and tribes, 
and establishing the family as the basis ofisocial organization," 
for it would then be possible to "impart t|o them some semblance 
of the manners, customs and laws of our civilization." As long 
as Indians lived on communal land "under tlje patriarchal system, 
they must contme to be...trubulent, id|le and expensive to 
maintain." 
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In 1889i as General George Crook explained the terms of the 
Great Sioux Agreement, he warned Teton leajders that the survival 
of tribal government should no longer be assumed; "it does not 
necessarily follow that because you are qhiefs today, that you 
are going to remain so in the future." Those who could not 
accept "this new departure" (confinement to reservation life) 
would "have to give way to those who can." Like drift wood, one 
who "keeps up with the current will be all right, and that which 
o 
cannot is left on the banks." 
Many were "left on the banks" thereafter. At Rosebud, Agent 
George Wright threatened to jail recalcitrants, and said that 
those who were "at one time recognized a^ chiefs, representing 
the older men, who have outlived their usef 
9 
be thrust aside* This happened at Standing 
|ulness," were going to 
Rock, where the Agent 
authorized Phillip Bullhead to take over the band of Little Dog, 
and directed mixed-blood District Farmer 
bring into it not only Little Dog's people, 
(Joseph Archambault to 
but also those in the 
bands of See-the-Bear and Moccasin, making thirty-nine families 
in all. 
Almost without exception, agents supplanted traditional 
leaders with tribal governments amendable t|o federal plans. For 
their effort, they received support an<i publicity from 
ecclesiastical spokesmen, who shared their 'philosophy. In 1909, 
one of them wrote that "tribal organization in itself always 
- 5 -
opposed civilization...for civilization means its downfall.... 
Where any form of this organization exists..., there you have a 
chilling shadow in the way of...progress."T 
Military leaders, agency personnel and missionaries all 
thrived on congressional support as they endeavored to 
manipulate, control, and in some instances destroy tribal 
government. The results of their efforts 4n Sioux Country varied 
from reservation to reservation. On those situated east of the 
Missouri River, tribal authority was either reduced to "factional 
groups...floundering," or for all practical purposes destroyed. 
On reservations west of the Missouri, j where larger Indian 
populations were shielded from White influences by distance and 
the possession of terrain with marginal value for agriculture, 
tribal leaders were more successful in tlfieir defense of their 
prerogatives. Even there, the procedures 
government were the same. Only the timetab] 
of attack on tribal 
le was different. 
Most populous and remote of all Sioux reservations was that 
of Oglalas around Pine Ridge. Truculent Valentine McGillycuddy 
initiated a methodical attack on the prer 
and other traditional leaders in the 
establishment of an "Agency Council" d>f 100 "working and 
progressive" delegates from the Farm Districts. They spoke for 
the tribe on matters of interest to the Agepc'^uand for some years 
pgatives of Red Cloud 
mid-1880s with the 
doubled as the Court of Indian Offenses. n Soon, officials in 
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Washington, DC, joined the attack on traditional leaders, 
withdrawing recognition from them and approving compliant 
made-chiefs (in one instance, replacing Red Cloud by American 
Horse).13 
"Old and non-progressive Indians wh<^  call[ed] themselves 
'head Men and Chiefs1" organized an "Oglala Council" of 300 or 
more to defend their prerogatives, to oppose federal policies, 
and to assert treaty rights. At first, they held monthly 
meetings. Later, they gathered only two or three times a year. 
Never did they receive recognition as members of a legitimate 
political body by Indian Office officials.] In 1907, the Acting 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs agreed to r^ise no objection when 
they assembled to discuss general "questions of interest." But 
the Indian Office recognized only the body organized by the 
Agency, which was by then the "Business Committee appointed by 
the general council" of voting tribal adiilts^ to reach official 
decisions about all matters except thos^ which justified the 
assembling of the general council. 
The Oglala Council asserted its influence, to be sure. For 
example, from 1902 to 1906 it foiled the efforts of Agent John 
Brennan and the Business Committee to arrange the lease of tribal 
pastures to a livestock syndicate. At length, Brennan dropped 
the issue for fear of provoking unnecessary friction in the 
tribe.16 
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This was an exception, however, becausfe even on remote Pine 
Ridge "progressive11 leaders spoke in ever increasing numbers 
favoring cooperation with the Agent* Several wrote as early as 
1894, urging federal officials to "do away with this Chieftain 
business which is unprogressive" and to rely on "regular 
councils...as the white men have...to encourage and assist 
progressive Indians." The number of men with this disposition 
grew as the tribe became increasingly dependent on federal 
support. In 1917, when compliant*
 Awere in the majority and 
traditionalists of the Oglala Council were feilent, Superintendent 
H. M. Tidwell called for the election of a jiew business committee 
of twenty delegates from farm districts, by ballot in general 
council, to function as an "executive committtee" or 
"deliberative body of practical size to consider and act on the 
18 
ordinary business of the tribe." This committee carried on 
tribal affairs under supervision by the Superintendent until the 
1930s, when the general council adopted and the people voted 
approval for a constitutional government to operate under the 
19 terms of the Indian Reorganization Act. 
On Pine Ridge Reservation, traditional Oglala leaders stood 
more tenaciously against the erosion of their authority over 
central tribal affairs then did leaders anywhere in Sioux Country 
obviously the Oglalas 
were unsuccessful in the effort to preserve their central power. 
On Pine Ridge, a similar process of erosion took place in the 
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excAg/t perhaps those at Standing Rjock, and 
AJcUtH 
communities, where traditional bands and their leaders were 
replaced for^ official purposes by Farm Districts and officers 
"made" by the Superintendents. After the Agency Council doubled 
for a time as the Court of Indian Offenses, special judges were 
appointed to the Indian Court as regular agency employees at the 
salary of $7 a month. Mainly, they worked in cooperation with 
salaried tribal policemen toward social control under supervision 
by the U. S. Assistant or Additional Farmers in the Districts. 
Case loads were sparse, according to a 1915 report, but fairly 
significant. "Over previous years" the judges had tried 
forty-seven criminal cases "dealing with assault, adultry, 
forgery, cattle stealing, timber cutting, elopement, contempt of 
court, drunkenness, fighting, wife beating, seduction and 
20 perjury." Without question, the judges and policemen performed 
vital services of governance. They did s0 not as officials of 
their tribe, however, but as regular agency employees on salaries 
under direct supervision from Farmers, who in turn functioned as 
sub-agents under Superintendents at Pine Ridge. And they behaved 
like agency employees, especially when dealing with traditional 
ceremonies regarded inconsistent with Indian Office orders, such 
21 as the practice of Peyote religion. 
At the community as well as the central level, on most 
reservations tribal members participated in governance through 
the era when the Dawes Act was in effect. But they did so as 
agency operatives more than tribal leaders under close 
- 9 -
AcU. \& 
supervision, and the power they exercised diminished 
considerably. In primary sources pertaining to their activities, 
there is nonetheless evidence that they functioned to control 
some patterns of behavior among Indians Who occupied Indian 
land. Nowhere in these records does evidende appear to state or 
demonstrate their power of jurisdiction over non-Indians within 
reservation boundaries, however, on land qeded as surplus for 
occupancy by bondifide settlers. 
Inasmuch as congressmen had access tcj> correspondence and 
reports on reservation life, and allocated funds to support it, 
one must assume that governance which existed approximated 
governance which congressmen meant to support. One's inclination 
regarding what congressional intent should have been does not 
alter the contents of a great body of original documents. They 
lead* to the conclusion that congressmen as well as 
administrators meant to diminish, consCain and in places destroy 
tribal governance as part of the plan for de-tribalization, and 
intended not to authorize tribal authority over Whites who 
occupied ceded land, or citizen Indian allottees who held patents 
in fee, within the original boundaries iof trans-Mississippi 
western reservations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In most areas of Anglo-American jurisprudence, a 
coherent body of law develops when a series of appellate 
cases are decided in such a way that one decision lends 
precedent to the next decision. Each new case places 
the court at a fork in the judicial road. In most cases, 
courts will follow the familiar path of p$st legal precedents 
Occasionally, however, courts detour from established 
precedents. If two cases cannot be reconciled, they are 
distinguished, and the law thereafter develops along two 
separate paths. Other times, a well-worn road is aban-
doned, as precedents which no longer reflect current 
legal, social or political values are overruled. A 
landmark decision often results when a past precedent is 
overruled, and a new legal trail is blazed. 
I 
Indian law, however, often defies precedent. Old 
roads as well as new roads may be abandoned without 
adequate legal or policy justifications. New trails 
are often not clearly marked. Decisions which could have 
been landmarks are seemingly disregarded by subsequent 
courts. For lawyers litigating Indian l&w issues, it is 
almost impossible to "map11 current developments in Indian 
law. The body of Indian law lacks coherence and consistency, 
Indian law seems to be developing on a case-by-case basis, 
without adhering to precedent and without establishing 
landmark decisions from which a coherent body of law might 
1 
AU.H3 
begin to develop. 
These disturbing developments in Indian law juris-
prudence are especially apparent in the disestablishment 
cases, sometimes referred to as boundary cases or diminish-
ment cases. Such cases typically arise out of disputes 
between Indian tribes or tribal members and state or local 
governments. At issue is the respective authority of 
tribes and other governmental units to ejxercise jurisdiction 
over land areas once set aside as Indian lands and later 
opened for settlement pursuant to §5 General Allotment 
4 
Act surplus lands acts. "Enacted over a span of almost 
thirty years after the passage of the Da^es Act of 1887 
[General Allotment Act, 24 Stat. 390 (18$7)], these statutes 
provided for the allotment in severalty of tracts of land 
on specific reservations to individual tribal members, 
and then for the opening of the surplus JLands to settle-
ment."5 
Recent disestablishment decisions b^ the United 
States Supreme Court and the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit have "compounded the 
confusion produced by the contradictions and conflicts 
already existing among the previous decisions in this 
area." Important historical facts relating to legis-
lative intent and federal policies regarding Indian people, 
Indian tribes and Indian lands, have beeti misapplied, 
misinterpreted, or ignored. Such cases violate available 
2 
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legal precedents while ignoring historical facts which 
are essential to a well-reasoned resolution of issues 
relating to Congressional intent. In some cases, nbad 
law11 results because attorneys have failed to provide 
the courts with an adequate evidentiary record (e.g., 
testimony of qualified historians, historic documents, 
and legislative histories) from which a court could make 
factual findings to support legal conclusions regarding 
intent. In such cases, there is simply no historical 
evidence, and courts are left to function in an historical 
8 
vacuum. In other cases, where historical! evidence has 
I 
been presented, courts have ignored or improperly inter-
preted such evidence, rendering decisions which might 
fairly be characterized as knowing attemptfs to rewrite 
history to reflect contemporary notions of social justice 
or political expedience rather than the intent of 
legislative drafters. 
The current state of the law raises several per-
plexing questions: Why have the courts seemingly strayed 
so far off any definable course in the disestablishment 
cases? Why has no clear standard of construction emerged 
which might bring some order to the currently chaotic 
disestablishment adjudications? Will the United States 
Supreme Court seize an opportunity to clatify current 
confusion with a landmark decision? 
3 
MU^s: 
In searching for possible answers to these questions, 
let us begin by retracing the steps of the United States 
Supreme Court in the five leading disestablishment cases 
decided to date: Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 
(1962); Mattz v.* Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 (1973); DeCoteau 
v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975); Rosebud 
Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 581 (1977); and Solem v. 
Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984). Tracing the evolution of 
standards for determining Congressional intent in the 
disestablishment cases, perhaps a "missed turn" will be 
discovered, or a new path uncovered. After looking to 
past cases for guidance, one can look ahead to the 
I 
critical juncture in the development of disestablishment 
case law which is looming on a not too dilstant horizon. 
q 
The pending case of Utah v. Ute Indian Tribe, currently 
on writ of certiorari to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, will be analyzed as a 
potential landmark decision. The United States Supreme 
Court has the opportunity, in Ute, to clearly articulate 
a standard of statutory construction which encourages 
historical inquiry in the adjudication or Congressional 
intent issues. If such a standard is defined and fol-
lowed, historians will play an essential role in assisting 
courts to understand and interpret historical facts 
relevant to the determination of issues of legislative intent. 
With adequate development and application of historical 
4 
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facts in disestablishment cases, perhaps legal conclusions 
based on those historical facts will begin to evolve into 
a series of consistent, coherent precedents. 
STANDARDS FOR DETERMINING CONGRESSIONAL INTENT IN THE 
FIVE MAJOR DISESTABLISHMENT CASES ' 
The Broad Context: Statutory Interpretation in the 
Supreme Court 
"The legitimate scope of a court's authority to make 
law where a legislature has spoken... is a recurring issue 
in American legal thought." The Supreme Court has 
wrestled with two competing versions of the "proper" 
judicial role in statutory construction cases. "One 
version grants primacy to the legislature as the author 
of the statute and therefore emphasizes the statutory 
text or legislative intention.... The second version 
grants primacy to the judicial reader or (interpreter of 
the statute and therefore emphasizes the creative role 
of common law courts." Each version has enjoyed 
dominance during at least one regime of academic thought. 
These regimes which influenced judicial behavior were 
catalogued by Professor Paul N. Cox of Valparaiso 
University as follows: 
The first regime, which shared some of its 
values with legal positivism, prevailed in 
the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Un-
der it, courts ... were to emphasize the plain 
meaning of statutory text....[T]ext had 
primacy under such a view. 
Adim 
The second regime, which may be identified 
with legal realism, ... denied the authority 
of text by demonstrating the indeterminacy 
of the meaning of language and denied the 
authority of legislative intent by pronouncing 
it a fiction. Judges on these premises are 
largely free from legislative wjll. 
The third regime, perhaps best represented by 
the Legal Process School... recognized the freedom 
of judges to choose between alternative 
interpretations of a statute....The language 
of statutory text, while not controlling, 
limited possible choices.... [T]jie third 
regime substituted legislative purpose as 
the fundamental basis.... [T]he third 
regime...treat[s] author and interpreter 
as rough equals. 
[W]e may have entered an era of the fourth 
regime, the regime of chaos..;. 
If there is therefore no currently dominant 
interpretive regime...it has nevertheless been 
recently claimed that a particular interpretive 
strategy has come to prevail iiji . . . the Burger 
Court: the strategy of literalism. If so, the 
Court has returned full circle to a version 
of the first regime and to the,contradictions 
of that regime: the text has primacy, but its 
force is to be strictly limited to the o^ 
language employed by the national legislature. 
Because Indian law develops within a larger body 
of law, problems of statutory interpretation which 
currently plague Indian lawyers may also be plaguing 
our colleagues in other legal specialties. Attempts to 
change the Court's approach to statutory construction 
issues in the Indian law context may be more difficult 
where the Court as a whole is operating in another regime. 
6 
The Narrower Focus: Congressional Intent Determinations 
in Five Major Disestablishment Cases 
During the past quarter century, the United States 
Supreme Court has on five occasions addressed questions 
of disestablishment or diminishment of Indian reservations. 
In each case, the Court interpreted acts of Congress 
which opened surplus lands (lands remaining after allot-
ments to individual Indian tribal members) to non-Indian 
settlement. None of the cases has yet emerged as a con-
trolling precedent. None of the cases has as yet been 
overruled by a subsequent disestablishment case. In each 
case, the Court has at least given lip service to the 
need to determine Congressional intent, but rules of con-
struction have shown little consistency ift application. 
Confusion abounds, as commentators both favoring and 
opposing disestablishment results freely (admit. 
During the October 1986 Term, the United States Supreme 
Court will again have an opportunity to clarify the 
confusion in yet another disestablishment! case, Ute v. 
Utah Indian Tribe, 521 F. Supp. 1072, affl'd in part and 
rev'd in part, 716 F. 2d 1298 (2-1 decision) (10th Cir. 
1983), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, qn rehearing en 
banc, 773 F. 2d 1087 (5-2 decision) (10th Cir. 1985), 
petition for cert, filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3071 (U.S. May 5, 
1986) (No. 85-1821). 
7 
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Seymour v. Superintendent 
In Seymour a member of the Colville Indian Tribe 
was convicted of burglary in a Washington state court. 
In a habeas corpus proceeding, Seymour alleged that the 
state court which had convicted and sentenced him was 
without jurisdiction, since the crime he had allegedly 
committed took place in the southern half of the Colville 
Indian Reservation, within "Indian country.11 The Washington 
Supreme Court denied the petition, holding that the southern 
half of the Colville Indian Reservation had been disestab-
lished and was therefore no longer "Indian country." On writ 
of certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed. 
It found that neither the surplus" lands act nor a 1916 
presidential proclamation diminished the original boundaries 
of the reservation. The case was decided in an historical 
vacuum. No reference was even made to the General Allotment 
Act or to the legislative history of the surplus lands act 
in question, and no one addressed the fact that the 1906 
act was based on a formal cession agreement. S. Rep. No. 
1424, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. (1906). In construing the 
statute, without aid of historical facts, the court relied 
primarily on the language of the act and a comparative 
statutory analysis (comparing one act with an earlier act 
or resolution). Perhpas Seymour is most remembered for its 
dicta, in which the Court distinguished A|ct of 1892, 27 
Stat. 62,63, the express terms of which "vacated and re-
stored to the public domain" the northern, disestablished 
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ticuiar --,.** ,,*<•_ rv: *„-
subsequtn* levelopinent s -c^ a
 4 ^  ^ . . . ,ered 
dcLual ^^urpfor of state i :sdict:TM 
unchallenged by Congress • Aifairs 
The Court announced and applied a v- r*abie thice-
part stanaa: ^gressional — *-*r 
court was exanir \c -u e 
iiLumstances; and 'egislative hist ry 
A - .ertainnit' : "ongression; 
*„--—•;-q* — ^ -:>.*-. - ; r. Court's i^ cisi*. ;e 
legislative - * v 
reservation status. The Com •*.*.- : .trn^„ 2 
• - -- » .-^ r^'Ptine >.o cession -.:.i 
relinquishment. ^ * . .^ i _ -i ^ Jl^r1—\r 
buip1*.:? 1 -*~rc qct^ -/.though there Ad 5 no evidence f 
lands (c-r^r.: had ^>r a L ^ L ^ , , . ^ tloteau) e 
;eeir*ed '"o» *-rl 1 irg s.nce the acts 
censtruee .a Rosebud were pa.. 
decision <_ *olf v. Hj.tchc:o_ck, . ^  ~< . - , 
' Alur L one wo If * - nat Congress *••' j. 
act unilaterally tc^ara Indain leu us ^nd re.c 
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1 r ) icvdflt inquiry became Congressional intent 
Th* ,-.wi*. J °~ seemed unconcerned aboul, I he .absence I 
^••'"^ai* -nprwo : .rases s; : •.- "restore 
..J 
Rose : - . n d : : i a of a p o t e n t i a l l a n d m a r k 
~~r b mode of d e r ^ i o n r ' 3 k i l n ^ • .Rosebud 
; . J , C <-- a p r o t o t y p e . . ^ - c n . . : . - - ; . . - - ' f 
d i s e s t a b l i s h n e ^ ' * - - - . * eemed •* r.e . e a r l y 
* " r i r e s s i c n a . : n r e * md t h a i . -, . ^ t t - •. , 
- ' - - * o a c k d r r - * he Vnp^a 1 :-* " ^r^en1" ^ t 
v*- w * : : U i c a t e t l - i v - u r p i u s ..*:.,:., j * . * Id Lc 
*-p^H h i s t o r i c a l c o n t e x t , as * our t had d o r e 
in DeCuLeau „ ' i I li.ir i'ctifciiess i ' mal inf nil, mi^hl hi1 mi' i 111 
a c c u r a t e l y d i s c e r n e d Yet Rosebud "has n o t b e e n s u b s e q u e n t l y 
- ^
J e n t . P e r h a p s , 4.0. i h r ^ - r* 
. «.; c ^ d i \ ) • i ^ i i . ^ . - «r-; -cjonour and .".:a_t_t_z, ^~ 
t h - ^ e r a s e < ' •' * f^ r -^ r e :"-it ; • v c o n f l i c t s 
. . - - * s 
*+- : c\ a*.*-; p r o n o u n c e m e n t s c o u . d have L t - n ^ u i d e o •* 
i 'np-rent U~A ' ^ " <^* ?bl 1 ^hment c a s e law c o u l d h a v e 
s p r u r 4 i r* ,Tii ;.. c Kosebuu . > t . . ^ o n , 
Recenr : -zdi c i a l hi s tc r-- however , i n d i c a t e s t h a t 
Rubebuu i s a, 1 andmark • :ieci sI on.. 
I n s t e a d ;+ - - re lega te*! , t o a s t a t u s of j u s t one 
i s e s t a b l i s h m e n t c a s e s w h i c h t h e 
^u^i' . Sol em c o u l d n o t r e c o n c i 1 * S p v e r a l . : _ - - : . i s , 
l( _ . ^ 
particularly those litigating :>x i bel lal f :: f i .01 1 Ii idian 
clients and governmental units in current disestablishment 
controversies, ai p lv\ I I m \v\ Ill'i"1 1 II " (! 11 I „ 
which appeared to be iharting a c 1 e.-ir course in R osebud, 
pi 1 hei : . . •: the c 01 irse. or ' missed the turn11 in 
deciding So I eg. 
Sol em v . -Dcirtiett 
s
* *-
m
 Y - M a r t l e t t ^ 6 r TT f ' ^ ° / 1 ° Q ^ 
. .aDe • *"-Mc petition 
rst f* *">•*"* . 
contended • mi .:*,c - ; T M ? 
o D er f- • hevpnnfe River Sioux Reservation 
which convicted hi:: was vithout jurisdict:c: e 
iui che i^jisLrie*" -^ f ^oijth 
Dakota issue. -r * labeas corpus, and 
Court of Appeal* •" the Eighth Circuit affirmed The 
Supreme „ . 
held that "he Cheyenne Rive* - :: :-^ . * -i lv^ v . -
ctuthor"* -"-^  ^- Secretar * ^ t e r i o r 
Rese^ • ir * - : > homestead ing, did • -• t: diminish the 
be..;/.. 
e Solem t •- u ^  *- ~ U -? a +-stor: - .*
 A ^ i 
t r e vjro 
f-n f 
i -* - , t, '> -Iv 
1
 c*. r\»^ f- i p n .J — 
?
*
 +
 *• Congress ^^ar ^ issed 
passed the acts partially 
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i n i quantum l e a p of l o g i c , t .o i ie luded t h a t C o n g r e s s ena< t ed 
c e i I: a i n t11J» |• I i 1 J ' i I i , ' i ]' " I > " 11' ' *1 » ' » '• <I 1111 f 11 i f s 
g e n e r a l i n t e n t and t h e o f f i c i a l p o l i c i e s oil t h e a l l o t m e n t 
eif mi I D e t o t e a u IUA i n Rosebud, t h e h i s t o r i c a l i i texf 
had b e e n deemed i n d i c a t i v e of an inLeiil I Il i m i i IIIII i III i n Il 
d i s e s t a b l i s h r e s e r v a t i o n s t h r o u g h p a s s a g e of i lie v a r i o u s 
s u r p n , J L l s 
The C o u r t d e p a r t e d f r - r ^ e s t ~ ~ d 3 ~ d r ~~** 
In . e^v t_<- i - z Rosebud, s t a n d a r d 6 r e q u i r ^ e *-hat M s 
t o r i c a l e v i i e M u - ' <- •. ^ s i d e r e ^ 
t exL v»hf^ e s o l v i n g : -^ \P< ^f " o n g r e s s i »nal in1.er 
c o n t r a v e ^ ^osfeOu» * t 
engaged in i : ,• - - r r w ^ : ] * i ; i t e d ni->t* r : c a l i n q u i r y . 
]• - " ' context t^ - i * wiic 
i n t e r p r e t a r i^n , * e - i i p i ^ b n. :s " . r e rV>e . , ; 
r e " - r 4 "P" * ^jir-f-r.r ~ ^ " v < — rean lne 1 * i n a l y s i s 
c o l l u d e d , 
i n t e n * - - s t a t u t o r y l a n g u a g e u s e d . . ~ - <:. n 
1
 r r i : ~~1 ^ " p h r a s e s s i : : . , ., i 
deemed d e t e r m i n e r ~"\- - f h e e a r l y d i s e s t a b l i s h m e n t c a s e s 
were - ^ ^n " i s o l a t e d 
p h r a s e s " and l f h a r d l y d i s p o s i t i v e - . c r e r . r e ? *-o 
> -'- ngh t t o be c h a r g e d v i t a 
s p e c i a l s i g n i f i c a n c e *<r. c ^ e . ^ g a c e u .n P r 1 . 
•.r ~ r e - a r i v ^ ^e^.T? ^^ii i r i. -n , e x p r e s s r e f e r e n c e t o 
" i c ^ e r v a c ; . - ' ^ h 5 s s 
Add i *'V 
the* exn". :*'* expression ~^ ~ .mgrebsiena1 "-*"— *• *-~i 
27 
o:^ *i '?ervacion. 
proper hist r:.a. , active -.c- general 
v
~- dt- ii si o n . 
passage * -* ^articular surplus land act .:; question, 
r 28 
attempt was \.. , . tgoi: . . . . 
uestior v «-u ~ e - ~*,>r ,-j 
context lur - . i^ ti.t era i 
other contemporaneous surplus "ands i. * - ;n ta. t, the 
Court foci.. . . ' j^turrrd 
af1 er passage * *< o demugrd^hJ *. ;ata corn^^ed 
f lis. jia'^ sapp , i h m un Iiisforical evidence 
or . egislative intent at the lime I "if ''' !i a1" w , > 
Q 
passed 
. . ^oiei "' ' -* "" : "• L s d n a ^ ?s 
h? ubsequent e v e n s r - r .** - ^ebud c o u r t - ^ e q u : _ 
. * : v e ' • i '• *~ c "*•" v a n ^  • ^  * v e r .u* i s c o r i c a 1 ^ a c 
p U 1 p -_ *. ^ tr U C <-> "^  O - - v. - . .. ~ -
The " - t 1 ' " - ! pffec r -f such a n a l y s i s <*llovs L O U I I -
S'^=: ' T.odern poll.:*-' — ; L 
should /* • ir^iHi histoiLcal ir5.*.ative -:.*_.• 
-.I c our Lb -ngage . r artificially narrow 
inquiries into <?ta*utcry purpose, dis-
regard principles announced in prior 
decisions, and allow their determinations 
to be governed by the vagaries of 
sequent developments, then they a: 
substitute thier judgment for tha-, . t 
Congress, indulging in judicial revisionism 
Mot io r 
Daki 
F i l e I-
a t 18 , 
• 
<it '. • 
So' 
L?0 
r r I-
i 
Ler 
II 
-. 
fo 
S. * - 669. 
• . . n t i e s o t 
r R e h e a r i r 
; a r t l e t r 
Deve 
Ifc -
«h ^ 
by conforming statutes t) 'iv-entlv 
accepted values and policy notions. 
To do so would be to remake history . 
derogation of the express .mandate yf 
Rosebud and DeCoteau 
Ziev-acv and Corson, South 
•< • > - "^- heave to 
I" L l l g 
_
 m 1984) . 
7 if«-f^ r~ -i •"- *• *ses 
seem destined * • * t decided ac IOC « d.-c ..v .2se 
t : •* **ri '•' •- consistent 
interpretation of legislative /ui.;^  : 
L 1 j ne ^- ii •. has attemptec „_ reconcile 
the conflict in the four ^receding o;.\^ns 
by essentially holding "hit the determmar • 
in one surplus land act ,. -se bears little 
relation to the next, <mft tr at each must be 
decided on a clean slate. This approach ig-
nores the historical threads binding together 
these different manifestations : he federal 
Indian policy of the turn of tr.e ./..-ntury, and 
hinders ar- -"nauiry into tr-^ ".v* *• ,-:ve intent. 
Motion of :he Counties or Dewey, Ziebach aiiu Corson, 
T h e s t a t e o t d i s e s t a b 1 i s I i rn e i 11 ' 2 w c 11 c 5 1 *• 
v
 *d perhaps best be characterized as a state oi confusion, 
v - - -iar tl •- ' •• — 
may hold f.r disestablishment litigants, ,. :,* 
detours ^nu .^iOchUc .f, . . . . 
g r o u n d s ' ' ' , ^ - ^ v - ;;'
 s ; i i s i » *h - t a t ' i t o r y 
c o n s t • - , a i t i S u i L s , J_U 
A.U. 
7±i i i,, i o\* i "'I i present - ^v - ca se course? 
J i l l the confusic- exempli : ; - : 
< 11 - e ^ f ri h I i *. limen t c a s f v. Ute IndI •_ 
continue to plague thi 
UTAH V. UTE INDIAN TRIBE: * 
T^VELOPMENT OF DISE^TABLTSl ' ^ 
"'vn?^e*!?iorai :n*.er' disestablishment 
cases hab - tates Supreme 
Court trah v Ut;e Indian Tribe ha$ .
 ? writing, 
wound :;s *. • J Jistric* >" (where a 
100-page c:^' rict o •.::. jpiiu^n wa? ii . ** f In "I" " 
•' -
 u
 <-> *-- r ^ i r L. u i t
 ( -in d an,, en ban£ 
nearmg bduic . "cuit 
iudgpp it;o^ :Vr •„ erti"rarL \a^ ^ c-en flit 
hope . ^ ^p,_ t"p opportunity 
to -ect-nsider d1 sestablishmeru i^-t ,
 :
 r
"^ *
 w J 
ia umr t^ir-r.'.ng or d:r"ini^hed reservation 
stat-ib ncompang - ne uir" -1* :---rvation 
ard certain "• her parcel- t" iibp^r ^ u lands tcii . 
appr - - r --rpQ s)i - Abich baa c l • 
ibi u e 
Circ-j-* v * ' have - * '*" ^?:^r>d ^ ^ e s t 
Indian reservation, "n fc>:""s of I^.d «.* -. !.Uil"os 11 
1 8 
At the district court level, the coutft was presented 
with a voluminous record which included 217 legislative 
documents and 485 historic documents, 1864-1978. In the 
trial court's lengthy opinion, a detailed historical 
analysis was undertaken in the search for Congressional 
intent. Subsequent decisions by the Tentfy Circuit, 
particularly the en banc court, have largely ignored 
the vast wealth of historical data available in the 
trial record, relying on language rather than legislative 
history, and a strained interpretation of Solem, in 
arriving at its anti-disestablishment decision. 
Had the court applied the standards set forth in 
DeCoteau and Rosebud, the court, given the historical 
record at its disposal, should clearly have concluded 
that the reservation had been disestablished, at least 
in part. 1) The face of the legislative act included 
32 
heretofore powerful reference to "public domain.11 
2) Surrounding circumstances evidenced aft intent to 
disestablish, as did "subsequent events11 and demographic 
information deemed so persuasive in Solem. The population 
3 
and land use of the disputed area is over 907o non-Indian. 
The federal government had not treated the area as an 
Indian reservation since 1897. The tribe itself had 
obtained a monetary award in its claims afction [Ut-e Indian 
Tribe v. U.S., 4 Ind. CI. Comm. 707 (1965)] based on the 
35 tribe's allegation that it had "lost the reservation." 
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3) Documented legislative history also indicated an 
36 intent to disestablish. 
However, the Tenth Circuit en banc,in an expansive 
reading of Solem concluded (5-2 decision) that despite 
the unequivocal language of disestablishment, the 
reservations had survived. The en banc majority 
refused to analyze the ''surrounding circumstances" and 
"legislative history" factors which the Rosebud court 
set forth in its standard for interpreting surplus lands 
37 
enactments. 
The en banc decision has further confused an 
already complicated body of case law. Petitioners 
make a convincing plea for clarification of disestab-
lishment standards in the aftermath of Solftn: 
Only this Court can correct the ^n banc 
majority's misreading of Solem, a mis-
reading that not only would result in 
transforming a vast region of the State 
of Utah into an Indian reservation, but 
also would threaten to have a similar 
effect throughout the Western States in 
other areas that are not now considered 
to be Indian reservations. Alrejady the 
Navajo Tribe of Indians, armed v^ ith the 
decision below, claims that 1.9 million 
acres in New Mexico, which were "restored 
to the public domain" in the early 1900fs, 
are nevertheless part of an Indiian reser-
vation because the en banc majority's 
decision here renders "unsound" the view ^g 
that such language ends reservation status. 
The case has potential ramifications that extend far 
39 beyond the immediate controversy in Utah. Ute is a 
critical juncture in the development of disestablishment 
case law. The Supreme Court, by granting certiorari, 
could seize the opportunity to provide needed clarification. 
CONCLUSION 
If congressional intent determinations in disestab-
lishment cases are to develop into a coherent body of 
law, two preconditions must be met. First, the Court must 
adopt and consistently apply a standard for statutory 
construction. The standard set forth in DeCoteau and 
Rosebud provides a ready model. Second, the Court must 
have access to necessary historical data if the standard 
adopted includes ''legislative history1' or "surrounding 
circumstances" elements. 
The second precondition can only be met if 
historians work with lawyers to compile, analyze, and 
explain the significance of historical data. The need 
is great for general research relating to the General 
Allotment Act, particularly the §5 surplus lands 
provisions. In other determinations, as well, 
historians can aid the courts in providihg a proper 
historical perspective for a fair adjudication of issues 
relating to Congressional intent. 
With proper historical guidance, Courts may be 
less tempted to adopt a literalist approach to statutory 
construction that can only deepen the state of confusion 
that typifies disestablishment adjudications of the recent 
past. 
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that is just what the Court has undertaken 
in this case. The result has been the per-
petuation of a cruel historieal hoax on 
thousands of innocent homesteaders and their 
descendants in the Cheyenne River area. 
These rangers and fanners now find themselves 
after the passage of many decadejs, suddenly 
thrust, into the unenviable statiis of residents 
of an Indian reservation, where their elected 
officials have only limited jurisdiction and 
where they have no effective voice in the gover-
nance of their affairs and property by tribal 
governments. 
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NATION 
A remote Utah community struggles with the confusing 
legacy of America's Indian reservation system. 
Outside the lumber store across the street from the small county courthouse in Duchesne, Utah, a sign gives the days prices on 
"Lay Mash, Hog Grow, Hen Scratch, 
Chick Starter and Turkey Feed." Nearby, 
a group of men discuss how they feel 
about living under "foreign" sovereignty. 
One insists that he is not really con-
cerned but adds, "If they push too hard, 
just let me put it this way, there is going 
to be a whole lot less of them soon." 
"Why are you worried?" asks another. 
"At least you got a paper from the Indians 
saying you paid them for the land. All I 
got is a paper from the Farm Bureau giv-
ing me my land. I may lose mine." 
"Those darn Indians got paid two or 
three times for that land," says a third 
angrily. "They got paid for it when Con-
gress took it and got paid again later. 
Now they got the land too." 
What happens when a sovereign coun-
try is reborn within the borders of the 
United States? For more than a hundred 
years, Congress, Presidents and the 
courts have left a legacy of doubt, a lega-
cy that has come home to Indian and 
non-Indian residents of the Uintah and 
Ouray Indian Reservation in northeast-
ern Utah. 
The reservation is located within tour 
sparsely populated counties—mostly 
Duchesne and Uintah Counties—in a 
large, bowl-shaped area in northeastern 
Utah. The bowl's rim is defined by jagged 
mountains that tower 13,000 feet high 
around an arid basin floor that is about 
4,200 feet above sea level. It takes about 
by Judy Jones 
three hours to drive to Duchesne from 
Salt Lake City, the state capital. The only 
road into the area passes by long stretch-
es of brown, wandering hills that harbor 
no visible life. 
The land in the basin is typical of the 
desert West. It is covered with faded gray 
sagebrush, tall pinyon pine, scrubby juni-
per trees and long, brown galleta grass. 
But, however desolute it may appear to 
the outsider, the area was used as hunt-
ing grounds by several bands of the I te 
Indian tribe before the white man ar-
rived in 1776. The area has been fought 
over ever since. 
Three million acres of reservation land 
were originally set aside for the Utes un 
der an executive order signed by Abra-j 
ham Lincoln on October 3. I Ho 1 On July 
14, 1905, however, Theodore Roosevelt 
declared that the land should be opened 
to entry, settlement and disposition un-
der the general provisions of the home 
stead and townsite laws of the United 
States"—an order that muddied reserva-
tion boundaries. When, in the 19 40s, 
over O^O.OOO acres were legally re 
turned to tribal jurisdiction, the Utes at 
last held title to one million undisputed 
acres of reservation territory' That situa-
tion lasted for 30 years, through several 
court disputes that often resulted in op-
posing decisions and failed to set a co-
herent legal precedent for settling Indian 
land cases. 
Then, in the mid-I9"()'s, the Indians 
A J J !4Q 
went to court, again, this time to reclaim 
all 3 million acres originally granted 
them by the Federal Government. After a 
decade of litigation, the 10th Circuit 
Court sided with the Utes l<a.st year, the 
Supreme Court refused to hear an appeal 
of the lower courts decision. 
Both Indians and non-Indians have re 
acted slowly to the court's decision The 
tribe has been excused from paying state 
sales and income taxes, and it has liberal 
ized tribal hunting rights to allow Indians 
to hunt the entire area, including Federal 
forest lands, throughout the year Aside 
from those steps, no major actions have 
been taken. 
But much more is possible As a mat 
ter of fact, a fact little known to most 
white Americans, the I S Constitution 
does stop at the border of most Indian 
reservations, but not because they arc 
islands of injustice.'" wrote the Indian 
newspaper. The I^ ikota Times, lax year 
"It stops because the Indian nations are 
sovereign Just as the I S Const mi don 
hxs no validity in Canada. Mexico IVru 
or in Europe, it is not the law of the land 
on the sovereign Indian nations 
Non-Indians in the affected area> seem 
uncertain about what that means NX an 
of outsiders who ask questions most \ o | 
unteer only that nothing ha> happened 
yet and won't concern them until it does 
Secretaries and clerks in the Dmhcsne 
County Courthouse glare at reporters 
and mumble that the recent ruling 
doesn't affect them at all "do a>k the 
Indians what they think the\ ,uot Dun 
ask them what they intend to do with it 
they repeat several times, finalU asking 
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to be left alone. 
But Ron Johnson, a salesman in Du-
chesne, expresses outrage. "How would 
you feel if the Russians came into New 
York City and took over?" he asks. "I am 
not going to leave. I am going to stay and 
fight, and they will not drive me out. If 
the whole town got up and left, I guess 
I'd go too. But before I left, I'd burn the 
town to the ground." 
Dave Bauman, a retired city worker 
who likes to hunt and fish and who is 
known locally as Santa Claus because of 
his long white beard, views the situation 
differently. "We can buy a permit to hunt 
and fish on their [Indian) land, which has 
the best hunting hereabouts." Bauman, 
whose wife, Lela, is part Indian, dismisses 
local talk about the Indians moving in 
and taking over. "They are not dumb and 
stupid like people think they are," he says 
of the Indians. "They have intelligent 
leaders running things. We don't expect 
any drastic changes." 
But reliable expectations—things 
you'd bet the farm on—are hard to come 
by here. Uncertainty is a kind of quick-
sand that the whole region has sunk into. 
No one really knows what to expect. For 
example, no one will lose their land, at 
least not outright. According to the court 
ruling, non-Indians who owned their 
land before the ruling still own it; the 
Indians cannot take land from any owner. 
It is possible, however, that through land 
use planning, environmental controls 
and control of water rights, the Indians 
could make the land literally unusable. 
I ndian government is quite different from American constitutional gov-ernment. Only about 450 of the 
2,500 tribal members on this reservation 
can register to vote. A voter must be 21 
years of age and meet residency and trib-
al blood requirements. The governing 
body for the Ute tribe, elected by tribal 
members, is a six-member Business 
Committee composed of two represent-
atives from each Ute band: the Uncom-
pahgres, the Uintahs and the White Riv-
ers. The six members then elect one 
committee member to serve as chair-
man. 
The present chairman, Lester Cha-
poose, a fatherly man with a political sci-
ence degree from the University of I tan, 
says the major benefit of the court deci-
sion, which made the Ute Reservation 
the second largest reservation in the na-
tion, was an increase of Indian authority 
over Indians. Before the Ute Law and Or-
der Code was passed in 1975, he says, 
"we had a tremendous amount of tres-
passing going on on this reservation that 
went unchecked." When the tribes en-
forcement officers took people to Justice 
cenr? 
Ihe non-Indians 
don't fault the Indians 
as much as the U.S. 
Government. They 
feel they should have 
the same civil rights 
as any other U.S. 
citizen. And yet 
they find themselvts 
a nation within a 
nation and a 
jurisdiction within 
jurisdiction." 
of the Peace courts, he adds, "in almost 
every instance the J.P court wouldj just 
throw it out. We didn't have any author-
ity at that time and we wanted to protect 
our own people Tribal members ir} the 
area of the reservation were subjected to 
incarceration in Duchesne or Koose|veIt, 
the non-Indian communities, and tpere 
was a lot of discrimination going on to 
get the tribe." 
But Tom Tobin, an attorney who rep-
resents the local governments and Who 
has specialized in Indian law for many 
years, believes that jurisdictional uncer-
tainties have made law enforcement 
more complicated. While county officers 
continue to have complete jurisdiction 
over the non-Indians and mixed bjood 
Indians, tribal members are now arretted 
and tried by tribal authorities TobiJi xs-
serts that even major crimes like murjder. 
which should be dealt with by Federal 
courts, could be handled in tribal courts 
where serious offenders could be lejt go 
without punishment. j 
Ron Crittendon, an aide to Utah Re-
publican Rep. Howard Nielson. is from 
the area now considered reservation He 
agrees that the present jurisdictional sit-
uation is complicated. "If it is Indian to 
Indian, the Indians handle it If it is ilon-
Ute tonon-Utc. then it clearly goes to the 
white man's court. If it is Indian dtul rion-
!>on-
l"hc 
f he 
Indian, then we just don't know 
tribal Indian gets to be a problem 
sheriffs have asked. How do 1 know 
is a Ute or not? Thev told them. Iff he 
looks like an Indian, he is an Indian and 
you gotta treat him that way." The prob-
lem with that logic is that mixed bloods 
are not members of the tribe nor are they 
considered Utes unless they have more 
than 50 percent Indian blood and at least 
1 percent Ute blood. 
There are other difficulties. The Busi-
ness Committee rules over the tribal ju-
dicial system. There is no separation of 
powers since tribal councils appoint trib-
al judges. If the Business Committee 
doesn't agree with a judge's decision, 
they simply remove the judge. A l i e 
judge was fired recently by the Ute Busi-
ness Committee when the judge de-
clared that a number of mixed blood In-
dians were in fact members of the tribe. 
At hearings for the U.S. Commission on 
Civil Rights held in Rapid City, S I ) , last 
year, many Indians complained about 
tribal justices lack of separation of pow-
ers. Agnes Bullickson, a formal tribal 
treasurer of the Yankton Sioux tribe, tes-
tified that she tried to keep records of 
tribal actions but got caught between 
two tribal factions, who burned, stole or 
otherwise misused her minutes She also 
claimed that when she protested against 
other tribal members trespassing on her 
land and removing truckloads of wood, 
tribal leaders tried to have her banished. 
An attorney who testified about several 
cases he had handled described one 
criminal case in which tribal leaders de-
nied a man bond simply because he was a 
resident of another reservation, and not 
because of the seriousness of his crime. 
Judge Bertha C. Two Bulls, an xvso-
ciate judge with the Pine Ridge Tribal 
Court, told the commission that the Indi-
an system doesn't work very well When 
asked to explain why, she said. Because 
of the same people being on the review 
boards and the grievance board And 
they are also commissioners ITie pe< > 
pie, you know, just give up after the first 
hearing because it takes so long, and thev 
have to just continually face the same 
people. They are all the same — the\ are 
the grievance committee and then thev 
are the commissioners.' I think that the 
Indian Civil Rights Act should be applied, 
and that it should be enforced, but m a 
lot of cases it applies to some and then it 
doesn't apply to anybody at all she said 
The hearing report is loaded with h«>r 
ror stories of abuses of Indians b\ other 
Indians—including police brutaht\ mb 
al groups fighting among themselves and 
verbal search warrants While tew MK h 
cases have been reported among the I te 
tribe, it is understandable that non huh 
ans, and especially part Indians art w«>r 
ried about the potential for mishandling 
of legal situations. 
The tribe's attornev, Ste\e l^»\iUn 
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maintains that the Indians are willing to 
negotiate with non- Indians to clear up 
confusion over the future of the affected 
areas. But Chapoose is less certain. "The 
question for the tribe," he says, "is going 
to come down to, Do you legislate away 
all the rights that you have gained? The 
point here is if we go out there and nego-
tiate with the state and come out losing 
more than what we should, then it is no 
good. We will have to look at the settle-
ment real closely to see that we do not 
give away this right that we have so long 
and hard fought to get in the first place." 
Dennis fckes, the first Deputy Director 
of the Office of Indian Rights in the Jus-
tice Department, believes that Congress 
should intervene. Ickes served as Deputy 
Undersecretary of the Interior and, al-
though he now represents Duchesne and 
Uintah counties as an attorney, he de-
scribes himself as a longtime friend of the 
Indians who does not want to deprive 
Indians their rights of self-governance. 
But, he says, Congress needs "to make 
adjustments in existing law so as to, on 
the one hand, protect and enhance tribal 
sovereignty and, on the other hand, bet-
ter protect the rights of individuals who 
are subject to that sovereignty." 
I ckes points to another cause of ap-prehension in the region—uncer-tainty over the tribes ability to tax. 
"Jurisdiction gives the power to tax," he 
says. "It is a little bit ironic that here you 
have taxation without representation— 
the tribe governing without any ability 
of the governed to participate in the 
levying of the taxes. It is latent power 
here. It is like the guy who has a gun 
pointed at you, got the hammer cocked 
and it is loaded with bullets. He says he is 
not going to pull the trigger. Yet the abili-
ty to do that is present." 
City and county officials worry aloud 
that if at some point the Indians decide to 
impose their own taxes, as they have on 
other reservations, the already de-
pressed area will be in dire straits. And 
non-Indians will have no right to vote on 
taxes, any more than they do on tribal 
leaders. 
The tax issue poses another prob-
lem—lost revenue. The court ruling 
brought 90 percent of Duchesne County 
and 60 percent of Uintah County within 
reservation boundaries. County officials 
express worry that their diminished tax 
base might hurt their ability to fund law 
enforcement as well as other vital gov-
ernment operations. 
The Senate Select Committee on Indi-
an Affairs has been holding hearings on 
the problems of taxation on reservations. 
The hearings have been held preliminary 
to consideration of a Senate bill that 
11 is a little bit 
ironic that here you 
have taxation without 
representation—the 
tribe governing 
without any ability of 
the governed to 
participate in the 
levying of the taxes." 
would impose a two-year moratorium on 
the implementation of any tribal taxes 
pending a study by a Presidential com-
mission— in exchange for an aid package 
to the Indians of over 1400 million to 
alleviate economic and social hardships 
caused by the moratorium. 
Attorney Tobin charges that Sen. John 
Melcher (D-Mont.) is using these hear-
ings to make political points back home. 
"To my way of thinking," he says, "it 
would have been better to hold a bill on 
taxation in the first place and decide 
whether Congress had historically ever 
intended that anything like that would 
result. He holds the hearings as though 
maybe they have the rights, but we want 
to see the ramifications. They vote $400 
million for the tribes for interim relief 
since they are going to be deprived of 
this important right." 
Attornies in the case do not agree on 
what the best solution to the problem is. 
Ickes would like to see Congress leave 
the reservation boundaries alone, let the 
Indians have full jurisdiction over their 
own and let the non-Indians have juris-
diction over their people and properties. 
Tobin says the best answer is to have 
Congress pass a law recognizing the orig-
inal Congressional intent of leaving tribal 
members on tribal property—which he 
defines as the original one million acres 
Indian attorney Boyden would like to see 
both sides work out a solution together 
and then have Congress set that agree-
ment in stone. 
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The courts have been unable to re-
solve the issue in any consistent fashion 
because they cannot agree on what Con-
gress originally intended to be the fate of 
the Indian reservations. Crittenden, his 
folksy, country speech turning suddenly 
to fire, maintains that the 10th Circuit 
court decision completely ignored Con-
gress's intentions, i t was the Congress 
during that period of time [early 20th 
century] that was trying to terminate the 
reservations and turn Indians into regu-
lar folks," he says. "To try and say that 
they didn't mean to is ludicrious. The 
courts have decided it wasn't right to do 
this to the Indians, so they are saying that 
Congress didn't mean to do that [termi-
nate the reservations]. That's legislating 
in my mind. I think the 10th Circuit 
Court did that." 
D id the Federal Government, and Congress in particular, intend originally to do away with reser-
vations? Probably. Is that what Congress 
wants today? Probably not. But some 
clarification of the laws intent is clearly 
necessary to prevent communities like 
this one in Utah from sinking further into 
a quagmire of uncertainty. Still, no deci-
sive action appears forthcoming. 
Sen. Jake Gam (R-Utah) has promised 
to at least hold Senate hearings, if that is 
what local officials want. But Gam's staff 
say they have not heard from the coun-
ties in months. County government at-
tornies say that the local people are not 
able to finance lobbying efforts, while 
the Indians have a well-financed and 
well-organized Washington lobbying 
group. "The problem here is that Con-
gress does not work well without hear-
ing both sides of a question," declares 
Tobin. 
Nielson, who represents the area, said 
he believes that "the time is right for 
cooperation between the Indians and the 
non-Indians." But Nielson has not been 
willing to press for any type of Congres-
sional action because he does not think 
Washington leaders would be interested 
in dealing with Indian problems buried 
in a Western desert. 
Crittenden says that another reason 
Nielson isn't trying to get Congress to do 
anything at present is fear that it would 
stop the parties involved from talking to 
each other. "If we just say, Hey, were 
going to go to Congress and were going 
to go to court and were going to beat 
you red-blooded pot lickers, we're not 
going to. The non-Indians don't fault the 
Indians as much as the U.S. Government. 
The land was opened up, and they went 
out there in g(x>d faith. They feel they 
should have the same civil rights as any 
other U.S. citizen. And yet tpey find 
themselves a nation within a nation and a 
jurisdiction within a jurisdiction.'' 
"If it keeps going like this," added for-
mer Duchesne County Commission 
chairman Ted Kappen, "we could ail end 
up back on Plymouth Rock with the rest 
of the country owned by the Indians. 
Let's face it, the Indians owned every-
thing before we got here and this deci-
sion implies we should give it all back. 
but other Westerners doubt that 
happen. They are more inclined to a 
with Nielson that Congress just isn' 
terested in the problems of a remote 
sert community. Nobody cares al 
18,000 people living in the middle 
Utah desert," says one non-Indian i 
dent. "You can bet that if it were Man 
tan the courts had given over to the I 
ans, something would be done fast." 
Judy Jones is an investigative repo 
for a Utah magazine. 
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